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Executive summary
Finland signed on 20 September 1994 the Convention on Nuclear Safety which was 
adopted on 17 June 1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference. The Convention was 
ratified on 5 January 1996, and it came into force in Finland on 24 October 1996. This 
report is the Finnish National Report for the Seventh Review Meeting in March/April 2017.
There are two nuclear power plants operating in Finland: the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. 
The Loviisa plant comprises of two PWR units (pressurised water reactors, of VVER type), 
operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy, and the Olkiluoto plant two BWR units (boiling 
water reactors), operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oyj. In addition, a new nuclear power 
plant unit (PWR) is under construction at the Olkiluoto site. At both sites there are interim 
storages for spent fuel as well as disposal facilities for low and intermediate level nuclear 
wastes. Posiva, a joint company by Fortum and TVO, submitted a construction licence 
application for the spent nuclear fuel repository in the end of 2012. The construction licence 
was granted for Posiva by the Government in November 2015. 
Finland is currently reviewing a construction licence application for Fennovoima Hanhikivi 
unit 1 in Pyhäjoki (VVER type design). Since the review is underway, Hanhikivi unit 1 is 
discussed in this report mainly with regard to the licensing process and siting (see Articles 
7 and 17 and Annex 5).
Furthermore, there is a Triga Mark II research reactor, FiR 1 in Espoo licensed to VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd. The operating licence for the research reactor 
FiR 1 is valid until the end of 2023. However, VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland 
Ltd has decided to shut down and decommission the reactor earlier due to economical 
reasons. This will be the first decommissioned nuclear facility in Finland representing a 
new challenge for the utility and the regulatory body.
In this report, latest development in the various topics of the Convention on Nuclear Safety 
is described. Major safety reviews and plant modernisations are explained including safety 
assessment methods and key results. Safety performance of the Finnish nuclear power 
plants is also presented by using representative indicators. Finnish regulatory practices in 
licensing, provision of regulatory guidance, safety assessment, inspection and enforcement 
are also covered. 
Major developments in Finland since the Sixth Review Meeting are as follows: updating 
of legislative and regulatory framework, implementation of the renewed regulatory guides 
at the operating nuclear power plants completed, periodic safety review carried out at the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant in 2015-2016, and IRRS follow-up mission (IAEA’s Integrated 
Regulatory Review Service) carried out in Finland. Furthermore, construction of the new 
nuclear power plant unit continued and progressed to the operating licence phase, one 
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new unit has entered into construction licence phase and construction licence for Olkiluoto 
Spent Nuclear Fuel encapsulation and disposal facility was granted. Latest development in 
the various topics of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is described in relevant articles.
Finland continues the hosting and participation in the international peer reviews and 
the Government of Finland has requested the IAEA to carry out four OSART missions in 
Finland between 2017–2022:
•	 Olkiluoto 1&2 OSART mission will be conducted from 27 February until 16 March 2017
•	 Loviisa NPP OSART mission would take place in March 2018.
•	 Pre-Operational OSART mission for Olkiluoto 3 before the first fuel loading (according 
to current schedule in April 2018)
•	 Pre-Operational OSART mission for Fennovoima (Hanhikivi unit 1) would take place in 
2022.
In the report, the implementation of each of the Articles 6 to 19 of the Convention is 
separately evaluated. Based on the evaluation, the following features emphasising Finnish 
safety management practices in the field of nuclear safety can be concluded:
•	 During the recent years Finnish legislation and regulatory guidance have been further 
developed and the revision of regulatory guide system was finalised in 2013. The overall 
revision of the regulatory guides took into account international guidance such as 
IAEA safety standards and WENRA (Western European Regulators’ Association) safety 
reference levels for existing reactors and safety objectives for new reactors. In addition, 
the lessons learnt from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident are taken into 
account. No deviation from the convention obligations has been identified in the Finnish 
regulatory infrastructure including nuclear and radiation safety regulations.
•	 The revised regulatory guides were published at the end of 2013. The revised guides are 
applied as such for new nuclear facilities. For the existing facilities and facilities under 
construction separate facility specific implementation decisions are made. In the end of 
2014 the licensees of operating NPPs submitted to STUK assessments on the fulfilment 
of the revised regulatory guides. In 2015, STUK evaluated the assessments and made 
decisions on how to further improve safety. Regular update and implementation of 
regulatory guides, particularly with regard to nuclear power plants in operation, are 
unique measures on the international perspective.
•	 The licensees have shown good safety performance and rigorous safety management 
practices in carrying out their safety related responsibilities in the operation and 
modernisation of existing NPPs. During recent years, only minor operational events 
(INES 1 and below) have taken place and no major safety problems have appeared. 
The licensees’ practices are considered to comply with the Convention obligations.
•	 Safety assessment is a continuous process and living full scope level 1 and 2 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practices are effectively used for the further 
development of safety. Periodic safety review of the Loviisa plant was carried out in 
2015–2016, and the periodic safety review of the Olkiluoto plant was carried out in 
2007–2009. The decisions how to apply the revised regulatory guides at the operating 
NPPs were made by STUK in 2015. Several plant modifications have been carried out at 
the operating NPPs during the recent years to further improve the safety. Some of these 
modifications are originating from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. 
•	 The resources of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) have been 
increased to meet the needs to oversee the construction of the new plants in Finland. 
The reports of the recent IRRS mission and follow-up mission have been published on 
STUK’s website and mission results have been and will be used to further improve 
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regulatory guidance and practices. VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd 
supports effectively the regulatory body in the safety assessment work providing safety 
analysis capabilities and tools and performing safety analyses. There are also national 
research programmes which support and develop the competencies in nuclear safety 
and waste management of VTT as well as in the universities participating in the 
research programmes.
•	 The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2015. The Act was revised to broaden STUK’s 
legal mandate to issue binding regulations. This was one of the recommendations from 
IRRS mission to Finland in 2012. Based on the amended Act, STUK published the new 
binding regulations concerning nuclear safety, security, emergency preparedness and 
waste management, as well as uranium and thorium mining in the beginning of 2016. 
Furthermore, based on changes in the Act the Government has to take into account the 
proposals included in the STUK’s statements when considering the conditions of the 
Decision-in-Principle and licences for nuclear facilities.
•	 In January 2013 the Ministry of Employment and the Economy set up a working group 
to prepare a research and development strategy for the safe use of nuclear energy. The 
working group emphasized the importance of the research in the competence building. 
The Ministry of the Employment and Economy has started the implementation of the 
recommendations. In 2015 the Nuclear Energy Act was changed to ensure the financing 
for the enhancement of the nuclear safety research infrastructure. 
The Sixth Review Meeting in 2014 identified some challenges and recorded some planned 
measures to improve nuclear safety in Finland. These issues are included and responded 
in this seventh national report of Finland. Some of these topics are discussed also below. 
These items were (in brackets the Articles, in which the issues are addressed):
•	 regulatory oversight of existing NPP’s: ageing management (see Article 14)
•	 challenges in new NPP construction project (Olkiluoto unit 3); oversight of contractors 
and subcontractors, operating licence application review, digital I&C  
(see Articles 10, 11, 12, 13, 18 and Annex 4)
•	 preparation for the new build (see Annex 5)
•	 maintaining and improving competence and responding to the growing needs for 
professional staff (see Articles 8 and 11)
•	 continuous improvement of plant design: natural hazards, ultimate heat sink, I&C, 
electrical systems, spent fuel storage, emergency control room, replacement of diesel 
generators (see Articles 14, 17, 18 and Annexes 2, 3 and 4)
•	 implementation of the action plan based on IRRS findings 2012, and follow-up IRRS 
mission in June 2015 (see Articles 7, 8, 10, 13, and Annex 6).
Still some of these issues require further development to enhance safety, i.e., including 
provision for plant ageing, reliability and safety demonstration of digital I&C and 
management of competence taking into account the new build projects and retirement of 
experts. Other important issues cover new technologies, security arrangements and the 
growing need for new research and development programmes. These are generic issues 
that require international attention in all countries using nuclear energy.
Implementation of the updated ageing management requirements is underway for NPPs 
in operation and some specific challenges to fulfil these requirements have been met. For 
instance the revised regulatory guide has a requirement on the availability and operability 
as well as monitoring the condition of spare parts. Inspections have revealed that the 
amount of spare parts can be inadequate for keeping the plant in a safe state also during 
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prolonged transients and accidents, and that some of the spare parts in the storage have 
either aged or obsoleted. Another challenge has to do with knowledge and resources 
allocated for ensuring appropriate ageing management programme at NPPs. Inspections 
have revealed that the licensees have challenges to implement knowledge management 
to ensure that in the event of personnel changes information and knowledge necessary 
for discharging the duties involved is transferred to the successors. Additional challenge 
is to conduct relevant research to both educate personnel and to identify new ageing 
mechanisms to develop new inspection or monitoring technologies to detect degradation 
early enough.
The expected lifetime of the existing nuclear power plants requires renewal of systems, 
structures and components and modernisation of technologies. The regulation of the 
existing nuclear power plants emphasises the management of ageing and the quality of 
plant operations. The modernisation of I&C and other systems at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plants are either undergoing or under planning, and therefore extra care is needed to 
ensure that operational safety will be maintained notwithstanding the plant modifications. 
Operating experience has shown that special attention has to be paid on the meticulous 
planning and controlled implementation and testing of the plant modifications and STUK 
is following this in its regulatory inspections.
A generic lesson learned in Finland is that the closer nuclear power plants get to the end of 
their design lifetime, especially due to the current market price of electricity, more difficult 
it is for the licensees to make decisions to modernise or modify the NPPs. Instead of 
renewing a system or a component, modernisation may be rejected or a partial modification 
is planned resulting in ageing issues in the remaining parts. Finland has successfully 
applied periodic safety reviews (PSR) for the operating NPPs. Practice has been that the 
licensee is obliged to demonstrate that the safety of the operations can be ensured and 
improved also during the next 10 years, and to do that the licensee has to commit to make 
safety improvements including major modernisations to address ageing of SSCs.
The retirement of large age groups in Finland has been affecting public administration 
and industry throughout, including STUK, utilities and the spent fuel management 
company Posiva as well as organisations providing technical support and education to 
them. The plans for a new NPP construction project and the above mentioned challenges 
and activities require additional resources and efforts from the nuclear power utilities 
and regulatory body as well as from technical support organisations. Thus, ensuring an 
adequate national supply of experts in nuclear science and technology and ensuring high 
quality research infrastructure are continuous challenges in Finland. For the moment, 
STUK has adequate resources to fulfil its oversight responsibilities. However, resources 
used for developing STUK’s own activities may be considered to be occasionally insufficient.
The Government has been decreasing STUK’s budget during the past years mostly due to 
reorganisation of funding and conduct of research in the government organisations. While 
oversight activities are charged in full from the licensees and nuclear safety research 
programmes are funded via waste management fund, budget cuts have not impacted the 
nuclear safety research or resources needed for the regulated activities. However, due to 
budget cuts STUK has partly terminated and also decreased significantly its radiation 
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safety research (e.g. biological effects of radiation, biodosimetry). Since radiation safety 
research activities have been contributing to the maintenance and development of know 
how in Finland, STUK has established a national radiation safety research programme in 
co-operation with all universities in Finland to ensure that radiation safety research will 
be continued in Finland.
Since the interest in nuclear power in Finland is increasing, communication and 
information sharing with media and the general public on nuclear and radiation safety 
has become an increasingly important success factor for STUK and utilities. Regulatory 
processes and decisions have to be clear and understandable to general public. Due to 
the challenge, STUK has initiated a strategic communication development project in 
spring 2016 to address both changing communication environment and the use of modern 
communication tools. In addition, STUK has also initiated a project to develop its crisis 
communication capabilities. This work is based on the experience on recent events as well 
as past emergency exercises.
Actions taken as a result of the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident
Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant on the 11th of 
March in 2011 (TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident), safety assessments were initiated 
in Finland immediately. In order to ensure nuclear safety, the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy requested STUK to carry out a study on how the Finnish NPPs have 
prepared against prolonged losses of electric power supply and ultimate heat sink and 
extreme natural phenomena. Based on the results of the assessments conducted in 
Finland, it was concluded that no such hazards or deficiencies have been found that would 
require immediate actions at the Finnish NPPs. However, areas where nuclear safety can 
further be enhanced were identified, and accordingly, Finnish National Action Plan how 
to address these areas was created. The experiences from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident were also addressed in the renewed regulation and Finnish Regulatory Guides 
(YVL Guides) and in the nuclear safety research programme (SAFIR), see Articles 7 and 8.
In addition to the periodic safety reviews carried out for the nuclear power plants, an 
extraordinary review of site related issues was performed after the TEPCO Fukushima 
Dai-ichi accident in connection with the so called European stress tests. Assessment of 
the safety margins and effects of exceeding the design basis values have been available 
and utilised for all identified relevant hazards (including extreme weather conditions) in 
connection with external events probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) which are mandatory 
for the Finnish NPPs. The stress tests did not reveal any new site-related external hazards 
or vulnerabilities of the plants to external events. No need for immediate action was 
recognised, but some additional studies of external hazards and feasibility studies for 
plant modifications to improve robustness against external events were found justified 
(see Article 17). The following examples of safety improvements and additional analyses of 
external events can be mentioned: enhanced protection against high seawater level at the 
Loviisa NPP, detailed structural analysis of spent fuel pools to demonstrate integrity of 
the pools in the case of an earthquake with consequential boiling in the pools and seismic 
walk-downs of the fire extinguishing water system at the Olkiluoto NPP following with 
some improvement measures.
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The systems needed for residual heat removal from the reactor, containment and spent 
fuel pools require external power at both Finnish NPPs. At both sites, the ultimate heat 
sink is the sea. A reliable supply of electrical power to the systems providing for basic 
safety functions at the Finnish NPPs is ensured by the Defence-in-Depth (DiD) concept. 
As a result of multiple and diversified electrical power sources at different DiD levels, the 
probability of loss of all electrical supply systems is considered very low at the Finnish 
NPPs. However, as a result of the studies made after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident, further changes are under planning or implemented at the both NPPs (see 
Articles 6 and 18). For example at the Loviisa NPP  the independent air-cooled cooling 
units have been installed for decay heat removal from the reactor core and from the spent 
fuel pools in case of the loss of sea as an ultimate heat sink. These cooling units were 
considered already before the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident due to the increased 
risks related to transporting of oil on the Finnish Gulf. Safety improvements at the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 include ensuring cooling of the reactor core in case of total loss of 
AC systems, ensuring operation of the auxiliary feed water system pumps independently 
of availability of the sea water systems, and diverse cooling of the spent fuel pools. 
The emergency diesel generators will be replaced within the next few years. The new 
emergency diesel generators will be provided with alternative air and seawater cooling, 
while the existing diesels have only seawater cooling.
A comprehensive severe accident management (SAM) strategy has been developed and 
implemented at the operating Finnish NPPs during 1980’s and 1990’s after the accidents 
in TMI and Chernobyl (see Annexes 2 and 3). These strategies are based on ensuring 
the containment integrity which is required in the existing national regulations. STUK 
has reviewed these strategies and has made inspections in all stages of implementation. 
As a result of the studies made after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, no 
major changes at the plants are considered necessary for severe accident management. 
However, the licensees are expected to consider ensuring the cooling of spent fuel pools 
in the SAM procedures (see Article 19). In addition, there are many actions related to the 
update of the emergency plans (see Article 16). Both NPPs were required to clarify and 
update their emergency preparedness plans with respect to issues like the possibility of 
several reactor units’ simultaneous accident, evaluation of the number and the suitability 
of emergency response personnel to their duties, management of access control and 
contamination control in the case when the normal arrangements are out of function and 
restoring the access routes and connections to the site in case of massive destruction of the 
infrastructure. 
Concerning the off-site emergency preparedness and response (see Article 16), no needs 
for major changes were identified. However, some improvements were identified and 
implemented that are for instance improved accessibility to the site in case of extreme 
natural hazards, ensured sufficient amount of radiation protection equipment and 
radiation monitoring capabilities for rescue services and improved the communication 
arrangements between emergency centers of NPPs, STUK, and Rescue Service.  In 
2014 Loviisa NPP exercised for the first time a two reactor unit’s simultaneous accident 
scenario. Furthermore, during the national full command post exercise OLKI-14 actions 
and decision making of the intermediate phase of the severe accident were exercised for the 
first time.
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Most of the Fukushima Dai-ichi related safety improvements presented in the Finnish 
national action plan have already been implemented. A few ongoing measures will still 
be completed in the next few years. Further information related to the actions taken 
in Finland following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant are 
described in more detail under Articles 16, 17, 18, 19 and Annexes 2, 3 and 4.
The challenges identified by the Special Rapporteur in the Sixth Review Meeting
How to minimize gaps between Contracting Parties’ safety improvements? The Finnish 
policy is to participate actively in the international work on developing safety standards 
and adopt or adapt the new safety requirements into national regulations. STUK 
participated WENRA’s work on the update of the Safety Reference Levels after the 
Fukushima accident and most of the updated Reference Levels were already taken into 
account in the finalisation of the revised YVL guides. In addition, Finland has bilateral 
agreements with several foreign countries and regulatory bodies. See more details under 
Article 7 and Annexes 2, 3 and 6.
How to achieve harmonized emergency plans and response measures? Nordic countries 
have published two joint documents that detail the cooperation arrangements in case of 
an radiological emergency. Nordic Manual and Nordic Flag Book ensure that the response 
to any nuclear or radiological emergency in Nordic countries is harmonised and consistent 
between the countries. Furthermore, Finland participates actively in the international co-
operation in the field of emergency preparedness, such as IAEA, OECD/NEA and EU/EC 
(WENRA and HERCA). See more details under Article 16.
How to make better use of operating and regulatory experience, and international peer 
review services? Finland supports activities to improve peer review services and has 
participated in the development of IAEA’s peer review services (e.g. IRRS, IPPAS and 
the OSART missions). Finland continues both hosting and providing experts to the 
international peer reviews. The latest peer reviews in Finland are described in Annex 6. 
STUK has also participated in co-operation between international organisations such as 
the IAEA, the OECD/NEA and the EU (Clearinghouse), which exchange information on 
safety issues, operating events and regulatory experience. Other forums that STUK uses 
to obtain information are WENRA, MDEP and its working groups, the VVER Regulators’ 
Forum as well as some bilateral agreements. See more details under Articles 8 and 19 and 
Annex 6. 
How to improve regulators’ independence, safety culture, transparency and openness? The 
regulatory control of the safe use of radiation and nuclear energy is independently carried 
out by STUK. STUK’s role and responsibilities have been assessed by a peer reviews (IRRT 
mission in 2001, follow-up in 2003 and IRRS mission in 2012, follow-up in 2015). STUK’s 
Safety and Quality Policy was fully renewed in 2014 as a result of the recommendation 
from the IRRS mission. STUK has also updated its management system and included self-
assessment of safety culture into annual self-assessment programme. The IRRS mission 
also recommended that the Government should seek to modify the Nuclear Energy Act 
so that the law clearly and unambiguously stipulates STUK’s legal authorities in the 
authorisation process for safety. Based on the recommendation, the Act was amended in 
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2015 to broaden STUK’s legal mandate to issue binding regulations. Furthermore, the 
Government has to take into account the proposals included in the STUK’s statements 
when considering the conditions of the Decision-in-Principle and licences for nuclear 
facilities. See more details under Articles 8 and 10.
How to engage all countries to commit and participate in international cooperation? 
STUK participates in international cooperation in several working groups of the IAEA, 
the OECD/NEA and the EU. For example, the OECD/NEA/CNRA working groups WGOE 
(Operating Experience) and WGRNR (Regulation of New Reactors) improve nuclear safety 
by sharing experience and lessons learnt from nuclear installations in operation and under 
construction. Other forums that STUK uses to obtain information are WENRA, MDEP and 
its working groups, the VVER Regulators’ Forum as well as some bilateral agreements. 
For example, exchange of information between Rostechnadzor and STUK on the operation 
of the Kola and Leningrad nuclear power plants and of Finnish nuclear power plants is 
an ongoing activity. The similar information exchange is arranged also to Sweden (SSM) 
and France (ASN). Furthermore, Finland has bilateral agreements with Sweden, Norway, 
Russia, Ukraine, Denmark and Germany on early notification of nuclear or radiological 
emergencies and exchange of information on nuclear facilities. In addition, STUK has 
bilateral arrangements with several foreign regulatory bodies, which cover generally the 
exchange of information on safety regulations, operational experiences, waste management 
etc. Such an arrangement have been made with NRC (USA),  ASN (France), FANR (United 
Arab Emirates), NSSC and KINS (Republic of Korea), TAEK (Turkey), ENSI (Switzerland), 
SUJB (Czech Republic), Rostechnadzor (Russian Federation), CNSC (Canada), AERB 
(India), ONR (Great Britain), HAEA (Hungary), NNR (South Africa), NRA (Japan) and 
SSM (Sweden). STUK has also formed a strategic partnership with King Abdullah City for 
Atomic and Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE) to develop the necessary infrastructure for the 
establishment of a national authority dedicated to regulate and monitor nuclear safety in 
Saudi Arabia. See more details under Annex 6.
Consideration of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety
The Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety was adopted by the Contracting Parties by 
consensus at the Diplomatic Conference on 9 February 2015. The Vienna Declaration 
contains three principles to guide the Contracting Parties. 
The first principle concerning the safety goal for new nuclear power plant design, siting, 
construction and operation is included in the Finnish regulations (see Articles 17 and 
18). Furthermore, the Nuclear Energy Decree stipulates that the release of radioactive 
substances arising from a severe accident at a nuclear power plant shall not necessitate 
large scale protective measures for the population nor any long-term restrictions on the 
use of extensive areas of land and water. In order to limit the long term effects, the limit for 
atmospheric releases of cesium-137 is 100 terabecquerel. The possibility of exceeding the 
set limit and of a release in the early stages of an accident requiring measures to protect 
the population shall be extremely small.
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Regarding the second principle, on the implementation of safety improvements at the 
operating NPPs to meet, as far as reasonably practicable, the safety goal of the first 
principle, Finnish regulations state that periodic safety review (PSR) shall be conducted 
at least every ten years. In addition, the Nuclear Energy Act states that the safety shall be 
maintained as high as practically possible and for further development of safety, measures 
shall be implemented that can be considered justified considering operating experience 
and safety research and advances in science and technology. Hence, the implementation 
of safety improvements has been a continuing process at both Finnish NPPs since their 
commissioning. The most significant plant modifications and modernisation projects 
carried out at the Finnish NPPs during the plant life time including backfitting of severe 
accident management systems during 1980’s and 1990’s are described in Annexes 2 and 3. 
Regarding the third principle of the Vienna Declaration requiring that national regulations 
need to take into account the relevant IAEA safety standards and, as appropriate, other 
good practices, the Finnish nuclear safety regulations are regularly updated taking into 
account operating and construction experience, safety research and advances in science 
and technology. The overall revision of the regulatory guides in end of 2013 took into 
account international guidance (e.g. IAEA safety standards and WENRA safety reference 
levels) and the lessons learnt from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.
In conclusion, Finland has implemented the obligations of the Convention and also the 
objectives of the Convention, including the principles of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear 
Safety, are complied with. Safety improvements have been implemented at the Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto plants since their commissioning. Legislation and regulatory guidance have 
been further developed. Additional safety assessments and implementation plans for safety 
improvements have been made at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants based on the lessons 
learnt from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. IRRS mission (IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory 
Review Team) was carried out in October 2012 and the follow-up mission in 2015. STUK 
has been implementing its action plan for improvement on the basis of the IRRS missions 
results and the self-assessment. There exists no urgent need for additional improvements 
to upgrade the safety of the Finnish nuclear power plants in the context of the Convention.
12
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Finland signed on 20 September 1994 the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety which was adopt-
ed on 17 June 1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference. The Convention was ratified on 5 
January 1996, and it came into force in Finland 
on 24 October 1996. This report is the Finnish 
National Report for the Seventh Review Meeting 
in March/April 2017.
In Chapter 2 of this report, the measures relat-
ed to each of the Articles 6 to 19 of the Convention 
are separately evaluated. The evaluation is based 
on the Finnish legislation and regulations as well 
as on the situation at the Finnish nuclear power 
plants. The reference is made to the IAEA Safety 
Requirements and other safety standards as ap-
propriate. IAEA’s Information Circular 572, Rev. 5, 
16 January 2015, was used as a guideline for the 
context of the report. Furthermore, the guidance 
“Additional Recommendations for the Preparation 
of National Reports” prepared by the 6th Review 
Meeting President has been taken into account.
In the report, latest safety reviews and plant 
1 Introduction
modernisations are explained in detail including 
safety assessment methods and key results. Safety 
performance of Finnish nuclear power plants is 
also presented by using representative indicators. 
The actions taken with regard to lessons learnt 
from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident 
are discussed under applicable Articles. Finnish 
regulatory practices in licensing, provision of regu-
latory guidance, safety assessment, inspection and 
enforcement are also covered in detail. The results 
of the latest IRRS mission (IAEA’s Integrated 
Regulatory Review Service) and the follow-up mis-
sion carried out in Finland in October 2012 and 
in June 2015 are described under Article 8 and 
detailed actions related to recommendations and 
suggestions under applicable Articles.
This seventh National Report is aimed to be a 
stand-alone document and does not require famil-
iarisation with the earlier reports. The fulfilment 
of the obligations of the Convention is described in 
general and the latest development since the Sixth 
Review Meeting is specifically described.
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2 Compliance with Articles 6 to 19 
– Article-by-article review
Article 6. Existing nuclear installations
Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that the safety of 
nuclear installations existing at the time 
the Convention enters into force for that 
Contracting Party is reviewed as soon as pos-
sible. When necessary in the context of this 
Convention, the Contracting Party shall en-
sure that all reasonably practicable improve-
ments are made as a matter of urgency to 
upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. 
If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans 
should be implemented to shut down the nu-
clear installation as soon as practically possi-
ble. The timing of the shut-down may take into 
account the whole energy context and possible 
alternatives as well as the social, environmen-
tal and economic impact.
In Finland, there are presently two nuclear 
power plants: the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. 
The Loviisa plant comprises of two PWR units 
(pressurised water reactors, of VVER type), oper-
ated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum), and 
the Olkiluoto plant of two BWR units operated by 
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO). TVO is construct-
ing a new plant unit of nominal reactor thermal 
power 4300 MW at the Olkiluoto site (Olkiluoto 
unit 3). At both sites there are fresh and spent 
fuel storage facilities, and facilities for storage 
and treatment of low and intermediate level ra-
dioactive wastes. Other existing nuclear installa-
tions in Finland are the repositories for low and 
intermediate level nuclear waste at the Olkiluoto 
and Loviisa plant sites. The disposal facility at 
Olkiluoto was taken into operation in 1992 and the 
facility at Loviisa in 1998.
Construction licence application for the fifth nu-
clear power plant unit in Finland on the Olkiluoto 
site was submitted by TVO to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (predecessor of the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy) in January 2004. 
The new unit, Olkiluoto 3 is a 1600 MWe European 
Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR), the design of 
which is based on the French N4 and German 
Konvoi type PWR’s. Commissioning work is pres-
ently under way and TVO submitted operating 
licence application to the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy in April 2016.
For taking care of the spent fuel disposal, a joint 
company Posiva Oy has been established in 1995 
by Fortum and TVO. Research, development and 
planning work as well as construction for spent 
fuel disposal are in progress and the disposal facil-
ity is envisaged to be operational in early 2020’s. 
The Decision-in-Principle (DiP) on the spent fuel 
disposal facility in deep crystalline bedrock was 
made by the Government in 2000 and ratified by 
the Parliament in 2001. In the connection of ap-
proving the DiP in May 2002 for the construction of 
the fifth power reactor in Finland, the Parliament 
also approved the DiP for expanding the capac-
ity of the planned spent fuel disposal facility 
in Olkiluoto to also include the spent fuel from 
this new reactor unit. The repository will be con-
structed in the vicinity of the Olkiluoto NPP site. 
To confirm the suitability of the site, construction 
of an underground rock characterisation facility 
(ONKALO) was commenced in 2004. The excava-
tion of ONKALO was almost completed during 
2015, but some extensions will be excavated dur-
ing 2016. Posiva submitted a construction licence 
application for the spent nuclear fuel facility to 
the Ministry of Employment and Economy in the 
end of 2012. The detailed technical documentation 
of the application was reviewed by STUK during 
2013-2014 and based on the review STUK gave a 
statement and safety assessment for the Ministry 
of Employment and Economy in February 2015. 
The construction licence was granted for Posiva by 
the Government in November 2015.
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Finland is currently reviewing a construction li-
cence application for Fennovoima’s NPP in Pyhäjoki. 
According to the set dead line in DiP, Fennovoima 
filed a construction licence application for Hanhikivi 
unit 1 (ROSATOM AES-2006 plant design) in June 
2015 to the Government and submitted according to 
the Nuclear Energy Decree safety, security and safe-
guards documentation to STUK for regulatory re-
view and assessment. It was noted that Fennovoima 
was not able to submit a complete licensing docu-
mentation to the regulatory review and assessment 
at same time. Fennovoima will complement its docu-
mentation during the years 2015-2017 according to 
a licensing plan. The Government has requested 
STUK to give its statement and safety assessment 
during the year 2017, if possible (see more details 
under Annex 5).
Finland observes the principles of the 
Convention, when applicable, also in other uses 
of nuclear energy than nuclear power plants, e.g. 
in the use of a research reactor. In Finland, there 
is one TRIGA Mark II research reactor (250 kW), 
FiR 1, situated in Espoo. The research reactor 
was taken into operation in 1962, and it is oper-
ated by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland 
Ltd (VTT). In 2012, VTT decided to commence the 
activities related to the planning of the decommis-
sioning of the research reactor due to economical 
reasons. The preparation of the programme for the 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure 
for the decommissioning of FiR 1 was started in 
May 2013 and the EIA programme was submitted 
to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
in November 2013. STUK submitted a statement 
on the EIA programme to the Ministry in January 
2014. Based on the EIA programme, VTT prepared 
an EIA report, and STUK issued its statement on 
the report in December 2014. In its statements, 
STUK paid special attention to more specific plan-
ning of the demolition and more specific planning 
of nuclear waste management during the decom-
missioning stage. In April 2015 STUK gave a state-
ment on VTT’s action plan for the permanent shut 
down of FiR 1. The reactor was then permanently 
shut down in the end of June 2015. VTT is plan-
ning to apply for an updated operating license for 
the decommissioning of FiR 1 by 2017. This will 
be the first decommissioned nuclear facility in 
Finland representing a new challenge for the util-
ity and the regulatory body.
In Finland, the continuous safety assessment 
and enhancement approach is presented in the 
nuclear legislation. Nuclear Energy Act states that 
the safety of nuclear energy use shall be maintained 
at as high a level as practically possible. For the 
further development of safety, measures shall be 
implemented that can be considered justified con-
sidering operating experience and safety research 
and advances in science and technology. The im-
plementation of safety improvements has been a 
continuing process at both Finnish nuclear power 
plants since their commissioning and there ex-
ists no urgent need to upgrade the safety of these 
plants in the context of the Convention, or Vienna 
Declaration on Nuclear Safety.
Loviisa NPP units 1 and 2
The reactor units at the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant were connected to the electrical grid in 
February 8, 1977 (Loviisa 1) and November 4, 1980 
(Loviisa 2). The nominal thermal power of both of 
the Loviisa units is 1500 MW (109% as compared 
to the original power of 1375 MW). The increase of 
the power level was implemented and licensed in 
1998.
The operating licences of the units are valid 
until the end of 2027 (unit 1) and 2030 (unit 2). The 
relicensing of the plant took place in 2005–2007. 
The Loviisa plant reached its original design age 
in 2007–2010, but the technical, safe and economi-
cal lifetime of the plant is estimated to be at least 
50 years according to the current knowledge of 
the plant ageing. The review was completed in 
July 2007 when STUK provided the Ministry of 
Figure 1. Loviisa nuclear power plant units 1 and 2. 
Source: Fortum.
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Employment and the Economy with its statement 
on the safety of the plant. The Finnish Government 
granted in July 2007 to the licensee Fortum new 
operating licences for unit 1 until the end of 2027 
and for unit 2 until the end of 2030. The length of 
the operating licences corresponds to the current 
goal for the plant's lifetime, which is 50 years. 
According to the conditions of the operating licenc-
es, two periodic safety reviews are required to be 
carried out by the licensee (by the end of the year 
2015 and 2023). STUK’s assessment of the first 
periodic safety review has been completed during 
the year 2016. Based on the assessment, STUK 
considered that the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
meets the set safety requirements for operational 
nuclear power plants. Further information about 
periodic safety reviews at the Loviisa NPP is pre-
sented in Annex 2.
Due to consistent plant improvements, the safe-
ty level of the plant has been increased as shown 
by the probabilistic risk assessment (see Article 
14). For continued safe operation, plant improve-
ment projects are still necessary. The largest ongo-
ing improvement is the renewal of the plant I&C 
system, where the safety classified parts of the 
project are intended to be completed in 2018.
Due to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi acci-
dent, safety improvements have been initiated at 
the Loviisa NPP. Improvements implemented, un-
der planning and implementation for the Loviisa 
plant include among other things:
•	 Installation of independent air-cooled cooling 
units for decay heat removal from the reactor 
core and from the spent fuel pools. The cooling 
units provide an alternative ultimate heat sink 
in case of loss of sea water cooling. The units 
have been taken into use in 2014-2015.
•	 Flood protection. The utility has estimated the 
effects of high sea water level to the plant 
safety. The utility has submitted a detailed plan 
of improved flood protection in 2015. The plan 
is based on strengthening of flood protection of 
the buildings most important to safety. The plan 
will be implemented by 2018 (protection during 
annual maintenance shutdown already partly 
implemented).
•	 Installation of diverse water supply to the spent 
fuel pools. STUK has approved the design plans. 
The plant modifications will be completed by 
2017.
•	 The licensee has conducted an evaluation of 
the availability of cooling water and emergency 
diesel fuel in case of accidents at both units. The 
volumes on site have been considered adequate. 
Furthermore, the diesel fuel distribution ca-
pabilities (connections between different fuel 
tanks) have been improved.
Fukushima related modifications, as well as other 
latest ongoing improvements at the Loviisa NPP 
are described in more detail in Article 18 and in 
Annex 2. Furthermore, the most significant plant 
modifications and modernisation projects carried 
out at the Loviisa nuclear power plant during the 
plant lifetime and STUK’s safety reviews are as 
well described in more detail in Article 18 and in 
Annex 2. During recent years, only minor opera-
tional events have taken place and no major safety 
issues have appeared (see also Article 19).
Plant lifetime management includes credible 
procedures for the follow-up of the plant ageing. 
The conditions of components which are practi-
cally impossible to be replaced by new ones (pres-
sure vessel, steam generators, etc.) are monitored 
most actively. One specific issue with Loviisa plant 
units is the risk of reactor pressure vessel brittle 
fracture. Several modifications have been made at 
both units to reduce the risk. Fortum submitted 
during the latest operating licence renewal process 
a comprehensive analysis based on which the brit-
tle fracture risk can be managed until the end of 
the 50 years plant lifetime. The permit renewal for 
the use of the reactor pressure vessels was carried 
out at the Loviisa unit 2 in 2010 and at the Loviisa 
unit 1 in 2012. STUK approved the applications 
to extend the operation of the pressure vessels at 
the both units to the end of the operating licence, 
i.e. until the end of 2027 for the Loviisa unit 1 and 
until the end of 2030 for the Loviisa unit 2.
In addition to the regulatory oversight and safe-
ty assessment, there have been independent safety 
reviews conducted by international organisations 
such as IAEA and WANO (World Association of 
Nuclear Operators). IAEA OSART (Operational 
Safety Review Team) missions have been organ-
ised at the Loviisa power plant in November 1990 
and in March 2007 with a latest follow-up review 
in July 2008. The next OSART mission will be 
organised during the year 2017. The pre-visit of 
the mission was carried out in 2016.The WANO 
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Figure 2. Olkiluoto nuclear power plant units 1 and 2. 
Source: TVO.
peer reviews have been carried out at the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant at the beginning of 2001, in 
March 2010 with a follow-up review in 2012, and in 
March 2015. The WANO review 2015 included also 
the WANO corporate review in January 2016. The 
WANO follow-up review will be carried out in 2017.
In 2013, the net production of the Loviisa unit 1 
was 4000 GWh, the load factor was 92,2% and the 
refuelling and maintenance outage lasted 19 days. 
The net production of the Loviisa unit 2 was 4040 
GWh, the load factor was 93.1%, and the refuelling 
and maintenance outage lasted 17 days. The collec-
tive radiation doses in 2013 were 0.33 manSv for 
the Loviisa unit 1 and 0.21 manSv for the Loviisa 
unit 2.
In 2014, the net production of the Loviisa unit 1 
was 4011 GWh, the load factor was 92,5% and the 
refuelling and maintenance outage lasted 21 days. 
The net production of the Loviisa unit 2 was 3873 
GWh, the load factor was 89,3%, and the refuelling 
and maintenance outage lasted 35 days. The collec-
tive radiation doses in 2014 were 0.32 manSv for 
the Loviisa unit 1 and 0.53 manSv for the Loviisa 
unit 2.
In 2015, the net production of the Loviisa unit 1 
was 4026 GWh, the load factor was 92,7% and the 
refuelling and maintenance outage lasted 21 days. 
The net production of the Loviisa unit 2 was 4039 
GWh, the load factor was 93.1%, and the refuelling 
and maintenance outage lasted 17 days. The collec-
tive radiation doses in 2015 were 0.27 manSv for 
the Loviisa unit 1 and 0.25 manSv for the Loviisa 
unit 2.
Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2
The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant units were 
connected to the electrical network in September 
2, 1978 (Olkiluoto 1) and February 18, 1980 
(Olkiluoto 2). The nominal thermal power of both 
Olkiluoto units is 2500 MW, which was licensed in 
1998. The new power level is 115.7% as compared 
to the earlier nominal power 2160 MW licensed in 
1983. The original power level of both units was 
2000 MW. The Operating Licences of the units are 
valid until the end of 2018.
The latest periodic safety review (PSR) of the 
Olkiluoto plant took place in 2007–2009. STUK 
made a decision concerning the PSR in October 
2009. The decision included also STUK’s safety 
assessment which provided a summary of the 
reviews, inspections and continuous oversight car-
ried out by STUK. The next periodic safety review 
will be carried out in 2016-2017 in connection with 
the renewal of operating licence for Olkiluoto NPP. 
STUK has started preparations for the safety as-
sessment for the operating licence renewal and has 
actively held meetings with the licensee. During 
2015-2017 the safety of the Olkiluoto plant is 
assessed more intensively and extensively than 
usual due to the licence renewal and extension of 
the original design lifetime which was 40 years. 
The safety documentation will be submitted to 
STUK at the end of 2016 and the review is planned 
to be made during 2017. The key issues in the 
licence renewal are ageing management, organisa-
tional issues, deterministic and probabilistic safety 
analyses, fatigue analyses, status of the safety 
improvements as well as matters relating to the 
environment, nuclear waste and nuclear fuel.
Safety improvements due to the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident under planning and 
implemented at the Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2 
include among other things:
•	 Assessing possibilities to ensure cooling of the 
reactor core in case of total loss of AC supplies 
and systems. The arrangement will consist of 
high and low pressure systems. The high pres-
sure system is based on a steam driven turbine. 
The low pressure system pumps coolant into 
the core from the fire fighting system. STUK 
has approved the design plans. The systems will 
be implemented in 2017–2018.
•	 Ensuring operation of the auxiliary feed water 
system pumps independently of availability of 
the sea water cooling systems. The modification 
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has been implemented at Olkiluoto 1 in 2014. 
Abnormal vibration and pressure oscillations 
have been observed during the testing of one 
subsystem and the reasons are under investiga-
tion. The modification will be implemented at 
Olkiluoto 2 when the issue has been resolved.
•	 Diverse cooling water supply to the spent fuel 
pools have been completed in 2015. To improve 
monitoring of the water temperature and level 
in the spent fuel pools is in progress and will be 
completed in 2016.
•	 The utility has acquired new mobile equipment 
(aggregates, pumps).
•	 The utility has evaluated the availability of 
cooling water and emergency diesel fuel in case 
of accidents at multiple reactor units and other 
nuclear facilities at the same site.
Fukushima related modifications, as well as other 
latest ongoing improvements at the Olkiluoto NPP 
are described in more detail in Article 18 and in 
Annex 3. Furthermore, the most significant plant 
modifications and modernisation projects carried 
out at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant during 
the plant lifetime and STUK’s safety reviews are 
as well described in more detail in Article 18 and 
in Annex 3. During recent years, only minor opera-
tional events have taken place and no major safety 
issues have appeared (see also Article 19).
In addition to the regulatory oversight and 
safety assessment, there have been independent 
safety reviews conducted by international organi-
sations. IAEA OSART mission has been organised 
at Olkiluoto in March 1986. The next OSART mis-
sion will be conducted from 27 February till 16 
March 2017. The WANO peer reviews have been 
carried out at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in 
1999, in 2006 with a follow-up review in 2009, and 
in 2012 with a follow-up review in 2014. The next 
WANO peer review will be carried out in October 
2016. The WANO review 2016 will also include the 
WANO corporate review.
In 2013, net production at the Olkiluoto unit 
1 was 7470 GWh and the load factor 97.1%. The 
annual refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Olkiluoto unit 1 lasted 8 days. The net production 
of the Olkiluoto unit 2 was 7163 GWh and the 
load factor was 93,1%. The annual refuelling and 
maintenance outage of the Olkiluoto unit 2 lasted 
17 days. The collective radiation doses in 2013 
were 0.14 manSv for the Olkiluoto unit 1 and 0.51 
manSv for the Olkiluoto unit 2.
In 2014, net production at the Olkiluoto unit 
1 was 7266 GWh and the load factor 94.5%. The 
annual refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Olkiluoto unit 1 lasted 17 days. The net produc-
tion of the Olkiluoto unit 2 was 7497 GWh and the 
load factor was 97,4%. The annual refuelling and 
maintenance outage of the Olkiluoto unit 2 lasted 
7 days. The collective radiation doses in 2014 
were 0.40 manSv for the Olkiluoto unit 1 and 0.24 
manSv for the Olkiluoto unit 2.
In 2015, net production at the Olkiluoto unit 1 
was 7397 GWh and the load factor was 96,2%. The 
annual refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Olkiluoto unit 1 lasted 10 days. The net produc-
tion of the Olkiluoto unit 2 was 6864 GWh and the 
load factor was 89,2%. The annual refuelling and 
maintenance outage of the Olkiluoto unit 2 lasted 
17 days. The collective radiation doses in 2015 
were 0.24 manSv for the Olkiluoto unit 1 and 0.51 
manSv for the Olkiluoto unit 2.
Olkiluoto NPP unit 3
Construction licence for the fifth nuclear power 
plant unit in Finland on the Olkiluoto site was 
granted in February 2005. Olkiluoto 3 unit is a 
1600 MWe European Pressurised Water Reactor 
(EPR), the design of which is based on the French 
N4 and German Konvoi type PWR’s. A turn key 
delivery is provided by the Consortium Areva NP 
and Siemens.
Construction work is almost completed and 
commissioning phase has started. TVO submitted 
the operating licence application in April 2016 to 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. 
Operating licence is needed prior to loading nu-
clear fuel into the reactor core. STUK has start-
ed reviewing the operating licence application 
documents and the safety assessment by STUK 
is expected to be completed before the end of 
2017. IAEA has agreed to carry out a pre-OS-
ART (Operational Safety Review Team) mission 
to Olkiluoto NPP before the fuel loading. Also, the 
WANO pre-startup peer review will be carried out 
before the fuel loading. Licensing and construction 
of the Olkiluoto unit 3 is described in more detail 
in Annex 4.
Due to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi ac-
cident, additional safety improvements have also 
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been initiated for the Olkiluoto NPP unit 3. These 
include e.g. the possibility to add water to the 
steam generator secondary side and to fuel pools 
from fire water distribution system as well as the 
possibility to move diesel fuel from emergency 
diesel generator storage tanks to station blackout 
diesel storage tanks. Additional mobile pumps to 
provide water injection into the fire fighting water 
system are to be acquired before the start of opera-
tion of the Olkiluoto unit 3. With the mobile pumps, 
water can also be added directly to fuel pools with 
hoses. Preparations have also been made to enable 
restoring the AC distribution system functionality 
by replacing the internals of damaged cabinets in 
case of full loss of all electrical power.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 6.
Article 7. Legislative and 
regulatory framework
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish 
and maintain a legislative and regulatory 
framework to govern the safety of nuclear 
installations.
2. The legislative and regulatory framework 
shall provide for:
i. the establishment of applicable nation-
al safety requirements and regulations;
ii. a system of licensing with regard to nu-
clear installations and the prohibition 
of the operation of a nuclear installa-
tion without a licence;
iii. a system of regulatory inspection and 
assessment of nuclear installations to 
ascertain compliance with applicable 
regulations and the terms of licences;
iv. the enforcement of applicable regu-
lations and of the terms of licences, 
including suspension, modification or 
revocation.
Legislative and regulatory framework
The current nuclear energy legislation in Finland 
(see Annex 1) is based on the Nuclear Energy Act 
originally from 1987. The Act has been amended 
over twenty times during the years it has been 
in force: most changes are minor and originate 
from changes to EU or other Finnish legislation. 
In 2008, nuclear energy legislation was updated to 
correspond to current level of safety requirements 
and the new Finnish Constitution which came into 
force in 2000. Together with a supporting Nuclear 
Energy Decree originally from 1988, the scope of 
this legislation covers e.g.
•	 the construction and operation of nuclear fa-
cilities; nuclear facilities refer to facilities for 
producing nuclear energy, including research 
reactors, facilities for extensive disposal of nu-
clear wastes, and facilities used for extensive 
fabrication, production, use, handling or storage 
of nuclear materials or nuclear wastes
•	 the possession, fabrication, production, transfer, 
handling, use, storage, transport, export and 
import of nuclear materials and nuclear wastes 
as well as the export and import of ores and ore 
concentrates containing uranium or thorium.
In 2012, the Finnish regulatory framework for 
nuclear and radiation safety was reviewed in the 
IRRS (Integrated Regulatory Review Service) peer 
review process. According to the IRRS recommen-
dations, some amendments were made to the legis-
 
Figure 3. Olkiluoto NPP unit 3 in construction phase in autumn 2015. Source: TVO.
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lation aimed to increase the independence of STUK 
and to extend its authorities. The Nuclear Energy 
Act was amended in 2015 giving STUK a mandate 
to issue binding STUK Regulations concerning the 
areas of previous Government Decrees, and a new 
area concerning mining and milling operations 
aimed to produce uranium or thorium. Based on 
the mandate, STUK issued on 1st January 2016 
the regulations listed below. There were still is-
sues, such as limits for radiation exposure of work-
ers and population and radioactive releases and re-
quirements for other governmental agencies, which 
must still be provided by the Radiation Act and the 
Nuclear Energy Decree causing an amendment of 
the Decree.
•	 STUK Regulation on the Safety of Nuclear 
Power Plants (STUK Y/1/2016)
•	 STUK Regulation on Emergency Response Ar-
rangements at Nuclear Power Plants (STUK 
Y/2/2016)
•	 STUK Regulation on the Security in the Use of 
Nuclear Energy (STUK Y/3/2016)
•	 STUK Regulation on the Safety of Disposal of 
Nuclear Waste (STUK Y/4/2016)
•	 STUK Regulation on the Safety of Mining and 
Milling Operations aimed at Producing Ura-
nium or Thorium (STUK Y/5/2016).
The current radiation protection legislation is 
based on the Radiation Act and Decree, both of 
which are from 1991 and take into account the 
ICRP Publication 60 (1990 Recommendations of 
the International Commission on Radiological 
Protection). Section 2, General principles, and 
Chapter 9, Radiation work, of the Act are applied 
to the use of nuclear energy. The radiation protec-
tion legislation is currently under overall reform 
caused by implementation of revised Basic Safety 
Standard Directive (2013/59/EURATOM) among 
other things.
As mentioned, nuclear legislation has been 
amended several times and therefore the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy has decided 
to start a more comprehensive update of the 
legislation. The update includes for instance the 
implementation of the following EU Directives: 
the amendment of Nuclear Safety Directive 
(2014/87/EURATOM, amending Directive 2009/71/
EURATOM), Basic Safety Standard Directive 
(2013/59/EURATOM), and amendment (2014/52/
EU) of Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of 
the effects of certain public and private projects on 
the environment.
At the same time with the international negotia-
tions to update the Paris and Brussels Conventions 
on Nuclear Liability also the Finnish Nuclear 
Liability Act was reviewed by a special govern-
mental committee already in 2002. The financial 
provisions to cover the possible damage and re-
sulting costs caused by a nuclear accident have 
been arranged according to the Paris and Brussels 
Conventions. A remarkable increase in the sum 
available for compensation of nuclear damages is 
expected in the future since international nego-
tiations about the revision of the Paris/Brussels 
agreements on nuclear liability were successfully 
completed in 2004. In addition to the revised 
agreements, Finland decided to enact unlimited li-
censee liability by law. This means, that insurance 
coverage will be required for a minimum amount 
of EUR 700 million and the liability of Finnish op-
erators shall be unlimited in cases where nuclear 
damage has occurred in Finland and also the third 
tier of the Brussels Supplementary Convention 
(providing cover up to EUR 1500 million) has been 
exhausted. The revised law will also have some 
other improvements, like extending the claiming 
period up to 30 years for victims of nuclear ac-
cidents (personal injuries). The law amendment 
(2005) has not taken effect yet. It will enter into 
force at a later date as determined by Government 
Decree. The entering into force of the amending 
act will take place as the 2004 Protocols amending 
the Paris and Brussels Conventions will enter into 
force.
As the ratification of the 2004 Protocols has 
been delayed, Finland made a temporary amend-
ment in the Finnish Nuclear Liability Act in 2012, 
implementing the provision on unlimited liability 
and requirement of insurance coverage for a mini-
mum amount of EUR 700 million by the operator. 
The temporary law came into force in January 
2012 and will be repealed when the 2005 law 
amendment takes effect. In Finland, the finishing 
off the international ratification process of the con-
vention amendments without any undue delay is 
considered to be extremely important.
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Provision of regulatory guidance
According to Section 7 r of the Nuclear Energy Act, 
STUK shall specify detailed safety requirements 
concerning the implementation of safety level in 
accordance with the Act. These requirements are 
presented in regulatory guides which are called 
YVL Guides. STUK shall specify the safety re-
quirements it sets and publish them as part of the 
regulations issued by the STUK.
The safety requirements in YVL Guides are 
binding on the licensee, while preserving the li-
censee's right to propose an alternative procedure 
or solution to that provided for in the regulations. 
If the licensee can convincingly demonstrate that 
the proposed procedure or solution will implement 
safety level in accordance with the Nuclear Energy 
Act, STUK may approve this procedure or solution.
New YVL Guides are applied to new nuclear 
facilities as such. The procedure to apply new 
guides to existing nuclear facilities and to facilities 
under construction is such that the publication of 
an YVL Guide does not, as such, alter any previous 
decisions made by STUK. Before an implementa-
tion decision is made by STUK the licensees are 
requested to evaluate the compliance with the new 
guide. In case of non-compliances the licensee has 
B  Plant and system design 
B.1  Safety design of a nuclear power plant
B.2  Classification of systems, structures and 
components of a nuclear facility 
B.3  Deterministic safety analyses for a nuclear power plant
B.4  Nuclear fuel and reactor 
B.5  Reactor coolant circuit of a nuclear power plant 
B.6  Containment of a nuclear power plant 
B.7  Provisions for internal and external 
hazards at a nuclear facility 
B.8  Fire protection at a nuclear facility  
Structure of the new YVL Guides
A  Safety management of a nuclear facility 
A.1  Regulatory oversight of safety in the use of nuclear energy 
A.2  Site for a nuclear facility 
A.3  Management system for a nuclear facility 
A.4  Organisation and personnel of a nuclear facility 
A.5  Construction and commissioning of a nuclear facility
A.6  Conduct of operations at a nuclear power plant 
A.7  Probabilistic risk assessment and risk management 
 of a nuclear power plant
A.8  Ageing management of a nuclear facility 
A.9  Regular reporting on the operation of a nuclear facility 
A.10  Operating experience feedback of a nuclear facility 
A.11  Security of a nuclear facility
A.12 Control of information security on a nuclear facility
E  Structures and equipment of a nuclear facility
  
E.1  Authorised inspection body and the licensee’s in-house 
inspection organisation
E.2  Procurement and operation of nuclear fuel 
E.3  Pressure vessels and pipings of a nuclear facility 
E.4  Strength analyses of nuclear power plant pressure 
equipment
E.5  In-service inspection of nuclear facility pressure 
equipment with non-destructive testing methods
D  Nuclear materials and waste 
D.1  Regulatory control of nuclear safeguards
D.2  Transport of nuclear materials and nuclear waste 
D.3  Handling and storage of nuclear fuel 
D.4  Predisposal management of low and intermediate level 
nuclear waste and decommissioning of a nuclear facility 
D.5  Disposal of nuclear waste 
D.6  Production of uranium and torium in mining and milling 
 activities
D.7 Barriers and rock engineering of nuclear waste 
 disposal facility
C  Radiation safety of a nuclear facility and environment 
C.1  Structural radiation safety and radiation monitoring 
of a nuclear facility 
C.2  Radiation protection and dose control of the personnel 
of a nuclear facility 
C.3  Control and measuring of radioactive releases 
to the environment of a nuclear facility 
C.4  Radiological control of the environment of a nuclear facility
C.5  Emergency arrangements of a nuclear power plant
C.6 Radiation monitoring at a nuclear facility
C.7 Radiological monitoring of the environment of a nuclear facility
E.6  Buildings and structures of a nuclear facility 
E.7  Electrical and I&C equipment of a nuclear facility 
E.8  Valves of a nuclear facility 
E.9  Pumps of a nuclear facility 
E.10  Emergency power supplies of a nuclear facility 
E.11  Hoisting and transfer equipment of a nuclear facility
E.12 Testing organisations for mechanical components and
 structures of a nuclear facility
Collected definitions of YVL Guides: same data is shown both as the collection and within the guides. 
Figure 4. The re-structured system of regulatory YVL Guides.
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to propose plans for improvement and schedules 
for achieving compliance. After having heard those 
concerned, STUK makes a separate decision on 
how a new or revised YVL Guide applies to operat-
ing nuclear power plants, or to those under con-
struction, and to licensee’s operational activities 
as well as to other nuclear facilities related to nu-
clear waste management and disposal and to the 
research reactor. STUK can approve exemptions 
from new requirements if it is not technically or 
economically reasonable to implement respective 
modifications and if safety justification is consid-
ered adequate. This is case by case decision.
In compliance with the national strategy and 
with expectations of IAEA the most important 
references considered in the Finnish regulations 
for nuclear safety are the IAEA safety standards, 
especially the Safety Requirements. Finland as a 
member of WENRA (Western European Nuclear 
Regulators’ Association) has committed itself to 
implement Safety Reference Levels published by 
WENRA. Also the WENRA Safety Objectives for 
new reactors and the WENRA positions on some 
key technical issues are considered. Other sourc-
es of safety information are worldwide co-oper-
ation with other countries using nuclear energy, 
e.g. OECD/NEA, MDEP (Multinational Design 
Evaluation Programme) and VVER Forum. The 
Finnish policy is to participate actively in the in-
ternational work on developing safety standards 
and adopt or adapt the new safety requirements 
into national regulations. The regulatory guides 
are updated based on advances in science and tech-
nology, results of safety research and on analysis of 
operational experience.
The regulatory guides are continuously re-eval-
uated for updating. If there is not any immediate 
need for corrections or updates of YVL guides 
(e.g. new international requirements or update of 
pertinent national legislation) there are criteria 
for the review and updating of the regulations. 
The preparation process of the regulatory guides 
includes internal hearings and external hearings 
of the stakeholders and STUK’s relevant advisory 
commissions and committees. The public participa-
tion is made possible through the website of STUK 
where the drafts for external hearings and all the 
regulations are also available.
After amending the nuclear energy legislation 
in 2008, also the revision of all YVL Guides was 
commenced to reflect the enhanced safety require-
ments. The thorough revision and update of the 
YVL Guides aimed at more goal-based and more 
user-friendly set of requirements. The updating 
integrated the lessons learnt from the regulatory 
oversight especially the lessons learnt from the 
Olkiluoto unit 3 project. The set of YVL Guides cov-
ers safety, security and safeguards.
Considering the WENRA Safety Reference 
Levels published in 2007 and 2008, the Finnish 
policy was to include all of them in the revised 
regulatory guide system. This was done during the 
work through a systematic approach to earmark 
all the Reference Levels to certain guides.
After the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident 
it was decided to include lessons learnt from the 
accident into the revised YVL Guides, which de-
layed the completion of the new guides. The most 
important changes that were included in the new 
YVL Guides due to the TEPCO Fukushima acci-
dent deal with the design of NPPs and spent fuel 
storages, consideration of severe external haz-
ards and with the requirements concerning on-
site emergency preparedness including multi-unit 
accidents. STUK participated WENRA’s work on 
the update of the Safety Reference Levels after 
the Fukushima accident and most of the updated 
Reference Levels were already taken into account 
in the finalisation of the revised YVL guides.
The new set of YVL guides was published 1st 
December 2013 (see Annex 1). The publication 
of 2 guides out of 45 guides takes place during 
2016. These were left to wait for publication due 
to the needed changes in the legislation and upper 
level regulations. Translations of YVL Guides into 
English are also published. Justification memo-
randums are published in connection of each guide 
in Finnish and will be translation into English is 
ongoing.
Systematic training on application of new 
YVL Guides has been provided to the licensees 
by STUK’s personnel involved in preparation of 
guides. Furthermore several training courses on 
YVL Guides directed for stakeholders, have been 
arranged also in English and are scheduled to be 
repeated in English also in future.
The guidance has now a new structure: guides 
are grouped under 5 topical areas. Single guides 
have a standard format and compact presentation 
of numbered requirements. Descriptive text in 
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requirements is avoided. Additional clarification 
of requirements is written in justification memo-
randums (separately for each guide). Guides use 
consistent terminology, in Finnish and in English, 
which is collected into a glossary.
After publishing the new YVL guides STUK 
asked in January 2014 licensees to make their as-
sessments concerning fulfilment of requirements: 
requirement by requirement assessment, justifi-
cations for the fulfilment and references to plant 
documentation. Requests for these assessments 
concerned separately the operating NPP units, the 
unit under construction and the research reactor 
as well. Deadlines for submittals were for operat-
ing nuclear power plants by the end of 2014 and for 
the unit under construction the operating licence 
application (April 2016).
STUK established a project for the implementa-
tion of the revised YVL Guides. Project target was 
to create a common view on application of require-
ments in new YVL Guides for existing nuclear 
facilities. Another target was that information was 
stored in the requirement management system to 
be utilised in STUK’s oversight activities in future. 
The implementation decisions were given by the 
1st of October 2015 for operating plants and by the 
1st of January 2016 for the research reactor. STUK 
has started the evaluation work for Olkiluoto unit 
3 together with the review of the operating licence 
application.
According to STUK’s evaluation, the revised 
guides do not contain notable technical modifica-
tion needs with regard to operating facilities since 
several plant improvements were already initiated 
after the Fukushima accident (Fukushima related 
improvement measures are in line with the up-
dated requirements). Several plant modifications 
have also been implemented during last decades or 
are still under implementation based on previously 
updated regulatory requirements, PRA results and 
periodic safety review (PSR) results. Operating 
NPPs must nevertheless, during the next few 
years, expand the scope of their accident analyses, 
improve measures related to the facilities’ age-
ing management and develop facility documenta-
tion that advances the traceability of modification 
plans.
After the renewal of YVL Guides nearly all 
IAEA Safety Requirements documents have been 
revised. Just because of TEPCO Fukushima Dai-
ichi accident IAEA has updated Requirements 
documents concerning site selection, design, opera-
tion, safety analysis, and regulatory oversight of 
nuclear power plants, and additionally General 
Safety Requirements on response to emergencies. 
The updated WENRA Safety Reference Levels for 
Existing Reactors taking into account the lessons 
learnt and the insight from the EU stress tests 
were published in fall 2014. WENRA has also pub-
lished Safety Reference Levels for Waste and Spent 
Fuel Storages in 2014, and both for Radioactive 
Waste Disposal Facilities and De-commissioning 
in 2015. The national regulators have made a 
commitment to improve and harmonize their na-
tional regulatory systems by implementing the 
new Safety Reference Levels until the end of 2017.
The updated international requirements are 
reviewed and assessed by STUK to clarify the need 
for further modifications of STUK’s regulations 
(STUK Regulations and Regulatory Guides (YVL 
Guides), see Annex 1). In this connection also the 
new requirements of Council Directive (2014/87/
Euratom) amending Nuclear Safety Directive 
(2009/71/Euratom) and BSS directive (Basic Safety 
Standards Directive, 2013/59/ Euratom) are re-
viewed and assessed their impact on the Finnish 
nuclear energy regulations; the laws and STUK’s 
regulations. STUK has an action plant to update 
STUK’s Regulations by 15th August 2017 and the 
YVL Guides by the end of 2017.
System of licensing
The licensing process is defined in the Finnish 
legislation. The construction and operation of a 
nuclear facility is not allowed without a licence. 
The licences are prepared by the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy and granted by 
the Government. The conditions for granting a li-
cence are prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act 
(Sections 18-20). For a nuclear power plant, nu-
clear waste disposal facility, or another significant 
nuclear facility the process consists of three steps 
(see Figures 5 and 6):
•	 Decion-in-Principle – made by the Government 
and ratified by the Parliament
•	 Construction licence – granted by the Govern-
ment
•	 Operating licence – granted by the Government.
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Before a construction licence for a nuclear pow-
er plant, nuclear waste disposal facility, or oth-
er significant nuclear facility can be applied 
for, a Decision-in-Principle by the Government 
and a subsequent ratification of the DiP by the 
Parliament are required. An Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure has to be con-
ducted prior to the application of the DiP and the 
EIA report has to be annexed to the DiP appli-
cation. A condition for granting the Decision-in-
Principle is that the construction of the facility in 
question is in line with the overall good of society. 
Further conditions are as follows: the municipality 
of the intended site of the nuclear facility has to be 
in favour of constructing the facility and no factors 
have appeared which indicate that the proposed 
facility could not be constructed and operated in a 
safe manner.
The entry into force of the Decision-in-Principle 
further requires ratification by the Parliament. 
The Parliament can not make any changes to the 
Decision; it can only approve it or reject it as it 
is. The stakeholders involved in the Decision-in-
Principle process and their tasks are described in 
Figure 6. In Decision-in-Principle phase STUK pre-
pares a statement on safety and preliminary safety 
assessment concerning the applicant, the proposed 
plant designs and plant sites. STUK asks also a 
statements e.g. from the Advisory Commission 
on Nuclear Safety and from the Ministry of the 
Interior concerning the emergency preparedness 
and physical protection arrangements.
For the construction and operating licence 
application, the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy asks STUK’s statement on safety. 
Construction and operating licence documents to 
be submitted to STUK for approval in this phase 
are defined in Sections 35 and 36 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree. STUK asks also statements e.g. 
from the Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety 
and from the Ministry of the 
Interior. After receiving all state-
ments for the construction or op-
erating licence, the Government 
will make its decision. In the con-
struction and operating licence 
phases the acceptance of the 
Parliament and the host munici-
pality are no more needed.
The Finnish process of licens-
ing was assessed in the IRRS 
mission conducted in Finland in 
October 2012. The IRRS team 
gave a recommendation that the 
Finnish Government should seek 
to modify the Nuclear Energy Act 
so that the law clearly and un-
ambiguously stipulates STUK’s 
legal authorities in the authori-
zation process for safety. In par-
ticular, the changes should en-
sure that STUK has the legal 
authority to specify any licence 
conditions necessary for safety. 
Due to the recommendations, the 
Nuclear Energy Act was amended 
in 2015. Based on these changes 
the Government has to take into 
account the proposals included in 
the STUK’s statements when con-
Renewal of operating licence, PSR
Decommissioning
Operating Licence
Construction Licence
Environmental Impact 
Assessment
Bidding & site preparation
Construction
Feasibility studies
(by utility)
Nuclear safety
Energy policy
Decision in Principle
Figure 5. Three steps of licensing of nuclear facilities.
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sidering the conditions of the Decision-in-Principle 
and licences for nuclear facilities.
The Decision-in-Principle procedure has been 
applied several times. The first DiP concerning 
the encapsulation and disposal facility for spent 
fuel in Olkiluoto was ratified by the Parliament in 
May 2001. Most recently the DiP procedure was 
applied during the period April 2008 – July 2010 
when three applications for new nuclear power 
plants (Fennovoima Oy, Fortum Power and Heat 
Oy and TVO), and two applications for expand-
ing the planned capacity of the future spent fuel 
disposal facility in Olkiluoto were handled by the 
Government. The Government approved TVO’s and 
Fennovoima’s applications but Fortum’s applica-
tion regarding the proposed new Loviisa unit 3 and 
the corresponding DiP application to expand the 
capacity of the spent fuel disposal facility were not 
approved. The DiP set a schedule for Fennovoima 
and TVO to submit the construction licence appli-
cations to the Government by mid 2015. In March 
2014 Fennovoima started a complementary DiP 
process to introduce a new plant alternative (AES 
2006), which was not mentioned in Fennovoima’s 
original DiP application in 2009. The Government 
approved the application and the Parliament rati-
fied it at the end of 2014 and Fennovoima submit-
ted the construction licence application according 
the conditions by the end of June 2015.
In May 2014, also TVO started a complemen-
tary process with the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy in order to extend the schedule for 
the submission of the construction licence applica-
tion. The Government did not grant the requested 
extension of time to Olkiluoto unit 4 project and 
the project ended in June 2015.
In accordance with Section 108 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, the different phases of construction 
of a nuclear facility may be begun only after STUK 
has, on the basis of the construction licence ap-
plication documents and other detailed plans and 
documents it requires, verified in respect of each 
phase that the safety-related factors and safety 
regulations have been given sufficient considera-
tion.
Review of the detailed design of structures and 
equipment can be begun after STUK has found 
during the construction licence phase that the 
Parliament:
Confirms Decision in Principle
Government:
Makes licensing decisions
Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy:
Conducts preparations
Three step 
licensing:
• Decision in Principle
• Construction Licence
• Operating Licence
Public, other authorities, 
and expert organisations
STUK 
(regulatory body)
Municipality
of plant site
Expert 
organisations
Applicant
Suppliers
nuclear industry
Nuclear safety  
advisory commission
Safety documents
Regulatory 
review and 
oversight
Application
Advice
Statement on safety 
Agreement on site in
Decision in Principle 
(veto right)
Opinions, statements
Figure 6. Licensing of nuclear facilities in Finland.
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system-level design data of the system concerned 
are sufficient and acceptable.
In accordance with Section 109 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, STUK oversees the construction of 
the facility in detail. The purpose is to ensure that 
the safety and quality requirements, regulations 
for pressure equipment and approved plans are 
complied with and that the nuclear facility is con-
structed in other respects in accordance with the 
regulations. In particular, the oversight is aimed to 
verify that working methods ensuring high quality 
are employed for the construction.
Before loading fuel into the reactor, an operat-
ing licence is needed. The operating licences are 
granted for a limited period of time, generally for 
10-20 years. In case the operating licence is grant-
ed for a longer period than 10 years, a periodic 
safety review (PSR) is required to be presented to 
STUK. The periodic re-licensing or review has al-
lowed good opportunities for a comprehensive, pe-
riodic safety review. Current operating licences of 
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto units are valid for about 
20 years, but PSRs at least every ten years are 
required in the licenses as a condition of continued 
operation.
In addition, the Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 
112) requires that if the licensee intends to carry 
out such modifications to the nuclear facility sys-
tems, structures, nuclear fuel or the way the facil-
ity is operated, which influence safety and involve 
changes in the plans or documents approved by 
the STUK, the licensee shall obtain approval from 
STUK for such modifications before they are car-
ried out. Correspondingly, STUK shall approve 
measures related to the decommissioning of a 
nuclear facility. The licensee shall ensure that the 
documents mentioned in Sections 35 and 36 are 
revised accordingly.
System of regulatory inspection 
and assessment
The legislation provides the regulatory control sys-
tem for the use of nuclear energy. According to 
the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK is responsible for 
the regulatory oversight of the safety of the use 
of nuclear energy. The rights and responsibilities 
of STUK are provided in the Nuclear Energy Act. 
Safety review and assessment as well as inspection 
activities are covered by the regulatory oversight.
Oversight during operation
STUK’s oversight during plant operation includes 
periodic inspection programme, continuous over-
sight performed by STUK’s resident inspectors, 
regular reporting and reporting of events and over-
sight performed at the plant site during operation 
and maintenance outages.
STUK’s periodic inspection programme is fo-
cused on the licensee’s main working processes and 
covers the most relevant areas of nuclear power 
plant safety. The objective of the inspection pro-
gramme is to assess the safety level at the plants 
as well as safety management. Possible problems 
at the plants and in procedures of the operating 
organisations are to be recognised.
STUK has put special emphasis on the manage-
ment of the entire inspection programme, includ-
ing the timely conduct, resource allocation and 
accurate reporting of results, but there are some 
issues which can be further improved. Periodic 
inspection programme was assessed in the IRRS 
mission conducted in Finland in October 2012. 
The IRRS mission team suggested that STUK can 
further enhance the effectiveness of its inspection 
activities by enhancing the focus of inspection 
on the most safety-significant areas, by defining 
more concrete criteria for reactive inspections and 
conducting higher number of unannounced inspec-
tions.
STUK has modified the inspection programme 
during the years. Latest changes were made in 
2015, when the whole inspection programme was 
re-assessed and the internal guidance was up-
dated taking into account the recommendations 
and suggestions of IRRS mission. Each year STUK 
defines the programme for the next year, including 
additional inspections as necessary. According to 
updated internal guide, many of the yearly con-
ducted inspections have been decided to be carried 
out every two years. The inspections focused on 
the most safety-significant areas are still carried 
out annually. In addition, reactive inspections can 
be carried out based on the oversight results and 
proactive inspections can be added focusing on 
ongoing or coming activities at the plant. The aim 
is to have more flexible inspection programme to 
optimize its effectiveness and focus and to be able 
to conduct inspections in the areas and at times 
considered necessary. In addition, unannounced 
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inspections are included in the annual inspection 
programme, e.g. inspection focusing on the conduct 
of operations is always carried out unannounced.
In the event review, the safety significance of 
the event is first evaluated based on the informa-
tion given by the operator and STUK’s resident 
inspectors. Later operating experience is reported 
to STUK as an event report, which STUK evalu-
ates and may require additional information or 
actions. STUK maintains internal database for 
events which disseminates operating experiences 
and provides easy access to operational event re-
ports. STUK may assign own investigation team 
for events deemed to have special safety impor-
tance, especially when the operations at the nu-
clear power plant have not been performed as 
planned or expected. It is also possible to nominate 
an investigation team to investigate a number of 
events together in order to look for possible generic 
issues associated with the events. These inspec-
tions are usually conducted by a leadership of the 
STUK’s event investigation manager, and an inves-
tigation team includes normally 3–5 experts from 
STUK or from external organisations nominated 
on case-by-case basis.
Numbers of operational events are followed 
through STUK’s plant performance indicator sys-
tem. Risk significance of operational events is fol-
lowed by PRA based indicators.
STUK’s oversight and safety assessment con-
cerning plant modifications is described under 
Article 14.
Oversight during construction
In accordance with Section 109 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, STUK oversees the construction 
of the facility in detail. Oversight consists of in-
spections within the frame of the Construction 
Inspection Programme and inspections on manu-
facturing and construction of systems, structures 
and components important to safety. In addition, 
STUK has four resident inspectors overseeing 
the construction, installations and commissioning 
work at the Olkiluoto site. Licensee reports regu-
larly about the progress of the construction.
To oversee the licensee’s performance in 
a construction project, STUK has established a 
Construction Inspection Programme. The purpose 
of the programme is to verify that the performance 
and organisation of the licensee ensure high-qual-
ity construction and implementation in accord-
ance with the approved designs while complying 
with the regulations and official decisions. The 
Construction Inspection Programme is divided into 
two main levels: the upper level assesses the licen-
see’s general operations to manage the construc-
tion, such as safety management and safety cul-
ture, organisation, corrective actions programme, 
the licensee’s expertise and use of expertise and 
project quality management. The next level, known 
as the operation level, assesses e.g. project quality 
assurance, training of the operating personnel, uti-
lization of the PRA, radiation safety issues, and li-
censee’s review and assessment process for system, 
structure and component-specific design reviews 
and inspections in the various fields of technology. 
Furthermore, the emergency response arrange-
ments during construction, physical protection, fire 
protection and nuclear waste treatment are sub-
jects of the Construction Inspection Programme as 
far as the scope is considered necessary by STUK. 
In addition to the above-mentioned inspections, of 
which the licensee is informed in advance, STUK 
carries out inspections without prior notice at 
its discretion. Construction Inspection Programme 
was also assessed in the IRRS mission and the 
recommendations and suggestions given for the 
periodic inspection programme of the operating 
plants concern also the Construction Inspection 
Programme. STUK has updated the internal guid-
ance of the Construction Inspection Programme in 
2014 to take into account the recommendations of 
IRRS mission, and again in 2015 and 2016 in order 
to cover e.g. changes in STUK’s organization.
STUK performs construction inspections of 
pressure equipment, mechanical components as 
well as steel and concrete structures as specified in 
the YVL Guides. These inspections are performed 
according to structure or component specific con-
struction plans that have been assessed and ap-
proved before start of manufacturing. The objective 
of the inspections is to verify that manufacturer, 
vendor and the licensee have performed their du-
ties as expected and that QC results of manufac-
turing and construction are acceptable. The licen-
see is responsible for inviting STUK to perform the 
inspection at a right time.
In addition, STUK performs inspections on 
installation and commissioning of systems, struc-
tures and components. Safety significance of sys-
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tems, structures and components are taken into 
account when determining the scope of inspections. 
STUK inspects safety class 1 and most safety 
important cases in safety class 2–3. Authorised 
Inspection Organisations (AIO) performs other 
inspections in safety class 2–3.
Enforcement
The Nuclear Energy Act defines the enforcement 
system and rules for suspension, modification or 
revocation of a licence. The enforcement system in-
cludes provisions for executive assistance if needed 
and for sanctions in case the law is violated. The 
enforcement tools and procedures of the regulator 
are considered to fully meet the needs.
In practice, STUK’s enforcement tools include: 
oral notice or written request for action by the 
inspector, and written notice or order for actions 
by STUK. Actions can include stopping the plant 
operation immediately or decrease of reactor power 
for unlimited time. Legally stronger instruments 
would be 1) setting a conditional imposition of a 
fine, 2) threatening with interruption or limiting 
the operation and, 3) threatening that STUK en-
forces the neglected action to be made at the licen-
see’s expense.
The repertoire of these tools together with some 
practical examples for implementing them has 
been presented in an internal policy document as 
part of STUK’s Quality System.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 7.
Article 8. Regulatory body
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or 
designate a regulatory body entrusted with 
the implementation of the legislative and 
regulatory framework referred to in Article 
7, and provided with adequate authority, 
competence and financial and human re-
sources to fulfil its assigned responsibili-
ties.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure an effective sepa-
ration between the functions of the regula-
tory body and those of any other body or or-
ganization concerned with the promotion 
or utilization of nuclear energy.
STUK in the regulatory framework
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the over-
all authority in the field of nuclear energy is the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy. The 
Ministry prepares matters concerning nuclear 
energy to the Government for decision-making. 
Among other duties, the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy is responsible for the formulation 
of a national energy policy.
The mission of the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) is ‘to protect people, so-
ciety, environment, and future generations from 
harmful effects of radiation’. STUK is an inde-
pendent governmental organisation for the regu-
latory control of radiation and nuclear safety as 
well as nuclear security and nuclear materials. 
STUK is administratively under the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health. Interfaces to ministries 
and governmental organisations are described in 
Figure 7. It is emphasised that the regulatory con-
trol of the safe use of radiation and nuclear energy 
is independently carried out by STUK. No Ministry 
can take for its decision-making a matter that has 
been defined by law to be on the responsibility 
of STUK. STUK has no responsibilities or duties 
which would be in conflict with regulatory control.
The current Act on STUK was given in 1983 
and the Decree in 1997. According to the Decree, 
STUK has the following duties:
•	 regulatory oversight of safety of the use of nu-
clear energy, emergency preparedness, security 
and nuclear materials
•	 regulatory control of the use of radiation and 
other radiation practices
•	 monitoring of the radiation situation in Fin-
land, and maintaining of preparedness for ab-
normal radiation situations
•	 maintaining national metrological standards in 
its field of activity
•	 research and development work for enhancing 
radiation and nuclear safety
•	 informing on radiation and nuclear safety is-
sues, and participating in training activities in 
the field
•	 producing expert services in the field of its ac-
tivity
•	 making proposals for developing the legislation 
in the field, and issuing general guides concern-
ing radiation and nuclear safety
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•	 participating in international co-operation in 
the field, and taking care of international con-
trol, contact or reporting activities as enacted 
or defined.
STUK has the legal authority to carry out regula-
tory oversight. The responsibilities and rights of 
STUK, as regards the regulation of the use of nu-
clear energy, are provided in the Nuclear Energy 
Act. They cover the safety review and assessment 
of licence applications, and the regulatory over-
sight of the construction, operation and decommis-
sioning of a nuclear facility. The regulatory over-
sight of nuclear power plants is described in detail 
in the Guide YVL A.1. STUK has e.g. legal rights 
to require modifications to nuclear power plants, to 
limit the power of plants and to require shutdown 
of a plant when necessary for safety reasons, as 
described in Article 7. Furthermore, the Nuclear 
Energy Act was amended in 2015 to give STUK a 
legal authority to carry out environmental moni-
toring as a regulatory activity. This change was 
based on the recommendation given in the IRRS 
mission in 2012.
STUK does not grant construction or operating 
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Figure 7. Co-operation and interfaces between STUK and Ministries and other organisations.
licences for nuclear facilities. However, in practice 
no such licence would be issued without STUK’s 
statement where the fulfilment of the safety regu-
lations is confirmed as described in Article 7.
STUK’s Advisory Committee was established in 
March 2008. Advisory Committee helps STUK to 
develop its functions as a regulatory, research and 
expert organisation in such a way that the activi-
ties are in balance with the society’s expectations 
and the needs of the citizens. Advisory Committee 
can also make assessments of the STUK’s actions 
and give recommendations to STUK.
An Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety 
has been established in 1988 by a Decree. This 
Commission gives advice to STUK on important 
safety issues and regulations. The Commission 
also gives its statements on licence applications. 
The Commission has now two international com-
mittees, one for reactor safety and one for waste 
safety issues. In addition, an Advisory Committee 
on Radiation Safety has been established for advis-
ing the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health. The 
members of the Advisory Commission on Nuclear 
Safety and the Advisory Committee on Radiation 
Safety are nominated by the Government.
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To assist STUK's work in nuclear security, 
an Advisory Committee on Nuclear Security was 
established in 2009. The members of the commit-
tee come from the various Finnish authorities, 
and the nuclear licensees also have their repre-
sentatives as experts. The duties of the commit-
tee include the assessment of the threats in the 
nuclear field as well as consultation to STUK in 
important security issues. The committee also aims 
to follow and promote both the international and 
domestic co-operation in the field of nuclear re-
lated security issues. The members of the Advisory 
Committee on Nuclear Security are nominated by 
the Government.
STUK is responsible for informing the public 
and media on radiation and nuclear safety. STUK 
aims to communicate proactively, openly, timely 
and understandably. A prerequisite for successful 
communication is that STUK is known among me-
dia and general public and the information given 
by STUK is regarded as truthful. Communication 
is based on best available information. STUK’s web 
site is an important tool in communication. It is 
important that the web pages are professionally 
edited and updated regularly. The information on 
web pages must be easy to find and understand-
able. Internal communication provides the person-
nel information about STUK’s activities and sup-
ports its capability in participating in the external 
communication.
STUK’s role and responsibilities have been as-
sessed by a peer review. Full-scope IRRT mission 
(IAEA’s International Regulatory Review Team) 
was carried out in 2000 and a follow-up mission in 
2003. IRRS mission (IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory 
Figure 8. Organisation of STUK. The total number of staff at the end of 2015 was 323.
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Review Service) was carried out in October 2012 
and the follow-up mission in June 2015.
In June 2015 the follow-up mission, 5 interna-
tional experts and 4 IAEA staff members reviewed 
regulatory activities in Finland on the basis of 
IAEA Safety Standards, international best prac-
tices and experiences and lessons learned from the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. The purpose 
of the IRRS follow-up was to review the measures 
undertaken following the recommendations and 
suggestions of the 2012 IRRS mission. The scope of 
the follow-up mission was the same as in 2012 i.e. 
nuclear facilities, except the research reactor FiR 
1 (due to decision of decommissioning), radiation 
sources and transport.
As the result of the follow-up mission the re-
view team concluded that the recommendations 
and suggestions from the 2012 IRRS missions have 
been taken into account systematically by a com-
prehensive action plan. Significant progress has 
been made in most areas and many improvements 
have been implemented in accordance with the ac-
tion plan. The IRRS team determined that 7 out of 
8 recommendations and 19 of 21 suggestions made 
by the 2012 IRRS mission had been effectively ad-
dressed and therefore could be considered closed.
One of the recommendations left open deals 
with the STUK’s position in the Government which 
will be discussed further in Finland. STUK’s cur-
rent position administratively under the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Health continues to have the 
potential for STUK’s decision-making to be unduly 
influenced by an entity that has interests in the 
medical applications of radiation. One of the sug-
gestions left open is related to STUK’s manage-
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Figure 9. Number of personnel in the department of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
ment system. According to the IRRS team in 2012, 
STUK should consider further improving its man-
agement system. The IRRS follow-up team found 
that while STUK has initiated a number of actions, 
work still has to be undertaken for further enhanc-
ing its integrated management system.
Two new recommendations were raised to 
amend the legislation to clarify that decommis-
sioning of a nuclear installation and closure of 
a disposal facility require a licence amendment; 
and to address the arrangements for research in 
radiation safety. STUK has updated its action plan 
and taken actions to complete the open issues (see 
Reference 6).
IAEA’s International Physical Protection 
Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission was carried out 
in Finland in 2009 and the follow-up in 2012.
Finance and resources of STUK
The organisational structure and the responsibili-
ties within STUK are described in the Management 
System of STUK. Also processes for regulatory 
oversight and other activities of STUK are present-
ed in the Management System. The organisation of 
STUK is described in the Figure 8.
STUK receives about 34% of its financial re-
sources through the government budget. However, 
the costs of regulatory oversight are charged in 
full to the licensees. The model of financing the 
regulatory work is called net-budgeting model and 
it has been applied since 2000. In this model the 
licensees pay the regulatory oversight fees directly 
to STUK. In 2015, the costs of the regulatory over-
sight of nuclear safety were 19 million €.
STUK has adequate resources to fulfil its re-
sponsibilities. The net-budgeting model makes it 
possible to increase for example personnel resourc-
es based on needs in a flexible way.
 At the end of 2015, number of staff in the de-
partment of Nuclear Reactor Regulation was 121. 
The number of staff has increased by 7 since the 
time of the sixth review meeting. The expertise of 
STUK covers all the essential areas needed in the 
oversight of the use of nuclear energy. As needed 
STUK orders independent analyses, review and 
assessment from technical support organisations 
to complement its own review and assessment 
work. The main technical support organisation of 
STUK is the VTT Technical Research Centre of 
Finland Ltd., but also Lappeenranta University 
of Technology (LUT) and Aalto University (former 
Helsinki University of Technology) are important. 
Also international technical support organisations 
and experts have been used, especially to sup-
port review and inspection activities related to 
Olkiluoto unit 3 and Fennovoima Hanhikivi unit 1.
New personnel have been recruited since 2003 
mainly for the safety review and assessment and 
inspection activities related to the Olkiluoto unit 
3. There is a plan to recruit almost 20 new staff 
members to the department during 2016 due the 
new NPP construction project (Hanhikivi unit 
1). The number of personnel in the department 
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of Nuclear Reactor Regulation over the period of 
2003–2015 is shown in Figure 9. The resources 
used for the oversight of operating nuclear power 
plants (Loviisa units 1 and 2 and Olkiluoto units 
1 and 2), Olkiluoto unit 3 which is under con-
struction and new plant projects (Loviisa unit 3, 
Olkiluoto unit 4 and Hanhikivi unit 1) are shown 
in Figure 10. Annual volume of the oversight of the 
Olkiluoto unit 3 construction was about 24 person-
years in 2015. Starting from year 2003, inspection 
organisations have been performing construction 
inspections in lower safety classes.
STUK has also personnel in the areas of safe-
guards and nuclear waste management and dis-
posal. The number of staff at the department of 
Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation was 26 at 
the end of 2015.
Ensuring competence
The management of STUK highlights the need for 
competent workforce. STUK has adopted a compe-
tence management system and nuclear safety and 
regulatory competencies are also emphasised in 
STUK’s strategy. Implementation of the strategy 
is reflected into the annual training programmes, 
on the job training and new re-cruitments. The 
national nuclear safety and waste management 
research programmes have an important role in 
the competence building of all essential organisa-
tions involved in nuclear energy. These research 
programmes have two roles: for the first ensuring 
the availability of experts and tools for regulatory 
oversight, and for the second ensuring the on-line 
transfer of the research results to the organisations 
participating in the steering of the programmes 
and fostering the expertise. STUK has an impor-
tant role in the steering of these programmes.
Most of the professional staff of STUK con-
ducting safety assessments and inspections has a 
university level degree. The average experience of 
the staff is about 15 years in the nuclear field. The 
competence analysis is carried out on regular basis 
and the results are used as the basis for the training 
programmes and the new recruitments. The train-
ing programme includes internal courses as well as 
courses organised by external organisations. On an 
average 5 % of the annual working hours has been 
used to enhance the competence.
An induction programme is set up at STUK for 
all new recruited inspectors. In addition to admin-
istrative issues, the induction programme includes 
familiarisation with legislation, regulatory guidance 
and regulatory oversight practices. Programme is 
tailored to each new inspector and its implementa-
tion is followed by the superior of the person. STUK 
has also participated in the preparation and execu-
tion of a basic professional training course on nu-
clear safety with other Finnish organisations in the 
field (described in more detail in Article 11).
National research programmes
In Finland, VTT Technical Research Centre of 
Finland Ltd is the largest research organisation 
in the field of nuclear energy. At VTT, about 200 
experts are working in the field of nuclear en-
ergy, about half of them full-time. The total volume 
of the nuclear energy research in Finland in the 
year 2012 was over 75 million € (estimate of the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy). This 
figure includes research related to use of nuclear 
energy conducted in all the stakeholder organi-
sations. Two thirds of the research is focused on 
the disposal of the spent fuel. The largest indi-
vidual organizations are VTT, LUT (Lappeenranta 
University of Technology), GTK (Geological Survey 
of Finland), and Aalto University (former Helsinki 
University of Technology, HUT).
The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2003 to 
ensure funding for a long-term nuclear safety and 
nuclear waste management research in Finland. 
Funds are collected annually from the licence hold-
ers to a special fund. Regarding nuclear safety re-
search the amount of money is proportional to the 
actual thermal power of the licensed power plants 
or the thermal power presented in the Decision-
in-Principle. For the nuclear waste research, the 
annual funding payments are proportional to the 
current fund holdings for the future waste manage-
ment activities. In 2016 the Nuclear Energy Act was 
amended and the temporary increase of the money 
collected to the nuclear safety research fund was 
introduced. The purpose of temporary increase of 
the research funding is to renew the ageing infra-
structure for the nuclear energy related research. 
The increased funding is collected in between the 
years 2016 and 2025. At the first stage the addi-
tional funding is allocated for the new hot cell at 
VTT Center of Nuclear Safety (CNS) and at the 
second stage for the thermohydraulic laboratory at 
Lappeenranta University of Technology. The esti-
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mated investment for the VTT CNS hot cell capacity 
is about 18 million €.
The research projects are selected so that they 
support and develop the competences in nuclear 
safety and to create preparedness for the regulator 
to be able to respond on emerging and urgent safety 
issues. These national safety research programmes 
are called SAFIR and KYT. The structure for 
SAFIR2018 was renewed to enhance multidiscipli-
nary co-operation within the research programme. 
Research areas are 1) Plant Safety and Systems 
Engineering, 2) Reactor Safety and 3) Structural 
Safety and Material. The key topics of the recent nu-
clear safety research programme (SAFIR2018) are 
automation, organisation and human factors, severe 
accidents and risk analysis, fuel and reactor phys-
ics, thermal hydraulics, structural integrity and 
development of research infrastructure. The amount 
of money collected from the licensees in year 2016 
was about 9 million € for nuclear safety research. 4 
million € is used to research projects and the rest is 
for the enhancement of the infrastructure. The deci-
sion by TVO to terminate the Olkiluoto unit 4 pro-
ject in 2015 decreased the funding by 24 % for the 
SAFIR2018 research projects. The research projects 
have also additional funding from other sources. 
The total volume of the programme in 2016 was 6.4 
million €.
The objective of KYT2018 (Finnish Research 
Programme on Nuclear Waste Management) is to 
ensure the sufficient and comprehensive availabil-
ity of the nuclear technological expertise and other 
capabilities required by the authorities when com-
paring different nuclear waste management ways 
and implementation methods. Likewise the previ-
ous programme also KYT2018 is divided into three 
main categories:
•	 new and alternative technologies in nuclear 
waste management
•	 safety research in nuclear waste management 
and
•	 social science studies related to nuclear waste 
management.
The main emphasis in the research programme 
will continue to be devoted to safety related re-
search. The funding of the research programme 
is provided mainly by the State Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund (VYR) into which those respon-
sible for nuclear waste management pay annually 
0.08 % of their respective assessed liability. The 
current level of annual funding is 1.8 million €.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 8.
Article 9. Responsibility of 
the licence holder
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that 
prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear 
installation rests with the holder of the rel-
evant licence and shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that each such licence holder 
meets its responsibility.
The responsibility for the safety rests with the 
licensee as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act. 
According to Section 9 of the Act, it shall be the 
licensee’s obligation to assure safe use of nuclear 
energy. That responsibility cannot be delegated or 
transferred to another party. Furthermore, it shall 
be the licensee’s obligation to assure such physi-
cal protection and emergency planning and other 
arrangements, necessary to ensure limitation of 
nuclear damage, which do not rest with the au-
thorities. In addition, a licensee whose operations 
generate or have generated nuclear waste shall 
be responsible for all nuclear waste management 
measures and their appropriate preparation, as 
well as for their costs.
It is the responsibility of the regulatory body 
to verify that the licensees fulfil the regulations. 
This verification is carried out through continuous 
oversight, safety review and assessment as well 
as inspection programmes established by STUK. 
In its activities, STUK emphasises the licensee’s 
commitment to the strong safety culture. The ob-
vious elements of licensee’s actions to meet these 
responsibilities are strict adherence of regula-
tions, prompt, timely and open actions towards 
the regulator in unusual situations, active role 
in developing the safety based on improvements 
of technology and science as well as effective ex-
ploitation of experience feedback. In addition to 
inspections and safety assessment, the follow-up 
of licensee’s efforts in achieving results is based on 
safety indicators. This system includes indicators 
e.g. for plant availability, incidents, probabilistic 
risk assessment results, safety system operability, 
radiation doses to personnel as well as releases to 
the environment and resulting radiation exposures 
to the general public.
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Based on the Chapter 7 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, to ensure that the financial liability for the 
future management and disposal of nuclear wastes 
and for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities 
is covered, the nuclear power companies are every 
third year obliged to present estimates for future 
costs of these operations and take care that the 
required amount of money is set aside to the State 
Nuclear Waste Management Fund. In order to 
provide for the insolvency of the nuclear utilities, 
they shall provide securities to the Ministry of 
Employment and Economy for the part of financial 
liability which is not yet covered by the Fund. At 
the end of 2015, the fund contained approximately 
2 450 million euros (see also Article 11).
The arrangements for the nuclear waste man-
agement liabilities related to the Olkiluoto unit 
3 will follow the same lines after the start of the 
operation. The licensee with a waste management 
obligation shall submit the waste management 
scheme and the calculations of waste manage-
ment costs, which are based on the scheme, to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy for ap-
proval for the first time early enough before begin-
ning the operations producing nuclear waste, and 
at the latest in connection with the operating li-
cence application. The waste management scheme 
shall cover all phases of waste management includ-
ing the decommissioning of the nuclear facilities 
and the disposal of all arising nuclear wastes. The 
scheme must be sufficiently detailed to allow the 
calculations for the assessed liability.
The financial provisions to cover the possible 
damages to third parties caused by a nuclear ac-
cident have been arranged in Finland according 
to the Paris and Brussels Conventions. Related to 
the revision of the Paris and Brussels Conventions 
in 2004, Finland has decided to enact unlimited li-
censee’s liability by law (see Article 7). The revised 
law will also have some other modifications, such 
as extending the claiming period up to 30 years 
for victims of nuclear accidents. As the interna-
tional ratification of the 2004 Protocols has been 
delayed, Finland made a temporary amendment in 
the Finnish Nuclear Liability Act in 2012, imple-
menting the provision on unlimited liability and 
requirement of insurance coverage for a minimum 
amount of EUR 700 million. The temporary law 
came into force in January 2012 and will be re-
pealed when the 2005 law amendment takes effect 
after the international ratification of the Paris and 
Brussels Conventions.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 9.
Article 10. Priority to safety
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that all organizations 
engaged in activities directly related to nucle-
ar installations shall establish policies that 
give due priority to nuclear safety.
Regulatory requirements regarding 
safety culture and safety management
The importance of a good safety culture is em-
phasised in the Nuclear Energy Act and in the 
STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016) Section 25, 
which states that when designing, constructing, 
operating and decommissioning a nuclear power 
plant, a good safety culture shall be maintained 
by making sure that the decisions and activities 
of the entire organisation reflect commitment to 
operational practices and solutions that promote 
safety. Licensee has to ensure that these require-
ments are applied in all organisations that partici-
pate in safety significant activities. An open work-
ing atmosphere must be promoted to encourage 
identification, reporting and elimination of factors 
endangering safety, and the personnel must be 
given opportunity to contribute to the continuous 
enhancement of safety. According to the Nuclear 
Energy Act, a responsible director has to be ap-
pointed for the construction and operation of a 
nuclear power plant. The appointment is subject to 
approval by STUK. The responsible director has a 
duty to ensure the safe use of nuclear energy and 
to see that the arrangements for physical protec-
tion and emergency preparedness and the safe-
guards control are complied with.
STUK’s Guide YVL A.3 sets general require-
ments for management systems. The new guide 
YVL A.3 is based on IAEA GS-R-3, and it includes 
detailed requirements for promoting good safety 
culture. The management system must support the 
characteristics of the organisational culture that 
promote good safety culture, and the management 
must express its commitment to safety. Safety 
culture expertise must be available for developing 
the safety culture. The development of the safety 
culture must be target oriented and systematic. 
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The procedures used must strengthen a vigilant, 
questioning and initiative attitude at all levels of 
the organisation. The licensee has to also establish 
a process to measure, assess and improve its safety 
culture.
STUK has published in the end of 2013 a new 
Guide YVL A.5 concerning nuclear facility con-
struction, commissioning and modifications. Also 
in this guide there are requirements concerning 
safety culture and risk management. During con-
struction and modification projects at existing 
NPPs the licensee must ensure that the contribut-
ing parties are able to perform according to safety 
requirements and there must be training on safety 
culture issues for the personnel taking part in the 
activities. The licensee must have procedures for 
evaluating and developing the safety culture of the 
contributing parties.
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident has high-
lighted the importance of safety culture and its 
continuous assessment and improvement. The 
Diet report in 2012 concluded that “fundamen-
tal causes of the accident are to be found in the 
ingrained conventions of Japanese culture; our 
reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question au-
thority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; 
our groupism; and our insularity”. These ingrained 
conventions were seen as factors preventing nec-
essary stakeholders (Licensee, Regulatory Body 
and Government) to take needed actions to ensure 
safety and therefore also contradicting with good 
safety culture. The influence of ingrained conven-
tions in national culture was considered in Finland 
to be one of the key messages in the Diet report. 
To better understand the ingrained conventions in 
the Finnish culture and their possible positive and/
or negative impacts on safety culture, STUK facili-
tated a research project touching this topic as part 
of the Finnish nuclear research program SAFIR 
(the SISIANS project).
Measures taken by licence holders
Loviisa NPP
Loviisa power plant is operated by Fortum Power 
and Heat Ltd, which is part of a large Fortum 
corporation. In 2015 Fortum renewed the qual-
ity and safety policy for the Nuclear Operations. 
The policy emphasises the priority of safety and 
requires commitment to high level safety culture 
from all parties involved in the activities. Fortum 
has also strengthened its internal Nuclear Safety 
Oversight function in its latest reorganisation. 
Loviisa NPP has a unit especially dedicated for 
operational experience and safety culture. In addi-
tion, the Loviisa NPP has an independent advisory 
body for safety issues, i.e., a nuclear safety commit-
tee with external expert members.
Fortum has continued having international 
peer reviews and evaluations at the Loviisa NPP 
in order to improve its own operations. In the be-
ginning of 2016 a WANO Corporate Peer Review 
was carried out for the first time in order to evalu-
ate corporate support functions to Loviisa NPP. 
The latest WANO Peer Review was performed in 
March 2015.
The licensee has continuously developed the 
self assessment procedure for the safety culture. 
As part of a periodic safety review the licensee 
conducted a safety culture self assessment in 2014 
which concluded that their safety culture complies 
with the requirements. During 2013-2016 there 
has been annual Safety Culture Survey and sev-
eral evaluations and development projects that 
have led to development of competences, instruc-
tions and support materials such as e.g. Human 
Performance Tools -training (HUP-training). 
Loviisa NPP is presently developing a safety cul-
ture improvement programme with which to coor-
dinate and communicate the activities done in the 
area of safety culture improvement.
Fortum has continued the special training pro-
gramme for the Loviisa NPP contractors, with 
which the licensee aims to ensure the right at-
titudes and safety culture and capabilities to safe 
operations among the contractors working at the 
NPP. Fortum is also going to train their contrac-
tors on Human Performance tools. In the training, 
Fortum communicates the safety-first-principle 
and nuclear and radiation safety issues for con-
tractor personnel working at the site. The contrac-
tor training is valid only for a determined time and 
has to be repeated when expired. All contractors 
and suppliers are regularly evaluated by Fortum 
to ensure that they can fulfil the regulatory and 
safety requirements. Fortum has developed pro-
cedures for ensuring appropriate competencies for 
the auditors conducting contractor evaluations and 
audits.
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Olkiluoto NPP
TVO, the licensee operating the Olkiluoto NPP has 
a corporate policy which shows commitment to cre-
ate conditions to produce electricity in a safe man-
ner. The corporate policy also emphasises commit-
ment to high level safety culture. TVO carries out 
regular safety culture surveys and more in-depth 
safety culture self assessments to ensure that their 
safety culture is on a good level. TVO reorganised 
its activities in 2015 and conducted pre- and post 
reorganisation safety evaluations.
TVO has a safety culture team that is inde-
pendent from operations and construction. This 
team meets regularly about 10 times a year and 
the mission is to form a comprehensive view of 
the safety culture situation in TVO and report and 
give suggestions to the top management. The NPP 
has a safety culture specialist who facilitates the 
safety culture self assessments and coordinates 
the safety culture improvement programme. TVO 
has a Corrective Actions Group (CAP) that works 
independently from line organisation and consists 
of specialists from quality, nuclear safety, risk man-
agement, human resource and occupational health 
areas. The objective for the CAP group is to support 
the continuous improvement of TVO’s performance 
by giving recommendations to the management.
TVO has undergone peer reviews by the WANO. 
The next peer review will be conducted in October 
2016. Furthermore, the WANO review 2016 will 
also include the WANO corporate review.
TVO carries out safety culture monitoring and 
continual development also at the construction site 
of Olkiluoto unit 3. Safety culture of the construc-
tion site is assessed through a questionnaire, inter-
views and analysis of safety observations, authori-
ty inspections and non-conformance records. Safety 
culture promotion methods include e.g. continual 
dialogue between the site workers and dedicated 
safety culture ambassadors, and regular safety 
culture meetings with the supplier. A strong safety 
culture is also essential during the commissioning 
phase, which has been taken into account in coop-
eration with the commissioning personnel.
TVO follows up the competence of contrac-
tors that work at the plant regularly or for longer 
terms. These contractors have to complete the 
same basic training as NPP’s own personnel as 
appropriate. Introductory nuclear and radiation 
safety training is a prerequisite for all persons 
working at the site. Priority to safety is addressed 
in the training. TVO regularly audits and evalu-
ates contractors and suppliers to ensure that they 
fulfil the regulatory and safety requirements.
Regulatory oversight
STUK has continued to regularly inspect the man-
agement systems of both licensees (Fortum and 
TVO) to ensure that they are fulfilling the require-
ments of the legislations and the Guide YVL 1.4 
and since the end of 2015 according to the new 
Guide YVL A.3. The Guide YVL A.3 has more de-
tailed requirements for management of a supply 
chain and for safety culture. Based on the inspec-
tions, there is still need for development actions to 
fulfil the requirements concerning both the process 
based management system and supply chain man-
agement.
STUK carries out safety culture oversight by 
collecting observations from resident inspectors, 
documents, events, and from other interactions 
with the licensee. STUK also conducts specific 
inspections focusing on Leadership and Safety 
culture. Further, STUK has utilised its TSO VTT to 
carry out independent safety culture assessments 
at the licensee organisations. Independent safety 
culture assessments were done at both Loviisa 
(2014) and Olkiluoto (2015-2016) NPPs to support 
STUK in the processes of periodic safety review of 
Loviisa NPP and the Licence Renewal of Olkiluoto 
1 and 2.
 During 2014–2016 specific safety culture in-
spections have dealt with safety culture evaluation 
methods and management commitment for safety 
culture and the responsibility for the management 
to define and communicate the requirement for 
a good safety culture. Additionally, safety culture 
topics are included in quality assurance audits. 
Safety culture related findings from different in-
spections are discussed in regular meetings in 
STUK and between the top management of the 
nuclear power plants and the regulatory body.
The event investigation that STUK conduct-
ed 2010-2011 concerning the Emergency Diesel 
Generator procurement for Olkiluoto NPP unit 3 
underlined the importance of strict supply chain 
management. This was an important input for 
developing the Finnish regulatory requirements 
concerning the topic in e.g. the Guides YVL A.3 and 
YVL A.5.
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STUK has developed a tool (HAKE-Polarion 
database) for gathering information about issues 
related to Human and Organisational Factors 
(HOF) from all oversight activities at all licensees 
or licensee applicants. The tool was implemented 
during 2015. STUK has also developed the process 
to create an overall picture of the licensee’s overall 
safety including HOF topics. The HAKE-Polarion 
tool and the developed process for creating the pic-
ture of the overall safety at licensee organisations 
are responding to the IRRS mission team’s sugges-
tion to have a more systematic method for collec-
tion and assessment of indications of the licensee’s 
safety culture. STUK is continuing the improve-
ment of the process by development projects.
STUK co-operates with VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland Ltd on safety culture related 
research and VTT has continued with re-assess-
ments on safety culture at the Olkiluoto unit 3 
construction site. Safety culture and supply chain 
management related seminars have also been ar-
ranged together with both VTT and the licensees, 
and vendors.
Means used by regulatory body 
in its own activities
Safety is emphasised in STUK’s Management 
System as well as in the framework contract be-
tween STUK and its technical support organisa-
tion VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland 
Ltd. STUK’s Safety and Quality Policy was fully 
renewed in 2014 as a result of the recommendation 
from the IRRS mission in 2012. The policy includes 
STUK’s values that give the highest priority to 
keeping the radiation exposure of people as low 
as reasonably achievable and preventing radiation 
and nuclear accidents. STUK has taken an active 
role in this area and both developed its own culture 
and taken the initiative in the assessment of cul-
tures of the licensee organisations. The IRRS mis-
sion was carried out in fall 2012 and the reviewers 
suggested that STUK could emphasize safety cul-
ture also in its quality manual in a more detailed 
way as well as to assure the safety consciousness 
of the staff. To meet this suggestion, STUK decided 
to update its management system and to include 
self-assessment of safety culture into annual self-
assessment programme. In addition STUK has 
provided training of safety culture to its personnel.
STUK conducts self-assessments and personnel 
questionnaires to follow up the internal opinions 
regarding the priority devoted to different topics of 
nuclear safety. STUK arranges regularly training 
for the inspectors and an introduction programme 
is set up for all new recruited inspectors.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 10.
Article 11. Financial and 
human resources
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that adequate 
financial resources are available to sup-
port the safety of each nuclear installation 
throughout its life.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that sufficient 
numbers of qualified staff with appropri-
ate education, training and retraining are 
available for all safety-related activities in 
or for each nuclear installation, through-
out its life.
Financial resources
Nuclear Energy Act defines as a condition for 
granting a construction or operating licence that 
the applicant has sufficient financial resources, 
necessary expertise and, in particular, that the op-
erating organisation and the competence of the 
operating staff are appropriate. According to the 
Nuclear Energy Act, the licensee shall also have 
adequate financial resources to take care of the 
safety of the plant. In addition, Nuclear Energy Act 
provides detailed regulations for the financial ar-
rangements for taking care of nuclear waste man-
agement and decommissioning. The Act on Third 
Party Liability provides regulations on financial 
arrangements for nuclear accidents, taking into 
account that Finland is a party to the Paris and 
Brussels conventions.
The financial preconditions are primarily as-
sessed by authorities other than STUK (mainly by 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy). 
The financial position and business environment 
of the licensee also affect the safety of plants, and 
STUK therefore follows licensees’ plans to improve 
safety of nuclear power plants, as well as organi-
sational reforms, safety research conducted by 
licensees, the number of employees and the compe-
tence of personnel. The annual reports of Fortum 
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Corporation and Teollisuuden Voima Oyj provide 
financial information on the utilities. Both utilities 
have annually invested typically about 40–50 M€ 
for maintaining the plant and improving safety. 
For example, TVO has recently made a decision to 
renew all emergency diesel generators where the 
overall investment is more than 100 M€.
A financing system for the costs of future waste 
management and decommissioning exists to en-
sure that the producers of nuclear waste bear their 
full financial liability on the coverage of those costs 
and that the costs can be covered even in case of 
insolvency of the waste generator. The pertinent 
licence-holders submit every three years for regu-
latory review the technical plans and cost calcula-
tions on which the liability estimates are based. 
After confirmation of the financial liabilities, the 
licensees pay fees to a State controlled Nuclear 
Waste Management Fund and provide securities 
for the liability not yet covered by the funded 
money. At the end of 2015, the fund contains ap-
proximately 2 450 million euros.
Human resources
The licensee has the prime responsibility for ensur-
ing that all the employees are qualified and author-
ised to their jobs. The regulatory requirements for 
human resources are stated in the Nuclear Energy 
Act (Sections 7 and 20), the STUK Regulation 
(STUK Y/1/2016) and Guide YVL A.4. The Nuclear 
Energy Act Section 7 was modified during 2012 
with a demand to appoint also deputies for the 
responsible persons for emergency preparedness, 
security and safeguards. According to Section 25 
of the STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016), signifi-
cant functions with respect to safety within nucle-
ar power plants must be designated, and training 
programmes shall be prepared for developing and 
maintaining of the professional qualifications of 
the persons working in such positions. Adequate 
command of the functions in question must also be 
verified. The Guide YVL A.4 sets requirements for 
training and qualifications of personnel working in 
functions that are important for plant safety and 
the Appendix E in this Guide sets requirements for 
NPP operator competence. This new YVL guide has 
more specific requirements for safety critical posi-
tions, e.g. for responsible director and persons re-
sponsible for safeguards, emergency preparedness 
and security (Appendix A–D). The guide also has 
specific requirements on management and leader-
ship competencies.
Human resource planning at the Loviisa NPP 
is based on a ten-year plan, which is subject to an-
nual management review and updating. Loviisa 
NPP has a project management procedure which 
includes a resource management approach that 
will support the NPP in evaluating and following 
up the resources needed for accomplishing the 
projects.
The training activities and procedures at the 
Loviisa NPP are constantly developing. Much re-
sponsibility is given to the line manager and the 
individual defining the qualification and training 
needs. The training unit can support the line or-
ganisation with their expertise, but the responsi-
bility for developing the specialist competence lies 
on the line organisation. The training unit’s main 
responsibility is to develop the human resource 
management procedures and organise the general 
training sessions. The training organisation has 
recently been strengthened with experts in behav-
ioural sciences. Fortum has a procedure for setting 
up individual development plans for all newcomers 
and for persons changing positions. Qualification 
needs for different positions are based on evalu-
ations performed by line managers. According to 
the requirements in the Guide YVL A.4 Loviisa 
NPP has started to develop tools and procedures 
for a more efficient competence management to 
be able to ensure the resources needed for also in 
the long-term. STUK has identified by inspections 
the needs for human resource development in, for 
example, quality assurance and safety cultural is-
sues. Loviisa NPP has during 2013-2016 faced sev-
eral organisational changes. Every organisational 
change is evaluated from safety point of view and 
the evaluation report is sent to STUK for review.
TVO has updated the personnel plan regu-
larly according to the phases of Olkiluoto NPP unit 
3 construction. TVO made a big organisational 
change during 2015 where the business model was 
changed, the organisation completely reorganised 
and also some personnel were laid off. This or-
ganisational change has been assessed by exter-
nal specialists and has been challenging for the 
organisation. TVO decided to stop the planning of 
the Olkiluoto unit 4 project to concentrate on final-
ising Olkiluoto 3 project and integrate the project 
organisation smoothly to the operating organisa-
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tion. Some administrative organisational parts 
of Posiva, which is a company responsible for the 
disposal project in Olkiluoto, were integrated to be 
part of TVO corporate group organisation.
TVO has a training program and procedures 
taking into account the commissioning of the 
Olkiluoto unit 3. TVO uses an IT-system that sup-
ports the managers e.g. in defining and following 
up individual development plans. TVO has defined 
training requirements for each position or job that 
automatically will be included in the new recruited 
person’s development plan.
Personnel and human resources related issues 
are included in STUK’s periodic and construc-
tion inspection programmes at the nuclear pow-
er plants. A top level inspection of the periodic 
inspection programme, “Human Resources and 
Competence”, includes assessment of human re-
source management, competence development and 
training programmes. It also covers the licensee’s 
procedures for managing human resources and 
competence of suppliers, sub-suppliers and other 
partners participating in functions affecting safety. 
During the years 2014-2016 STUK has paid atten-
tion especially to personnel planning and ensuring 
resources in development and modification pro-
jects. STUK also participates in examinations of 
shift personnel, where the operators working in the 
control rooms show that they are conversant with 
all salient matters related to plant operation and 
safety. STUK further approves the appointment 
of certain key personnel, such as the responsible 
director and his/her deputies.
Strengthen and maintain 
competence building in Finland
Ensuring an adequate national supply of experts 
in nuclear science and technology and high quality 
research infrastructure is recognised as a continu-
ous challenge in Finland because of the ongoing 
Olkiluoto unit 3 construction project and the new 
reactor project Hanhikivi unit 1.
During 2012–2015, the three Universities Aalto, 
Helsinki University and Lappeenranta University 
of Technology set up a Doctoral programme YTERA 
(Doctoral Programme for Nuclear Engineering 
and Radiochemistry), which was funded by the 
Academy of Finland, the universities and the in-
dustry (the NPP utilities and Posiva). The aim was 
to ensure supply of high-level expertise of nuclear 
engineering and radiochemistry and to create a 
permanent network for nuclear post-graduate edu-
cation. The programme covered all fields of nuclear 
engineering and radiochemistry and it involved 
close collaboration with Finnish research bodies, 
industry and authorities that deal with nuclear 
energy generation. In general, the YTERA doc-
toral programme has reached its goals. During the 
programme 21 new doctors have been graduated. 
The future challenge is to sustain the nationwide 
activities within the domestic network.
The main organisations in the nuclear energy 
area in Finland develop and organise the basic pro-
fessional training course on nuclear safety, which 
is a annually held approximately 6-week training 
programme for students and staff members of 
the participating organisations (STUK, the licen-
sees, VTT, Aalto University and Lappeenranta 
University of Technology, Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy). The first course commenced in 
September 2003 and the 14th basic professional 
training course will commence in autumn 2016. 
At the moment, over 800 newcomers and junior 
experts have participated in these courses. The 
content and structure of the course has been en-
hanced according to the feedback received from the 
participants.
During 2010-2012 a committee set up by the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy worked 
on a report aiming at giving recommendations 
and steps to be taken until the 2020’s for ensuring 
competence and resources needed for the nuclear 
sector. STUK was an active part in this committee. 
One of the recommendations of the committee was 
that the future needs and focus areas of Finnish 
nuclear energy sector research must be accurately 
defined and a long-term strategy drawn up for 
further development of research activities. This 
calls for a separate joint project among research 
organisations and other stakeholders in the field. 
The update of the competence review is planned to 
be carried on in 2017 to reflect the current changes 
in the operating environment.
At the end of January 2013 the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy set up a working 
group to prepare a research and development 
strategy with in the use of nuclear energy. The 
working group was chaired by a representative of 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. The 
nominated members of the working group include 
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experts from STUK, VTT, Finnish Academy, Aalto 
University, Technical University of Lappeenranta, 
University of Helsinki, Fortum, TVO and Posiva. 
Results of the research and development strategy 
work have been published at the end of April 2014. 
The report “Nuclear Energy Research strategy” 
emphasizes the importance of the research in the 
competence building. The recommendations of the 
working group are the following: 1) The areas of 
focus in nuclear energy research must be compiled 
into wide-ranging national programmes. 2) The 
scientific level of Finnish nuclear energy research 
needs to be raised. 3) Active participation is needed 
on international research that is important for 
Finland through broad-based national multidis-
ciplinary collaboration. 4) To secure the quality 
and quantity of researcher education, a broad and 
comprehensive doctoral programme network needs 
to be established for the nuclear energy field. 5) 
Building, maintaining, and utilizing infrastruc-
ture requires coordination at the national level. 
Financing needs to be considered strategically and 
the roles of national financiers need to be clari-
fied. 6) In research activities input is needed into 
the development of innovations. The growth of 
business operations and internationalisation are 
supported by bringing the players together under 
Team Finland. 7) It is proposed that an advi-
sory committee be set up in connection with the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy linked 
with nuclear energy research and co-operation as a 
permanent expert body to support decision-making 
in national questions related to the nuclear energy.
The ministry of the Employment and Economy 
has started the implementation of the recom-
mendations. In 2015 the Nuclear Energy Act was 
changed to ensure the financing for the enhance-
ment of the nuclear safety research infrastructure.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 11.
Article 12. Human factors
Each Contracting party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that the capabilities 
and limitations of human performance are 
taken into account throughout the life of a 
nuclear installation.
Regulatory requirements 
regarding human factors
Human reliability in the plant operations is largely 
based on good plant design and proper procedures, 
training and recruitment. According to Section 6 
of the STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016), atten-
tion shall be paid to the avoidance, detection and 
correction of human errors affecting safety and the 
limiting of their effects throughout the service life 
of the nuclear power plant. The possibility of hu-
man error shall be taken into account in the design 
of the nuclear power plant and in the planning of 
its operations and maintenance, so that human er-
rors and deviations from normal plant operations 
due to human error do not endanger plant safety or 
lead to common cause failures.
According to Section 16 of the STUK Regulation 
(STUK Y/1/2016), the control rooms of a nuclear 
power plant shall contain equipment that provides 
information on the state of the nuclear power 
plant and any deviations from normal operation. 
Furthermore, the nuclear power plant shall be 
equipped with automatic systems that actuate 
safety functions as required, and that control and 
supervise their functioning during operational oc-
currences to prevent accidents and during acci-
dents to mitigate their consequences. These auto-
matic systems shall be capable of maintaining the 
plant in a controlled state long enough to provide 
the operators with sufficient time to consider and 
implement the correct actions. The nuclear power 
plant shall have a supplementary control room 
independent of the main control room, and the nec-
essary local control systems for shutting down and 
cooling the nuclear reactor, and for removing decay 
heat from the fuel in the nuclear reactor and the 
spent fuel stored at the plant.
Measures taken by licence holders
Loviisa nuclear power plant
In 2015 Loviisa plant made a big investment in 
Human Performance training. Every person work-
ing at the plant attained a very practical two day 
training which focused on a few important Human 
Performance working methods that may by ef-
ficient usage effectively decrease human errors in 
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activities at the plant. These methods include pre-
job-briefing, de-briefing, peer checking and clear 
communication. Measures at the Loviisa plant to 
ensure adequate human performance have also 
focused on development of operating procedures. 
Large part of plant’s emergency operating pro-
cedures (EOPs) has been modified into flowchart 
format. These EOPs include symptom based iden-
tification which guides operators to event based 
procedures. Complex accident sequences and core 
melt accidents lead to symptom based operation. 
Human redundancy is provided by independent 
on-duty safety engineer. These emergency operat-
ing procedures have gone through a comprehensive 
set of verification and validation activities which 
include background analysis of the plant behav-
iour. Loviisa plant is equipped with a full scope 
training simulator which is used for operator train-
ing, including accident situations.
Fortum evaluates human reliability as part of 
the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). For ana-
lysing hidden defects influencing the course of a 
possible transient or accident, Fortum has evalu-
ated regularly different types of duties performed 
at the plant. In the analysis such operational and 
maintenance mistakes have been evaluated which 
may act as an initiating event of a transient or an 
accident. Different plant states and duties related 
to them have been evaluated in detail.
For preventing human errors it is important, 
that the operating events are carefully evaluated 
and, if necessary, procedures of the nuclear power 
plant are developed to prevent similar mistakes. 
Fortum has developed the utilisation of operating 
experiences and conducts the root cause analyses 
out of most significant events.
The protection systems of the plant initiate the 
safety systems automatically when needed so that 
the operators will have enough time to consider 
actions according to operating and emergency pro-
cedures. Due to the inherent characteristics of the 
Loviisa plant, e.g. large water volumes both in the 
primary and secondary circuits, the operators will 
have more time for consideration in a transient 
situation than usually at other nuclear power 
plants. The Loviisa units 1 and 2 have their own 
independent main control rooms where the needed 
process information is available and control actions 
can be performed. Alarm signals from the separate 
interim spent fuel storage are also available in the 
Loviisa unit 2 main control room. The process com-
puter gives process information in an illustrative 
format for the use of the operators.
In addition to the main control room, the shut-
down of the reactor as well as the control and 
monitoring actions necessary for safety can be per-
formed by means of a so-called emergency control 
post. For severe accidents there is a separate dedi-
cated control room shared by both units.
The I&C systems are currently being renewed 
at the Loviisa plant. Human performance is taken 
into account in the modification. This automation 
renewal project has a dedicated control room de-
sign team, which is in charge of the human factors 
engineering (HFE).
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Basis for safe operation has been laid already in 
design phase. The so-called 30-minute rule has 
been the design basis for the protection system at 
the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2. Important protection 
measures and safety systems start up automati-
cally so, that no actions of operating personnel are 
needed during the first thirty minutes after the 
beginning of the operational transient or postu-
lated accident. Proper emergency and transient 
situation procedures as well as training for those 
situations reduce the possibility of human errors 
further.
Olkiluoto reactor units 1 and 2 have their own 
independent control rooms, where the necessary 
process information is available, and from where 
all necessary control measures can be conducted. 
The alarms covering the separate interim stor-
age facility for spent fuel are also available in the 
control room of the Olkiluoto unit 1. The technical 
solutions of the main control rooms are based on 
the proven control room technology. During the 
renewal of turbine automation system several new 
computerised operator workstations and a large 
screen display system were installed into the main 
control room. Process information is presented 
by the indicating measuring equipment installed 
in the steering desks and panels as well as with 
several computer display units. Conventional and 
computer aided alarm systems are used to fa-
cilitate the management of main processes and 
other sub and auxiliary processes. The alarms are 
indicated primarily by the alarm lamp panels. The 
parallel alarms received through the computer 
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are seen on the monitors. In addition, the event 
and state data as well as deviations from warn-
ing/alarm limits are printed on the alarm print-
ers. A safety parameter display system (SPDS), 
which improves the performance capability of the 
operating personnel in controlling transient and 
accident situations, is in use at the Olkiluoto plant 
units. Main control room can now be described as 
a hybrid control room. All the main control room 
related modifications are tested at the training 
simulator, and operators are trained for managing 
the modified systems prior to the modifications are 
installed.
Currently both Olkiluoto plant units have an 
emergency control room that has been redesigned 
and relocated to provide better co-ordination and 
control for plant shutdown and safety function 
monitoring. Cooling the reactor down to a safe cold 
state can be carried out after the shutdown by us-
ing emergency control room and some local control 
posts.
There are methods for preventing human errors 
during operation. Main areas to be considered are 
operation, maintenance and modification projects. 
Human reliability can be enhanced in every day 
activities with special methods. These methods 
include pre-job-briefing, de-briefing, peer checking, 
independent verification and clear communication. 
TVO has trained and introduced these methods 
in feasible activities. Proper work planning and 
Permit-to-Work-system in addition to up-to-date 
procedures are key methods in maintenance relat-
ed activities to ensure safety during maintenance. 
Checking and approval requirements are also con-
sidered when requalifying systems back into oper-
ation. This work is part of a company wide project 
called “Human Performance 2012” which incor-
porates also other measures to improve human 
performance. The aim is to support managers and 
the personnel in managing human performance to 
avoid as many human mistakes as possible.
Human Factor issues are taken into account 
in all events. Lessons learned from the events are 
taken into account in the corrective action plans 
and lessons learned are used in internal training 
and organisational development. TVO has utilised 
operating experience and results of root cause 
analyses in the development of human aspects in 
the operating procedures. Errors related to the 
maintenance actions have also been examined 
and measures have been developed to avoid corre-
sponding errors. Fatigue has been identified as an 
important factor to be managed.
TVO has conducted a probabilistic risk assess-
ment (PRA) where the consequences of human 
errors have been studied. Latent maintenance and 
testing errors have been studied in connection with 
the system analyses related to the PRA. In addi-
tion to the human factor experts, experienced staff 
members from the operating and maintenance 
personnel have participated in assessing the pos-
sibility of errors. The identified error possibilities 
have been classified into groups according to their 
importance and the most important ones have 
been modelled in the PRA study to clarify the 
risks related to errors. The reliability of operator 
actions conducted during accident conditions was 
assessed as a part of the PRA analysis. The diag-
nostic errors that may be made in connection with 
accidents have also been assessed. Based on the 
results of the analyses concerning the human er-
rors, a few additions and modifications have been 
made on the emergency and operating procedures 
of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2. Emergency operat-
ing procedures have been recently re-evaluated 
in order to identify any previously unnoticed er-
rors. Some clarifications have been made into 
procedures based on these talk/walk-throughs and 
simulator tests.
For the Olkiluoto unit 3, human factors engi-
neering has been part of the design phase. Concept 
of operation is taken from existing units and ref-
erence plants. Main control room has operational 
I&C system with operating terminals and large 
screen displays. This interface can be used in all 
plant conditions. Additional information can be 
integrated into this system, e.g. alarm systems and 
operating procedures. Safety related I&C system 
has own traditional operating panels which are 
diverse control method for operational I&C. These 
safety panels include also hardwired controls 
which are additional back-up for all I&C systems. 
Olkiluoto unit 3 has also remote shutdown sta-
tion. Feasibility of human factors engineering will 
be demonstrated in validation studies. Integrated 
validation will be done at a full scope simulator 
before plant commissioning.
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Regulatory oversight
Human factors have to be taken into account in 
the design and analysed in the failure analyses 
of plant safety systems and in probabilistic risk 
assessments. Such analyses have been completed 
for both Finnish nuclear power plants. In addi-
tion to this high level licensing documentation, 
individual system design needs to be reviewed 
by STUK. Main emphasis is on the control room 
design approvals and verification and validation 
procedures for normal and emergency operations. 
Design documentation needs to reflect proper hu-
man factors design and design shall be coordinated 
with Human Factors Engineering -program and 
according to quality plans, change processes and 
verification/validation plans. Finally licensee shall 
demonstrate the safety with integrated system val-
idation and analyse the results. Human error dis-
crepancies need to be addressed if there are major 
findings, before commissioning of the control room 
systems can proceed.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 12.
Article 13. Quality assurance
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that quality assurance 
programmes are established and implemented 
with a view to providing confidence that spec-
ified requirements for all activities important 
to nuclear safety are satisfied throughout the 
life of a nuclear installation.
Regulatory requirements regarding 
management systems
According to Section 25 of STUK Regulation (STUK 
Y/1/2016), the organisations participating in the 
design, construction, operation, and decommission-
ing of a nuclear power plant are required to employ 
a management system. The quality management 
system must cover all functions influencing plant 
safety, and the licensees are further required to en-
sure that all their suppliers, sub-suppliers and oth-
er partners participating in functions that affect 
nuclear and radiation safety adhere to the quality 
management system. Along with the management 
system, the STUK Regulation sets requirements 
for the documentation of the lines of management 
and monitoring of the operations.
STUK’s Guide YVL A.3 sets general require-
ments for management systems. Guide YVL A.3 
adheres to IAEA Safety Standard GS-R-3 on man-
agement systems. Requirements for quality man-
agement of system design are established in the 
new Guide YVL B.1. The quality management 
requirements related to specific technical areas are 
presented in the corresponding technical guides. 
STUK also has a new YVL guide concerning nu-
clear facility construction and modifications, i.e., 
Guide YVL A.5. In this new guide, there are re-
quirements for example on project management 
and supplier management. The management sys-
tems of the licensees and applicants are subject 
to approval by STUK. According to the Guide YVL 
A.3, any safety-significant revisions to the manage-
ment system must be submitted for approval to 
STUK, but minor revisions are only submitted for 
information prior to their use.
Measures taken by licence holders
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Fortum’s Policy Commitment to Quality in the 
Nuclear Power Operations was revised and con-
firmed by the management of Fortum in 2015. The 
development of Loviisa NPP’s quality management 
system is based on the principle of continuous im-
provement in accordance with the observations 
and remarks made in quality audits and quality 
assessments. The environmental management sys-
tem of the plant is compatible with the ISO 14001 
and OHSAS 18001 standards.
Fortum has developed their management sys-
tem, according to the guide YVL 1.4 requirements 
and in 2014 Fortum started a development pro-
ject aiming at fulfilling the new Guide YVL A.3 
requirements concerning the process based man-
agement system. This project concerns Fortum’s 
Nuclear operations and Loviisa NPP and will con-
tinue. The quality management system of Fortum 
Power & Heat Oy for the Loviisa NPP complies 
with the requirements of the Guide YVL A.3 in 
most respects, but some deviations still remain 
of which the most significant is the process based 
management approach. Other areas where there 
still are development needs are the quality man-
agement in procurement and supply management. 
Fortum conducted an independent evaluation of 
the purchasing activities at the Loviisa NPP in the 
end of 2012 and the evaluation resulted in a devel-
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opment program. Also the implementation phase of 
the Guides YVL A.3 and A.5 resulted in additional 
development needs and actions that are still ongo-
ing. Loviisa NPP has clearly defined the responsi-
bilities for developing the management system and 
reformed the procedures for reviewing the manage-
ment system. Loviisa NPP has had special training 
sessions for defined personnel on the management 
system and the Guide YVL A.3. Loviisa has re-
formed also the quality assurance (QA) personnel 
qualification demands and procedures for evaluat-
ing and developing the QA-competence.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
TVO’s quality management system is described 
in the Quality Management Manual. It takes into 
account the requirements from YVL A.3, IAEA 
GS-R-3 and ISO 9001:2000. TVO is actively de-
veloping the management system towards a pro-
cess based management system due to the grow-
ing organisation and the need for systematic and 
efficient operations throughout the organisation. 
The Management System guides all TVO’s opera-
tions and provides each staff member with proce-
dures for the safe, economical, high-quality and 
environmentally friendly generation of electricity. 
TVO’s company-level policies are nuclear safety 
and quality policy, social responsibility policy, pro-
duction policy and corporate security policy. The 
functions and responsibilities of TVO’s organisa-
tions and personnel are described in detail in the 
TVO’s Administrative Rules, in the Organisational 
Manual and in the manuals and instructions of 
individual organisational units. For the Olkiluoto 
unit 3 construction phase, STUK has approved 
“The Quality Plan for Olkiluoto 3 Project”. The 
review of document as well as review of the QM 
systems of plant vendor and major suppliers has 
been carried out by STUK. STUK has also asked 
external QM experts’ opinions on the QM systems.
The quality management system of TVO for 
the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 mainly complies with 
the requirements of the Guide YVL A.3. The most 
significant development need concerns the process 
management and process descriptions. TVO also 
needs to develop the purchasing processes and the 
quality assurance competence in procurement. The 
Guide YVL A.3 was implemented to the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2 during 2015 and the implementation 
for the Olkiluoto unit 3 will be carried out during 
the evaluation of the operating licence application.
Regulatory oversight
STUK has followed up the implementation of 
the Guide YVL A.3 requirements in the manage-
ment systems of the licensees during the peri-
odic inspection program. The top level inspection 
of the STUK’s periodic inspection programme, 
“Functioning of the Management System”, in-
cludes assessment of functioning, development and 
assessment of the management system as well as 
assessment of the organisation for quality man-
agement. The “Management and Safety Culture” 
inspection (see Article 10) also contains items con-
cerning management systems. During 2014-2016 
the management system inspections have especial-
ly dealt with the process management, follow up of 
corrective actions, quality assurance competence in 
procurement and supply management. The man-
agement systems of the main suppliers are also 
reviewed and assessed and their implementation 
is verified through inspections and audits mainly 
by the licensee where STUK is taking part as an 
observer.
Concerning the Olkiluoto unit 3 construction 
project, STUK has performed two quality man-
agement and quality assurance inspections every 
year as a part of the construction inspection pro-
gramme. In addition, STUK has participated as 
an observer in the licensee’s and vendor’s quality 
audits at the subcontractors. STUK’s inspections 
have been focussed on the ongoing integration 
of the management system of Olkiluoto unit 3 to 
TVO’s management system.
Management system of the regulatory body
STUK has an own Quality Manual that includes 
safety and quality policy, description of the qual-
ity system, organisation and management, roles 
and responsibilities, main and supporting work-
ing processes and personnel policy. The results 
of management reviews, internal audits, self-as-
sessments and international evaluations are used 
as inputs for the enhancement projects of the 
Quality Management System at STUK. In addi-
tion to STUK’s Quality Manual, all main functions 
of STUK have their own more detailed Quality 
Manuals.
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STUK’s management system will be further de-
veloped during the next years according to the sug-
gestions of the IRRS mission and its follow-up. For 
example, STUK will continue reviewing and revis-
ing the existing Quality Manuals and guidance 
documents for consistency and improve overall de-
scriptions of the processes including sub-processes 
and their interdependency. STUK has developed 
further a systematic long-term programme for 
self-assessments, internal and external audits and 
evaluations on the effectiveness of the processes. 
In addition, STUK has developed new more for-
malised principles of using graded approach in its 
oversight activities as a response to IRRS mission 
findings. STUK will continue developing more de-
tailed procedures for the use of graded approach 
in the authorisation of systems, structures and 
components and in the planning and conducting 
inspections.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 13.
Article 14. Assessment and 
verification of safety
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that:
i. comprehensive and systematic safety as-
sessments are carried out before the con-
struction and commissioning of a nuclear 
installation and throughout its life. Such 
assessments shall be well documented, sub-
sequently updated in the light of operating 
experience and significant new safety in-
formation, and reviewed under the author-
ity of the regulatory body;
ii. verification by analysis, surveillance, test-
ing and inspection is carried out to ensure 
that the physical state and the operation 
of a nuclear installation continue to be 
in accordance with its design, applicable 
national safety requirements, and opera-
tional limits and conditions.
Regulatory approach to safety assessment
The prerequisite of the construction and operating 
licences is that the licence applicant has made its 
own safety assessment on the facility and in partic-
ular how the facility meets Finnish safety require-
ments. The fulfilment of the safety requirements 
is demonstrated in the construction and operating 
licence documentation. STUK makes an independ-
ent safety assessment concerning the application 
and STUK’s assessment is required in the Nuclear 
Energy Act. Conditions for granting a licence are 
provided in the Nuclear Energy Act. In Section 20 
of the Act it is further stated that the operation of 
the nuclear facility shall not be started until STUK 
has ascertained that the nuclear facility meets the 
prescribed safety requirements.
The Nuclear Energy Decree requires that when 
applying for a construction licence, the applicant 
must submit to STUK the following documents: 
a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, a design 
phase Probabilistic Risk Assessment, a proposal 
for a safety classification document, a description 
of Quality Management during the construction of 
the nuclear facility, preliminary plans for periodic 
inspections, for the arrangements for security and 
emergency preparedness, and a plan for arranging 
the safeguards control. For the operating licence, 
the applicant must submit to STUK: the Final 
Safety Analysis Report, the Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment, the safety classification document, 
the quality management programme for the opera-
tion of the nuclear facility, Operational Limits and 
Conditions, a programme for periodic inspections, 
security and emergency plans, a description on 
administrative rules for safeguards, a programme 
for radiation monitoring in the environment of the 
nuclear facility, a description of how safety require-
ments are met, and a programme for the manage-
ment of ageing. In addition, the Decree gives STUK 
a possibility to ask other documents considered 
necessary for safety demonstration.
Design of the facility is described in the 
Preliminary (PSAR) and Final (FSAR) Safety 
Analysis Reports. As listed above, the reports 
have to be submitted to STUK for approval with 
the applications for construction and operating 
licences. PSAR/FSAR forms the basis to STUK´s 
safety assessment which is required before grant-
ing the Construction/Operation Licence (see Article 
7). According to the Nuclear Energy Decree, FSAR 
has to be continuously updated, and changes to 
FSAR have to be submitted to STUK for approval. 
Requirements for the plant modification process 
are presented in the Guide YVL B.1. The main 
principle in plant modification process is that 
conceptual design plans and system-specific pre-
inspection documents of Safety Class 1, 2 and 3 
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systems must be submitted to STUK for approval. 
STUK reviews and approves the modification prior 
to its implementation at the plant. In connec-
tion with a system modification, the Final Safety 
Analysis Report shall be amended accordingly 
without delay.
The general design bases for nuclear fuel are 
defined in the Guide YVL B.4. The design objective 
is that the probability of fuel failure is low during 
normal operational conditions and anticipated op-
erational transients, and that during a postulated 
accident the rate of fuel failures remains low and 
the fuel remains in a coolable state. Detailed re-
quirements for the design, quality management 
and control, handling, storage and transport of fuel 
are specified in the Guides YVL A.1, YVL A.5, YVL 
A.11, YVL D.2, YVL D.3 and YVL E.2.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the oper-
ating licence is granted for a fixed term. However, 
legislation has not prescribed the length of the 
term. The term is proposed by the licensee in the 
application, and must be justified on the basis of 
the ageing and planned future operation of the 
nuclear facility. Particular attention is paid to 
licensee´s processes and activities and planned 
safety improvements to ensure safety for the esti-
mated duration of operation. The procedure for op-
erating licence renewal is in general the same as in 
applying for an operating licence for a new nuclear 
facility. Specific requirements on the documents to 
be submitted to STUK for the renewal of the oper-
ating licence are described in the Guide YVL A.1. 
Renewal of the operating licence always involves 
a periodic safety review of the facility. If a licence 
is granted for a significantly longer term than ten 
years, STUK requires the licensee to carry out a 
periodic safety review within about ten years of 
receiving the operating licence or of conducting 
the previous periodic safety review. For a separate 
periodic safety review, STUK must be provided 
with similar safety-related reports as in apply-
ing for renewal of the operating licence. Periodic 
safety review of the Loviisa plant was carried out 
in 2014–2016, and the periodic safety review of the 
Olkiluoto plant was carried out in 2007–2009 (see 
Article 6).
According to the STUK Regulation (STUK 
Y/1/2016), nuclear power plant safety and the 
technical solutions of its safety systems shall be 
assessed and substantiated analytically and, if 
necessary, experimentally. The analyses shall be 
maintained and revised as necessary, taking into 
account operating experience from the plant itself 
and from other nuclear power plants, the results 
of safety research, plant modifications, and the 
advancement of calculation methods. The analyti-
cal methods employed to demonstrate compliance 
with the safety requirements shall be reliable, 
verified and qualified for the purpose. The analyses 
shall demonstrate the conformity with the safety 
requirements with high certainty. Any uncertainty 
in the results shall be considered when assessing 
the meeting of the safety requirements.
Detailed requirements concerning transient and 
accident analyses, including sensitivity analyses, 
are presented in the Guide YVL B.3. Requirements 
for probabilistic risk assessments are given in the 
Guide YVL A.7. Acceptance criteria for the analy-
ses are presented in Guides YVL B.4, YVL B.5 
and YVL B.6. Acceptance criteria for limitation of 
public exposure in the environment of a nuclear 
power plant or other nuclear facility and limitation 
of radioactive releases from the plant are given in 
the Nuclear Energy Act 1988/161.
Deterministic safety assessment
As mentioned above, detailed requirements con-
cerning transient and accident analyses, including 
sensitivity analyses, are presented in the Guide 
YVL B.3. YVL B.3 was revised together with other 
YVL Guides and was published 1st December 2013. 
New features of YVL B.3 compared with previous 
guides were inclusion of design extension condi-
tions as an event category to be analysed and the 
possibility to utilise the so-called Best Estimate 
plus Uncertainty analysis method as an alterna-
tive to conservative approach. The event categories 
used in the Guide YVL B.3 are shown in the Table 
1.
The acceptance criteria considering doses and 
releases in case of severe accidents are determined 
in the Nuclear Energy Decree. Other acceptance 
criteria are given in the B-series of YVL Guides for 
plant and system design.
Fortum submitted with the licence renewal 
documentation in 2005–2007 the revised Final 
Safety Analysis Report, including the transient 
and accident analyses of the Loviisa units 1 and 
2. The analyses presented in the Safety Analysis 
Report cover anticipated operational transients, 
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category 1 and 2 accidents, and severe accidents. 
The analyses cover comprehensively different op-
erating states and include accident analyses for 
the storages of spent fuel and reactor operational 
wastes. Fortum will supplemented the determinis-
tic safety analyses by analyses of type A and B de-
sign extension conditions, as required by YVL B.3, 
in association with the plant I&C renewal project 
by the end of 2018. Deterministic DEC C analyses 
will be submitted to STUK in 2019. Extreme ex-
ternal events have already been included in the 
plant PRA analyses. STUK reviewed the analyses 
for the Loviisa NPP license renewal and methods 
applied in the analyses. STUK contracted VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland to carry out 
independent analyses to verify the results given in 
the licence renewal documentation and to conduct 
sensitivity analyses. STUK concluded that the 
plant behaviour in different transient and accident 
situations has been analysed comprehensively and 
that the methods used in the analyses are properly 
validated to describe the operation of the Loviisa 
plant.
Accident and transient analyses of the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2, as well as the analysis methods, 
have been updated and developed throughout the 
operation of the plant. TVO revised completely 
the accident and transient analyses in conjunction 
with the application for the renewal of its operat-
ing licence in 1995–1998. The analyses were at 
that time carried out for nuclear fuel that is no 
longer being used at the NPP units. For the peri-
odic safety review in 2007–2009, TVO updated the 
accident analyses using the SVEA-96 Optima 2 as 
a reference fuel. The plant modifications carried 
out after the renewal of the operating licence in 
1998 were also taken into account in the update. 
Since the periodic safety review, YVL Guides have 
been revised and requirements regarding analyses 
of design extension conditions have been intro-
duced. TVO will updated its safety analyses taking 
into account the new regulation in connection with 
the renewal of operating licence for Olkiluoto units 
1 and 2 in 2017.
The calculation methods used for analysing the 
plant normal operating conditions, transients and 
postulated accidents were developed by the suppli-
er of the Olkiluoto plant units. The methods have 
been qualified to an extent corresponding to a good 
level from the international perspective. STUK 
reviewed the analyses updated for the periodic 
safety review and the calculation methods used. 
The conclusion was that the analyses of transients 
and accidents of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 were 
conducted as referred to in the Government Decree 
(733/2008) in force at the time of the review. STUK 
required updating of the loss of coolant analyses 
which TVO submitted in 2010.
The preliminary analyses of Olkiluoto unit 3 
were presented to STUK in PSAR and the Topical 
Reports appended to PSAR with the application for 
the construction licence. STUK contracted techni-
cal support organisations to carry out independent 
analyses to verify the results. STUK approved the 
PSAR of Olkiluoto unit 3 in January 2005 just 
before the construction licence was granted by the 
Government. TVO has submitted updated analyses 
for the Final Safety Analysis Report in 2008–2015. 
The analyses will be reviewed as a part of the 
Olkiluoto unit 3 operating licence application.
Table 1. Event categories used in Guide YVL B.3.
DiD level Event category Frequency Acceptance criterion (doses)
Level 1 Normal operation (DBC1) 0.1 mSv
Level 2 Anticipated operational 
occurrences (DBC2)
f > 10-2/a 0.1 mSv
Level 3a Postulated accidents Class 1 
(DBC3)
10-2/a > f > 10-3/a 1 mSv
Postulated accidents Class 2 
(DBC4)
f < 10-3/a 5 mSv
Level 3b Design extension conditions 
(DEC)
Multiple failures
DEC A – CCF combined with DBC2 / DBC3
DEC B – Complex failure combination
DEC C – Very rare external event
20 mSv
Level 4 Severe accidents (SA) Release limit
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Probabilistic risk assessment
Regulatory requirements on PRA
In the Nuclear Energy Decree, probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) has been included since 1988 
in the list of documents to be submitted to STUK 
for the review of the operating licence application. 
Since 2008 the design phase PRA has been in the 
list of documents to be submitted to STUK for the 
review of the construction licence application ac-
cording to the Nuclear Energy Decree, but a limited 
preliminary PRA has been required in Regulatory 
YVL Guides since 1996. PRA for construction li-
cence application is based on preliminary design 
information and generic reliability data for com-
ponents. PRA for operating licence application is 
based on essentially final design information and 
vendor specific component reliability data, where 
available, and more detailed modelling of systems.
According to the STUK Regulation (STUK 
Y/1/2016), nuclear power plant safety and the 
technical solutions of its safety systems shall be 
assessed and substantiated analytically and, if 
necessary, experimentally. The analyses shall be 
maintained and revised as necessary, taking into 
account operating experience from the plant itself 
and from other nuclear power plants, the results 
of safety research, plant modifications, and the 
advancement of calculation methods. The detailed 
requirements on the use of PRA are set forth in the 
Regulatory Guide YVL A.7. Detailed requirements 
on risk-informed applications are included in sev-
eral other YVL Guides.
STUK required in 1984 that the Finnish utili-
ties Fortum (former Imatran Voima Oy) and TVO 
shall make extensive probabilistic risk assess-
ments for the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plants. The objective of these assessments was to 
determine the plant-specific risk topographies of 
the essential accident sequences. Another impor-
tant objective was to enhance the plant personnel’s 
understanding of the plant and its behaviour in 
different situations. Therefore STUK also required 
that the PRAs are performed mainly by the utility 
personnel and external consultants are used only 
for special topics.
In 1987 STUK published the Regulatory Guide 
YVL 2.8 on PRA. The Guide was updated in 1996 
and 2003. In Nov. 2013 it was replaced by the new 
Regulatory Guide YVL A.7. Currently the Guide 
requires a full-scope (including internal events, 
fires, floods, seismic events, harsh weather and 
other external events) PRA for power operation 
and low-power and shut-down states. PRA shall 
cover the analysis of the probability of core damage 
(Level 1) and large release of radioactive substanc-
es (Level 2). PRA shall be updated continuously 
to reflect plant and procedure modifications and 
changes in reliability data.
Guide YVL A.7 includes the following probabil-
istic safety goals:
•	 Core damage frequency less than 1∙10-5/year
•	 Large radioactive release (> 100 TBq Cs-137) 
frequency less than 5∙10-7/year.
These safety goals apply as such to new NPP units. 
For operating units, instead of the numerical safety 
goals, the SAHARA (safety as high as reasonably 
achievable) principle and the principle of continu-
ous improvement are applied.
Guide YVL A.7 also includes requirements on 
several risk informed applications, such as analy-
sis of plant modifications, risk-informed in-service 
inspections and testing, development of emergency 
operating procedures and training programmes 
and review of safety classification and Operational 
Limits and Conditions.
For a new NPP unit, a preliminary PRA cover-
ing Levels 1 and 2 shall be submitted to STUK for 
the review of the construction licence application 
(design phase PRA) and the updated and comple-
mented PRA (Levels 1 and 2) shall be submitted 
for the review of the operating licence application.
PRA’s computer models shall be submitted to 
STUK. PRA is routinely used by STUK to support 
its decision making, for example, in the review of 
plant modifications and applications for exemption 
from Operational Limits and Conditions and in the 
analysis of operating events.
Main developments in risk informed 
regulation and safety management 
during the reporting period
During the reporting period the role of risk in-
formed regulation and safety management has 
been further strengthened by STUK and the licen-
sees. The following activities can be given as exam-
ples of the increased role of risk informed methods:
•	 Unit-specific PRA models have been completed 
for Loviisa NPP unit 2 and Olkiluoto NPP unit 2.
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•	 TVO and Fortum have applied PRA in support 
of the review of safety classification of the oper-
ating units.
•	 The finalisation of the PRA for Olkiluoto unit 
3 under construction is still ongoing. Risk in-
formed applications have been used in the de-
sign of the unit and the risk informed applica-
tions for the operating phase are under develop-
ment in accordance with the YVL Guides. PRA 
is also used in the planning of commissioning 
testing programmes.
•	 Risk informed methods have been used to sup-
port ageing management, for example, trend 
analysis of failure data. In connection with the 
life extension of Loviisa NPP unit 1 reactor 
pressure vessel, the probabilistic analysis of 
pressurised thermal shock was used to evalu-
ate the safety significance of radiation induced 
embrittlement of weld seams.
•	 Risk informed approach has been used also for 
inspections of Loviisa reactor vessel internals. 
Preliminary results show that risk reduction 
could be gained by doubling the inspection 
interval, which would decrease the risk due to 
heavy load drop significantly.
The use of PRA in several well-established appli-
cations has been continued and the methods have 
been further refined.
In addition to the risk informed applications 
based on regulatory requirements, the licensees 
use PRA in applications supporting their operat-
ing activities, for example availability analysis and 
reliability centered maintenance.
Further development of the PRA computer code 
software developed at STUK has been continued in 
a joint project with VTT Technical Research Centre 
of Finland. The software is used in the review of 
the PRAs submitted by the licensees and in sup-
port of risk informed decision making at STUK.
Probabilistic risk assessment 
of the Loviisa NPP
Fortum provided STUK with Level 1 PRA in 1989. 
Since 1990 Fortum has extended PRA by analys-
ing risks related to fires, floods, earthquakes, se-
vere weather conditions and outages, as well as by 
conducting Level 2 PRA. Plant modifications have 
been carried out continuously at the Loviisa NPP, 
including safety system improvements, fire safety 
improvements, implementation of Severe Accident 
Management systems and a major modernisation 
programme in mid 1990’s (see Annex 2). By means 
of these modifications risks have been decreased 
and the risk topography of the plant has been 
balanced. Technical solutions of the modifications 
have also been often justified with PRA.
The development of the core damage frequency 
since 2000 is shown in Figure 11. Until year 2014, 
PRA was done only for Loviisa NPP unit 1 and the 
small differences between the NPP units were as-
sessed on case by case basis. Thereafter unit-specif-
ic PRA models have been kept up-to-date reflecting 
the small differences between unit 1 and unit 2. At 
the end of year 2015 the calculated estimate for the 
total probability of reactor core damage was about 
1.7∙10 5 per reactor year for unit 1 and 2.0∙10 5 per 
reactor year for unit 2. The relative contribution to 
the annual core damage frequency from different 
groups of initiating events is shown for NPP unit 
1 in Figure 12. There are no major differences be-
tween unit 1 and unit 2 risk profiles.
Fortum has also provided STUK with the Level 
2 PRA, in which the integrity of the containment 
and the release of radioactive materials from the 
plant to the environment are evaluated. In the lat-
est update in 2015, it was estimated that the total 
probability of a large release to the environment 
is about 9.3∙10–6 per reactor year. The estimate 
includes all initiating event groups, except for 
seismic events. The following modifications have 
Loviisa NPP Unit 1 core damage frequency
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Figure 11. Development of the estimate of annual core 
damage frequency of the Loviisa NPP in 2004–2015.
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decreased core damage frequency and large release 
frequency: the independent air-cooled cooling units 
for decay heat removal from the reactor core and 
from the spent fuel pools, enhanced protection 
against extreme high seawater level, renewal of 
auxiliary service water system, modifications in 
power distribution for some containment systems, 
renewal of Pressuriser Overpressure Protection 
Valve (PORV), renewal of pressuriser spray system 
and new procedures for sump recirculation in shut-
down states.
The results of STUK’s review show that Fortum 
has applied in its analyses commonly accepted 
methods in modelling transient and accident situ-
ations of the plant and in collecting and analysing 
reliability data. The reviews also show that the 
assessments provide an adequate basis for risk 
informed decision making.
PRA has been used by the licensee in the risk-
informed applications as required by YVL Guides, 
for example in evaluation of plant modifications, 
review of safety classification, development of 
Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection programme, 
risk informed review of the Operational Limits 
and Conditions, including optimisation of testing 
intervals, and optimisation of Operational Limits 
and Conditions (allowable outage times). The 
Loviisa NPP has also introduced a Risk-Informed 
In-Service Inspection programme for piping. The 
number of inspections was increased but the focus 
shifted from high safety classes to lower safety 
classes. This shift is due to the fact that some lower 
safety class pipings have relatively large risk sig-
nificance as they belong to vital support systems, 
or leaks in lower class pipelines may lead to conse-
quential damage to safety systems. The radiation 
doses to inspection personnel will decrease as a 
result of the new inspection programme.
Probabilistic risk assessment of 
the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2
TVO submitted to STUK the first version of Level 
1 PRA in 1989. Since then, the PRA has been 
updated several times and the scope has been ex-
tended. TVO has now practically full-scope PRA 
covering levels 1 and 2 for full power operation and 
for low power and shutdown states.
Annual core damage frequency since 2000 is 
shown in Figure 13. Plant modifications have been 
carried out continuously at the Olkiluoto plant, 
including backfitting with severe accident manage-
ment systems and power uprate and modernisa-
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Figure 12. Relative contribution of different initiating 
event types to the annual core damage frequency in 
2015 for Loviisa NPP unit 1. The most significant initiat-
ing events at full power (power operation, PO) are fires 
in the control building and in the turbine hall, and loss 
of off-site power due to strong wind combined with 
heavy snow fall or algae in the sea water intake. At 
shutdown (SD) the most significant initiating events 
are drop of heavy loads and various fire events. Note: 
“Flood” includes only internal flooding from process 
systems and external flooding is included in “Weather”.
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Figure 13. Development of the estimate of annual core 
damage frequency for Olkiluoto unit 1 in 2004–2015. 
The risk estimate increase in 2009 is due to a more 
detailed analysis of the capacity of decay heat removal 
by diverse systems. The risk estimate increase in 2011 
is due to the change of the method used to deter-
mine fire ignition frequencies and update of external 
hazards study that contains a new man-made hazard 
“marine oil-spill”. Risk increase in 2015 estimate is due 
to more realistic modelling of operator and operating 
staff actions during shutdown.
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tion in the 1990’s (see Annex 2). Until year 2013, 
PRA model was done only for Olkiluoto unit 1 and 
the small differences between NPP units 1 and 2 
were assessed on case by case basis. Thereafter 
unit-specific PRA models have been kept up-to-
date reflecting the differences between Olkiluoto 
unit 1 and unit 2.
At the end of 2015 the overall core damage 
frequency was approximately 9.0∙10–6 per reactor 
year for Unit 1 and 1.5∙10–5 per reactor year for 
unit 2, including all operating states and all groups 
of initiating events. The higher risk for unit 2 can 
mainly be explained by the fact that plant modifi-
cations that improve safety are not implemented 
at the same time. In 2014, a new recirculation line 
modification in auxiliary feedwater system was im-
plemented. The modification reduced the system’s 
dependence on seawater cooling. A similar modi-
fication has not been implemented at unit 2 yet. 
The relative contributions to annual core damage 
frequency from different groups of initiating events 
are shown in Figure 14.
In 1996, TVO submitted to STUK the Level 2 
PRA. The analysis has been updated a few times 
since then. According to the latest PRA model the 
frequency of the large release to the environment 
(>100 TBq Cs-137) is 2.6∙10–6 per reactor year, 
which was approximately one tenth of the core 
damage frequency. The large release frequency 
has decreased in the updates mainly due to the 
decrease of the core damage frequency, but the 
severity of the release has decreased significantly 
mainly due to modifications in procedures.
TVO has used PRA in the risk-informed appli-
cations required by the Guide YVL A.7, for exam-
ple in evaluation of plant modifications, review of 
safety classification, development of Risk-Informed 
In-Service Inspection programme, optimisation of 
testing intervals, and optimisation of Operational 
Limits and Conditions (allowable outage times).
Probabilistic risk assessment 
of Olkiluoto unit 3
The vendor of Olkiluoto unit 3 conducted a design 
phase PRA, which TVO submitted in 2004 to STUK 
for the review of the construction licence applica-
tion as required by the Nuclear Energy Decree. 
The design phase PRA already included analysis of 
internal initiating events, internal hazards and ex-
ternal hazards for power operation and refuelling 
outage. STUK approved the Olkiluoto unit 3 PRA 
for the construction licence in January 2005. The 
PRA of Olkiluoto unit 3 has been continuously up-
dated by the plant vendor during the construction 
phase and STUK has closely followed the comple-
tion of the PRA.
The PRA for operating licence application was 
submitted to STUK in April 2016. The modelling 
has been improved in several areas taking into 
account the detailed design information. Main im-
provements are related to the modelling of internal 
fires and the extension of the PRA to cover seismic 
events. PRA review is ongoing and will be finalised 
in 2017.
Olkiluoto unit 3 Level 1 and Level 2 PRA covers 
transients and LOCAs as well as internal and ex-
ternal hazards in all operating modes, as required 
by YVL Guides. Level 3 PRA, which assesses the 
potential risk to people and the environment, is not 
required in Finland.
According to the Level 1 PRA results (under 
review), Olkiluoto unit 3 fulfils with a wide margin 
the probabilistic safety goals. The total core dam-
age frequency estimate is approximately 3.0∙10–6 
per reactor year.
Results of the Level 2 PRA show that large re-
lease frequency of Olkiluoto unit 3 is very small, 
approximately 1.0∙10–7 per reactor year. Level 2 
covers both the reactor core and the spent fuel pool.
PRA has been used by TVO and plant vendor in 
the risk-informed applications in accordance with 
YVL Guide requirements, for example in evalu-
ation of system design, review of safety classifi-
Seismic
Weather
Shutdown
Fire
Flood
Internal
9.0 %
16.0%
25.9%
2.0%
0.3%
46.9%
Olkiluoto NPP Unit 1 
relative risk profile 2015, total CDF 8,97E-6/year
Figure 14. Relative contribution of different initiating 
event types to the annual core damage frequency in 
2015 for Olkiluoto unit 1. The most significant internal 
initiating events at full power are the loss of off-site 
power and loss of feedwater. Note: “Flood” includes 
only internal flooding from process systems and exter-
nal flooding is included in “Weather”.
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cation, development of Risk-Informed In-Service 
Inspection programme, optimisation of testing in-
tervals, optimisation of Operational Limits and 
Conditions (allowable outage times), and planning 
of plant commissioning tests.
Assessment of safety as a result of 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident
Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
nuclear power plant on the 11th of March in 2011, 
safety assessments in Finland were initiated af-
ter STUK received a letter from the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy on 15 March 2011. 
The Ministry asked STUK to carry out a study 
on how the Finnish NPPs have prepared against 
loss of electric power supply and extreme natu-
ral phenomena in order to ensure nuclear safety. 
STUK asked the licensees to carry out assessments 
and submitted the study report to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy on 16 May 2011. 
Although immediate actions to ensure safety of 
public and environment were not considered neces-
sary, STUK required the licensees to carry out ad-
ditional assessments and present action plans for 
safety improvements. Assessments were conducted 
and reported by the Finnish licensees to STUK on 
15 December 2011. STUK reviewed the results of 
national assessments, and made licensee specific 
decisions on 19 July 2012 on the suggested safety 
improvements and additional analyses.
Finland also participated in the EU Stress Tests 
and submitted the national report to European 
Commission at the end of 2011. An EU level peer 
review on the report was completed by April 2012. 
The recommendations of the EU peer review have 
been taken into account in the regulatory decisions 
as well as included in the development of national 
regulations. A National Action Plan was prepared 
addressing the measures initiated on a national 
level and at the nuclear power plants as a result 
of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi accident. The 
National Action Plan was sent to the European 
Nuclear Regulators Group (ENSREG) and peer 
reviewed in April 2013 and April 2015. In addition, 
Finland participated in the second Extraordinary 
Meeting of the Convention of Nuclear Safety (CNS) 
in August 2012 and prepared a report introduc-
ing all Fukushima related actions. All STUK’s 
related decisions, the national report to European 
Commission, the report to the Extraordinary CNS, 
and the Finnish National Action Plan have been 
published on STUK’s website.
Based on the results of assessments conducted 
in Finland to date, it is concluded that no such 
hazards or deficiencies have been found that would 
require immediate actions at the Finnish NPPs. 
However, areas where safety can be further en-
hanced have been identified and there are plans on 
how to address these areas, some of which have al-
ready been implemented. The experiences from the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident are also tak-
en into consideration in the renewal of the legisla-
tion and Finnish Regulatory Guides (YVL Guides) 
and in the nuclear safety research programme 
SAFIR (see Articles 7 and 8). Implemented safety 
improvements as well as the ones under planning 
and implementation due to the TEPCO Fukushima 
Dai-ichi accident are described more detailed un-
der Articles 16, 17, 18 and 19, and in Annexes 2, 3 
and 4.
Information collected in connection with exter-
nal events PRAs has been used in the national and 
EU stress tests after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-
ichi NPP accident, although mainly deterministic 
approach has been used. Seismic events and other 
off-site external events have been included in the 
PRAs in the 1990’s and the analyses have been up-
dated regularly. The input data and plant response 
analyses used in the external events PRAs have 
been reviewed after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-
ichi NPP accident in connection with the stress 
tests and no essential shortcomings have been 
found. Further updates of the analyses and hazard 
estimates will be continued.
Verification of safety
Verification programmes
STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016) includes sev-
eral requirements which concern the verification 
of the physical state of a nuclear power plant. For 
instance, in all activities affecting the plant opera-
tion and the availability of components, a system-
atic approach shall be applied for ensuring the 
operators’ continuous awareness of the state of the 
plant and its components. The reliable operation of 
systems and components shall be ensured by ade-
quate maintenance as well as by regular in-service 
inspections and periodical tests. General require-
ments on verification programmes and procedures 
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are provided in the YVL Guides (e.g. Guide YVL 
A.8 and YVL E.5).
Main programmes used for verification of the 
state of a nuclear power plant are
•	 periodic testing according to the Operational 
Limits and Conditions
•	 maintenance programme
•	 in-service inspection programmes for pressure 
retaining components
•	 surveillance programme of reactor pressure 
vessel material
•	 research programmes for evaluating the ageing 
of components and materials.
Activities for verifying the physical state of a pow-
er plant are carried out in connection with nor-
mal daily routines and with scheduled inspections, 
testing, preventive maintenance etc. Activities are 
performed by the licensee and in the case of certain 
inspections by contractors approved separately. 
Detailed programmes and procedures are estab-
lished and approved by the licensee. They are also 
reviewed and, when needed, approved by STUK. 
The results of tests and inspections are document-
ed in a systematic way and used through a feed-
back process to further develop the programmes. 
The Operational Limits and Conditions are ap-
proved by STUK. In general, the role of STUK is 
to verify that the licensees follow the obligations 
imposed on them and carry out all activities sched-
uled in verification programmes.
Comprehensive evaluations related to the state 
and operation of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants 
were carried out in the periodic safety reviews 
by Fortum in 2014–2016 and TVO in 2007–2009. 
These activities were controlled by STUK.
Inspection qualification
According to international experience and the 
Guide YVL E.5, STUK has recognised the qualifi-
cation of non-destructive testing systems and pro-
cedures as an issue of high importance. This issue 
requires high priority at both present nuclear pow-
er plants. The implementation of qualified NDT 
systems has been started in 1990's.
General requirements on inspection qualifica-
tion are provided in the Guide YVL E.5. The 
document “European methodology for qualifica-
tion” drawn up by the European Network for 
Inspection and Qualification (ENIQ) shall be used 
as the minimum requirement level for qualifica-
tion of inspection systems to be used in in-service 
inspection, and it shall be complemented by the 
ENIQ Recommended Practices. In the content 
of licensees’ guidelines published by the qualifi-
cation body, the requirements presented in the 
Guide YVL E.5, in the European Methodology for 
Qualification (EUR 17299) and in its recommenda-
tions have been taken into account.
The licensees Fortum and TVO have estab-
lished the Steering Committee for Qualification 
and nominate members to the Committee on annu-
al basis. The Steering Committee for Qualification 
is guiding and supervising the practical qualifica-
tion work with the help of a separate Technical 
Support Group nominated and supervised by the 
Steering Committee.
Based on a contract with the licensees, Inspecta 
Certification is nominated as the qualification 
body for qualification management, implementa-
tion, control and assessment as well as the issuing 
of qualification certificates in Finland. The Finnish 
qualification body is a qualification body of type 
1, which is an independent third party organisa-
tion as defined by ENIQ Recommended Practice 7. 
When needed Inspecta Certification uses also ex-
perts outside of its own organisation for individual 
qualifications.
Most of the qualifications have already been 
performed by the qualification body and approved 
by STUK.
STUK ordered in 2009 an assessment of the 
current qualification activities in Finland from an 
independent expert organisation. The purpose was 
to assess whether Finnish inspection qualification 
practice leads to reliable and effective in-service in-
spection of safety critical components. Review was 
performed in two parts: 1) review of the inspection 
qualification system as specified in the Guide YVL 
3.8 (in force at the time) and the national qualifica-
tion guideline documents issued by the qualifica-
tion body and 2) review of the inspection qualifica-
tion practices. As a conclusion of the assessment it 
was reported that the qualification system meets 
the Finnish requirements, is effective and provides 
confidence in the inspections of safety critical com-
ponents.
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In-service inspections
The condition of the pressure-retaining compo-
nents of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs is en-
sured with regular in-service inspections. The com-
ponents of the primary circuit are inspected by 
means of non-destructive examination methods. 
These regularly repeated examinations are carried 
out during outages according to the Guide YVL 
E.5. The results of the in-service inspections are 
compared with the results of the previous inspec-
tions and of the pre-service inspections which have 
been carried out before the commissioning.
The in-service inspection plans are submit-
ted to STUK for approval before each individual 
in-service inspection. Programmes and related in-
spection procedures are changed when necessary, 
taking into account the development of require-
ments and standards in the field, the advancement 
of examination techniques and inspection experi-
ences as well as operating experiences in Finland 
and abroad.
Guide YVL E.5 and the latest revisions of the 
ASME Code, Section XI are applied as approval 
bases for the in-service inspection programmes 
and procedures. ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix 
R and ENIQ European Framework Document for 
Risk-informed In-service Inspection are used as 
approval bases for the risk-informed in-service in-
spection programmes.
The reliability of the non-destructive exami-
nation methods for the primary circuit piping 
and components has been essentially improved 
after the commissioning of both the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPPs. Guide YVL E.5 calls for the qual-
ification of the entire NDT-system; equipment, 
software, procedures and personnel. Most of the 
inspection systems are already qualified at both 
the plants. STUK follows the development and im-
plementation of the plans.
A risk-informed inspection programme has 
been introduced and approved by STUK at the 
Loviisa units 1 and 2 for the in-service inspections 
of safety-critical pipelines. The deployment of risk-
informed inspection methods for targeting inspec-
tions has been developed in Finland by STUK, 
Fortum, TVO and VTT. The objective of risk-in-
formed in-service inspection programmes is to al-
locate inspection resources to the targets that are 
most critical from the point of view of risk. Using 
this approach, it is possible to ensure that the cur-
rent inspection objects are well-justified, identify 
new objects and omit certain less safety-critical 
objects from the existing inspection programme.
The length of the inspection period of the 
regular inspections (e.g. ASME Code, Section XI) is 
normally ten years. Inspection programmes have 
been complemented with additional inspections 
as regards the reactor pressure vessel and the pri-
mary circuit piping, and the length of the inspec-
tion period of the reactor pressure vessel has been 
reduced to eight years. The length of the inspection 
period of the objects susceptible to thermal fatigue 
is typically three years.
At the Olkiluoto plant, attempts have been 
made to focus the inspections on areas where 
faults are most likely to emerge. These include, 
for example, items susceptible to fatigue due to 
temperature variations or items susceptible to 
stress corrosion cracking. The selection of inspec-
tion items is under continuous development. For 
this purpose, a risk-informed in-service inspection 
programmes have been developed for the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2. Risk informed programmes have 
been approved by STUK and inspection schedules 
are optimized. These programmes are under con-
tinues optimization and reviewed annually.
The frequency of the non-destructive examina-
tions performed at regular intervals is usually ten 
years at the Olkiluoto NPP. The inspection fre-
quency for items susceptible to thermal fatigue is 
three years, and the inspection frequency for items 
susceptible to stress corrosion cracking is two to 
five years.
In addition to the inspections mentioned above, 
physical inspections concerning the condition and 
reliability of pressure equipment are carried out 
as regular pressure equipment inspections accord-
ing to the Finnish pressure equipment legislation. 
Such inspections are a full inspection, an internal 
inspection and an operational inspection. These 
inspections include non-destructive examinations 
as well as pressure and tightness tests. The inspec-
tions of piping have been defined in the system-
specific monitoring programmes. These periodic 
inspections are dealt with in the Guides YVL E.3, 
YVL E.8, YVL E.9, YVL E.10 and YVL E.11. The 
periodic inspection programmes of the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPPs fulfil the requirements of YVL 
Guides, as regards the number and techniques of 
inspections.
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Ageing management
According to the STUK Regulation (STUK 
Y/1/2016), the design, construction, operation, con-
dition monitoring and maintenance of a nuclear 
power plant shall provide for the ageing of sys-
tems, structures and components (SSCs) important 
to safety in order to ensure that they meet the 
design-basis requirements with necessary safety 
margins throughout the service life of the facility. 
Systematic procedures shall be in place for pre-
venting such ageing of SSCs which may deterio-
rate their availability, and for the early detection 
of the need for their repair, modification and re-
placement. Safety requirements and applicability 
of new technology shall be periodically assessed in 
order to ensure that the technology applied is up to 
date, and the availability of the spare parts and the 
system support shall be monitored. Furthermore, 
a dedicated regulatory guide for ageing manage-
ment, Guide YVL A.8, requires that when applying 
for an operating licence for a new nuclear facility, 
the licensee shall submit to STUK for approval the 
ageing management programme for the nuclear 
facility that is to be complied with during the op-
eration of the facility.
Ageing management at the Loviisa NPP
Radiation embrittlement of the reactor pressure 
vessel (RPV) and the related surveillance and miti-
gation actions have dominated the ageing man-
agement in Loviisa NPP since the early years of 
operation. This was more relevant to Loviisa unit 
1 whose girth weld at the level of the reactor core 
has a higher content of impurities. In 1996, the 
brittle weld joint of the Loviisa 1 reactor pressure 
vessel was heat-treated to improve the ductility 
properties of the welding material. In this con-
nection the reactor pressure vessel was subject 
to thorough non-destructive tests. Embrittlement 
rate has been re-assessed based on the new sur-
veillance programme representing the critical 
weld. STUK has granted the operating licences of 
the RPVs for the Loviisa units 1 and 2 until 2027 
and 2030, respectively. For both units, determinis-
tic and probabilistic safety analyses will be evalu-
ated in the PSRs (by end of 2015 and 2023) in order 
to justify continued service of the RPVs. In addi-
tion, new findings from domestic and international 
inspection and research programmes may require 
updating of the RPV analysis results.
In the mid-1990’s, Fortum implemented their 
systematic plant-wide ageing management pro-
gramme. The SSCs are assigned to categories A 
through D based on their technical and economical 
replaceability. SSC failures in category A would 
limit plant lifetime and thus deserve a part-assem-
bly-wise break-down of ageing related remedies. 
Category A comprises the main primary compo-
nents. Data indicative of plant status and trends 
are collected with operation, maintenance and in-
spection IT systems, R&D activities and via experi-
ence exchange. The consequent ratings of operabil-
ity, remaining service life and necessary actions for 
each SSC are stored on the plant database.
In 2006 the operating utility Fortum submitted 
to the Government an application to continue the 
operation of Loviisa units 1 and 2 until the end of 
2027 and 2030, respectively, meaning a 20-year ex-
tension to the original design lifetime. Among the 
ageing-related justification were the main fatigue 
analyses, updated to cover the whole 50 years’ 
life span with consideration of the environmen-
tal effects. Documents on In-Service Inspection 
Summary Programme, Ageing Management 
Programme Principles and Implementation, and 
SSC Status and Service Life Extensibility were 
also submitted. For electrical and I&C components 
it was noted that massive projects are underway to 
replace cables in containment due to its detected 
considerable ambient temperature rise, and for 
plant-wide replacing of obsolete protection and 
plant I&C systems and components. In its review, 
STUK presented a general point that the state-of-
the-art permitted a quantitative life-time evalu-
ation only in case of ageing by fatigue. However, 
other potential mechanisms have been identified 
and resources are in place to monitor, inspect, 
mitigate and repair as needed. The operating or-
ganisation has also strong technical support which, 
in the past, has convincingly resolved forthcoming 
ageing issues, and the history records are well 
preserved. The Government granted the applied 
operating licences on condition that two periodic 
safety reviews (PSR) are undertaken during the 
licence period. The first PSR review was done in 
2014-2016 and the ageing management was one 
of the key issues – especially the embrittlement 
margins of Loviisa unit 2 reactor pressure vessel 
before the expected end of life in 2030 (Loviisa 1 
reactor pressure vessel core area was annealed 
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in 1996). Related to PSR assessment Fortum will 
send at the end of 2016 to STUK for information 
the documents concerning the actions to increase 
the embrittlement margins of unit 2 reactor pres-
sure vessel in the future.
Ageing management at the Olkiluoto NPP
The ageing management activities at the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2 arose from wide-spread indications of 
inter-granular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) 
in reactor auxiliary system piping. Early replace-
ment of entire piping systems, achievable with 
modest doses to maintenance staff, considerably 
mitigated IGSCC and led the way to the utility’s 
strategy of seeing to the critical SSCs so that a 
remaining plant life-time of 40 years (design life-
time) could be always demonstrated.
Since 1991, the licensee’s AGE Group, with 
assistance of several technical discipline related 
expert groups, has taken care of these activities by 
gathering information of possibly needed future 
actions from several sources and by preparing and 
updating a table of recommended major modifica-
tions, replacements, repairs and overhauls. The 
modernisation and power uprating of the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2 by 16% in 1994–1996 evolved from 
these recommendations and was completely car-
ried out by the utility’s technical support organisa-
tion residing on plant site. The associated signifi-
cant renewal campaigns of obsolete electrical and 
instrumentation systems and components largely 
contributed to current 20-year operating licence 
periods terminating in 2018. Efforts to enhance the 
reliability and good performance of the plant com-
ponents, and to ensure the spare part and support 
service availability have continued until recent 
years. The major foreseeable modifications until 
decommissioning have been identified.
Systematic maintenance planning is an integral 
part of ageing management at the Olkiluoto units 
1 and 2. Nominated owners of equipment groups, 
characterised by a common type or location, ana-
lyse the entire maintenance programme and its 
experiences, and assist in selection of the most ef-
fective maintenance works. Annual findings from 
each equipment group are stored into a relational 
data base on the plant computer.
STUK reviewed TVO’s clarification on the ac-
tual condition and ageing implications of the main 
SSCs in connection to the periodic safety review 
(PSR) carried out in 2007–2009. Supporting as-
sessment has been done in several periodical in-
spections on plant site. The main components 
were generally found to be in good condition, but 
the appearance of IGSCC in Nickel-based alloys 
could not be excluded and it possibly explains 
an indication reported from the safe-end weld of 
the main feedwater nozzle, made from Alloy 182. 
The indication has, however, remained unchanged 
as evaluated by NDT-inspections during annual 
outages (further information in Article 18). The 
PSR also referred to a completed pilot project for 
updating fatigue analyses of selected systems to 
incorporate the environmental effect as required 
in Guide YVL 3.5 (in force at the time). Based on 
recommendations from expert consultancy of VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland, more re-
fined modelling is employed now that the utility is 
renewing all fatigue analyses to justify a prospec-
tive re-licensing of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 for 
an operating life of 60 years.
At the Olkiluoto unit 3, the ageing management 
is taken into account at the design and construc-
tion phase. The most severe operating conditions 
and long-term influences, under which an indi-
vidual component is expected to serve as a part 
of a process system, are used to determine the de-
sign basis requirements for that component. With 
known design basis requirements and defined life 
times of SSCs, their materials, fabrication and 
other ageing management related issues are speci-
fied accordingly. This includes precautions against 
foreseeable degradation mechanisms with state-of-
the art technology, and provision for inspections, 
overhauls, testing and replacements as needed 
while respecting the ALARA principle. The antici-
pated life-span of the main technologies and inde-
pendence from single technologies are particularly 
considered in I&C system and component design. 
The design and fabrication of SSCs are verified 
with qualified analyses, inspections and testing, 
overseen by STUK, in order to demonstrate fulfil-
ment of quality and performance requirements set 
by the design specifications. During Olkiluoto unit 
3 operation, the ageing of SSCs and retaining the 
design margins will be managed by dedicated pro-
grammes and monitoring tools, and by in-service 
inspections to who’s planning risk-informed meth-
ods are applied.
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The regulatory oversight during operation
The regulatory oversight of ageing in operating 
plants focuses on operating licence renewals and 
periodic safety reviews (PSRs) where the conform-
ance to the relevant STUK Regulations and YVL 
Guides, including experiences with ageing and 
its management, is investigated. STUK’s findings 
from other regulatory control practices, particu-
larly the periodic inspection programme, are used 
as verification.
The periodic inspections are performed on plant 
site according to annual planning and tackle both 
the technical aspects of each discipline and the 
process of ageing management. Possible problems 
at the plants and in procedures of the operating 
organisations are to be recognised. The dedicated 
plant maintenance inspection is exclusively fo-
cused on the maintenance activities and ageing 
management. The aim of the inspection is to evalu-
ate the procedures the licensee has for ensuring 
reliable operation and integrity of SSC. STUK will 
also assess the implementation of the ageing man-
agement programme based on the follow-up report 
prepared annually by the licensee.
In addition, an expert group dedicated to ageing 
management has been established within STUK to 
oversee how the licensees perform their duties in 
the ageing management of SSCs. The group, which 
consists of mechanical, electrical, I&C, civil and 
human resource experts and resident inspectors, 
plans and coordinates STUK’s regulatory duties 
pertaining to the ageing of nuclear facility sys-
tems, equipment and structures. If shortcomings 
are found, for example in condition monitoring or 
maintenance, the group calls the licensee for fur-
ther clarifications or corrective actions. The group 
also follows up findings from other countries and 
evaluates their possible applicability to the ageing 
management of the Finnish nuclear power plants.
A dedicated regulatory guide for ageing man-
agement, Guide YVL A.8, apply as such for new 
NPPs, but also the NPPs in operation have to meet 
the new requirements in the new guide to the ex-
tent practicable. Implementation of the updated 
ageing management requirements is underway for 
NPPs in operation and some specific challenges to 
fulfil the new ageing management requirements 
have been met. For instance the new guide has 
a requirement on the availability and operabil-
ity as well as monitoring the condition of spare 
parts. Inspections have revealed that the amount 
of spare parts can be inadequate for keeping the 
plant in a safe state also during prolonged tran-
sients and accidents, and that some of the spare 
parts in the storage have either aged or obsoleted. 
Another challenge has to do with knowledge and 
resources allocated for ensuring appropriate age-
ing management programme at NPPs. Inspections 
have revealed that the licensees have challenges 
to implement knowledge management to ensure 
that in the event of personnel changes informa-
tion and knowledge necessary for discharging the 
duties involved is transferred to the successors. 
Additional challenge is to conduct relevant re-
search to both educate personnel and to identify 
new ageing mechanisms to develop new inspection 
or monitoring technologies to detect degradation 
early enough.
A generic lesson learned in Finland is that the 
closer nuclear power plants get to the end of their 
design lifetime, more difficult it is for the licen-
sees to make decisions to modernise or modify the 
NPPs. Instead of renewing a system or a compo-
nent, modernisation may be rejected or a partial 
modification is planned resulting in ageing issues 
in the remaining parts. A postponed decision to 
renew for instance an I&C system or an electri-
cal system may result in that later on spare parts 
are no longer available for the remaining systems. 
Both of these cases may lead to situations where 
the licensee may not be able to demonstrate the 
continued safety of operations to the regulator, or 
at least the views on the demonstration results 
may differ between the licensee and the regulator. 
Finland has successfully applied periodic safety 
reviews for the operating NPPs. Practice has been 
that the licensee is obliged to demonstrate that 
the safety of the operations can be ensured and 
improved also during the next 10 years, and to 
do that the licensee has to commit to make safety 
improvements including major modernisations to 
address ageing of SSCs.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 14.
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Article 15. Radiation protection
Each contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that in all operational 
states the radiation exposure to the workers 
and the public caused by a nuclear installa-
tion shall be kept as low as reasonably achiev-
able and that no individual shall be exposed 
to radiation doses which exceed prescribed 
national dose limits.
Regulatory requirements regarding 
radiation protection
The main regulations governing radiation pro-
tection of Nuclear Power Plant operation are 
the Radiation Act (592/1991), Radiation Decree 
(1512/1991), STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016) 
and YVL Guides, Group C (7 guides). Radiation 
Decree stipulates that the effective dose caused 
to a worker shall not exceed an average of 20 mil-
lisieverts (mSv) per year in any five years period, 
nor 50 mSv in any single year. The limit for the 
annual dose of an individual in the population, 
arising from the normal operation of a nuclear 
power plant, is 0.1 mSv. Based on this, STUK shall 
upon application confirm the release limits for ra-
dioactive materials during the normal operation of 
a nuclear power plant. ALARA requirements are 
issued in the Radiation Act and more in detail im-
plementation requirements are given in the YVL 
Guides both for NPP workers and release abate-
ment. During 2013–2015 the Guides as regards 
radiation protection were updated. When updating 
the guides the latest operation experience includ-
ing the experience from Tepco Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident was taken into account. However, the ra-
diation legislation as well as the regulations and 
guidance of STUK is under renewal to meet the 
requirements stipulated e.g. in the BSS-directive.
Radiation doses of the NPP 
workers and the public
The most important tools to reduce radiation doses 
for the NPP workers and the public shall be de-
scribed in an ALARA programme of a NPP.
At the Loviisa NPP the ALARA programme was 
updated in 2014. One of the main objectives has 
been that there shall be a continuous improvement 
in the collective dose indicator trends. The four 
years average of collective dose has decreased at 
Loviisa NPP to 0.6 manSv/reactor unit/year. The 
ALARA programme includes also the goal that no 
employee at the plant should receive a radiation 
dose exceeding 15 mSv per year.
The most important measure to lower the dose 
rates at the Loviisa NPP has been the minimi-
sation of antimony 122 and 124 content on the 
primary circuit surfaces. It has been discovered 
that the original seals of the main coolant pumps 
were the main reason for the activation products of 
antimony 122 and 124 in the primary circuit. The 
activation products of antimony have contributed 
approximately 40% of the doses of the workers 
during the outages. All the reactor coolant pump 
seals have now been replaced with an antimony-
free material. The replacement work took place in 
years 2012 - 2014. In the following years a positive 
development in dose-rates near the primary circuit 
is to be expected.
Another important measure has been the opti-
misation of the use of additional shielding in the 
primary coolant circuit area during outages. Also 
by extensive work planning and training and by 
timing the work between yearly outages it has 
also been possible to reduce some of the radiation 
burden.
In the ALARA programme of the Loviisa NPP 
the company has committed, that in the effluent 
control mere compliance with the limits is not 
enough. Efforts shall be made to keep the radioac-
tive releases to and radiation levels in the environ-
ment arising from the operation of the plant as low 
as reasonably achievable. The numerical target 
values, well below effluent limits, were set in the 
programme at the beginning of 2016.
The ALARA programme of the Olkiluoto NPP 
contains also the major objectives and procedures 
regarding the reduction of the doses of the employ-
ees and the target values for the main radioac-
tive effluents. The ALARA programme was last 
updated in 2016. The ALARA programme includes 
the goals for collective dose of the Olkiluoto 1 and 
Olkiluoto 2 units. For these two reactor units in a 
normal year the collective dose of 1 manSv should 
not exceed (1.5 manSv, when major additional 
maintenance is needed). Also no employee at the 
plant should receive a radiation dose exceeding 10 
mSv per year. There is also a goal that the internal 
dose of any worker shall not exceed 0.5 mSv. For 
Olkiluoto unit 3 the collective dose is targeted to be 
low. From the first operation year of this new NPP 
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unit the collective dose is expected to be below 0.05 
manSv.
In order to minimize the doses to the popula-
tion, in the ALARA programme there are target 
limit values for the main radioactive effluents like 
noble gases, iodine isotopes, water-borne releases 
and tritium. The goal is that the annual effluents 
will cause calculative annual dose for an individual 
in the population, arising from the normal opera-
tion of a nuclear power plant, which is less than 1% 
of the limit value of 0.1 mSv.
The Olkiluoto NPP has continued the replace-
ment of cobalt-containing components (containing 
stellite alloys) in the primary circuit with new 
ones with low cobalt content. Stellite-containing 
components represent today approximately 60% 
of the surface-are of the original design of primary 
circuit. The reduction in moisture of the primary 
steam with the equipment upgrades (new steam 
dryers) during 2005–2007 at the Olkiluoto NPP 
has contributed the substantial reduction of ra-
diation dose rates at the turbine plant. The risk-
informed procedure was deployed to the in-service 
material inspections in piping and welding for the 
first time in outages 2012. This has contributed to-
wards reducing the amount of the work carried out 
in the most radioactive areas, thus reducing the 
radiation exposure of the employees.
Both the Loviisa NPP and the Olkiluoto NPP 
have their own ALARA groups where the topics of 
the ALARA programmes are discussed regularly. 
At both NPPs ALARA-programmes are described 
in the radiation protection manuals, which are up-
dated regularly.
The radiation dose statistics of the workers are 
presented for the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plants in Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 15 and 
16. The individual radiation doses have remained 
well under the set annual and five years dose 
limits. The maximum combined dose of a Finnish 
worker at the NPPs for a single year during 2013–
2015 was 9.2 mSv. For a 5 years period 2011–2015, 
the maximum dose was 36.6 mSv and was received 
by a person working at the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant.
In international comparison (e.g. the ISOE ra-
diation dose database of the NEA, the Nuclear 
Energy Agency of the OECD countries), the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 have been among the best 
boiling water reactors when comparing both the 
individual and collective radiation doses. The long-
term planning of annual maintenance operations 
has made it possible to keep outage duration short, 
which usually reduces the amount of work carried 
out and hence also lower the radiation exposures. 
Also in comparison with different types of PWRs 
Loviisa units 1 and 2 have been on an approvable 
level.
Radioactive effluents
STUK confirms upon the licensee’s application 
the release limits for radioactive materials dur-
ing the normal operation of a nuclear power plant. 
Operational Limits and Conditions have more 
stringent requirements applicable for the radio-
active sub-stances of primary coolant (fuel integ-
rity), thus practically preventing more significant 
releases. The fuel rods at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa 
NPPs have had very low failure rates. Both nu-
clear power plants have efficiently implemented 
measures to reduce the releases of the radioactive 
substances into the environment.
The radioactive effluents from the plants 
in 2013–2015 are shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
Radioactive releases into the environment from the 
Finnish nuclear power plants have been well below 
authorised limits (for important nuclides and path-
ways, of the order of 0.0001% to 0.1% of set values 
based on the requirements). The noble gas releases 
from the Olkiluoto NPP have been below minimum 
detectable activity in 2014 and 2015. Calculated 
radiation exposures to the individual of the criti-
cal group living in the environment of the nuclear 
power plants are shown in Figure 16.
STUK received reports from the Loviisa NPP 
(the latest report in 2011) and the Olkiluoto NPP 
(the latest report in 2010) on the implementation 
of BAT (Best Available Techniques) for further 
reduction of the radioactive discharges from the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs. The Loviisa NPP has 
developed and taken in operation caesium removal 
technology from liquid releases. The utility re-
viewed VVER reactor R&D issues and evaluated 
their own developments underway. They recog-
nized some techniques worth of further research 
and development.
The Olkiluoto NPP had previously carried out 
improvements on the water treatment and purifi-
cation of discharge waters, and no new solutions 
were presented now. The Olkiluoto NPP had also 
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an independent assessment, comparing the emis-
sions and operating experience in the Olkiluoto 
plant units and in equivalent Swedish BWRs. The 
results indicate that the standard of radiation pro-
tection is also in this respect at least on the same 
level as in the reference plant units surveyed.
STUK concluded that the both utilities apply 
the BAT principle to abatement of radioactive dis-
charges of their power plants.
Environmental radiation monitoring
STUK has approved the operating programme for 
environmental radiation monitoring in the sur-
roundings of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs for 
2012–2016. The changes in the programme com-
pared with the previous one were related to, inter 
alia, the use of reference samples, changes in gar-
dening and agricultural product samples, collect-
ing frequencies of samples, measurements of the 
water treatment plant sludge and the interpreta-
tion of measurement results on carbon-14 nuclides.
Department Environmental Radiation Surveill-
ance and Emergency Preparedness of STUK has 
acted as an outside contracted laboratory for the 
licensees. The outside contracted laboratory col-
lects and analyses about 300 samples (air, fallout, 
sediment, indicator organisms, milk, etc.) per year 
from the environment of both the Loviisa and 
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Figure 15. Collective annual occupational doses at the Loviisa nuclear power plant.
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Figure 16. Collective annual occupational doses at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant.
Table 2. Annual radiation doses of workers at the 
Loviisa NPP in 2013–2015.
Year
Collective 
dose 
[manSv]
Maximum 
personal dose 
[mSv]
Average 
dose*) 
[mSv]
2013 0,54 8,6 1,14
2014 0,85 9,2 1,47
2015 0,52 7,1 1,12
*) Calculated by using the registered radiation doses, which are ≥ 0.1 mSv/
month.
Table 3. Annual radiation doses of workers at the Olki-
luoto NPP in 2013–2015.
Year
Collective 
dose 
[manSv]
Maximum 
personal dose 
[mSv]
Average 
dose*) 
[mSv]
2013 0,65 8,1 0,79
2014 0,64 7,7 0,76
2015 0,75 7,9 0,85
*) Calculated by using the registered radiation doses, which are ≥ 0.1 mSv/
month.
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Olkiluoto NPPs. Very small quantities of radioac-
tive substances of local origin were detected in 
2010–2012 on some samples from the environment 
of both nuclear power plants. Concentrations of the 
radioactive substances were very low, and effects 
on the public are insignificant.
The IRRS review team recommended that 
STUK should withdraw from the current practice 
of conducting the environmental monitoring pro-
grammes in the vicinity of the nuclear facilities 
based on commercial contracts with the licensees. 
Furthermore, STUK should implement an inde-
Table 4. Radioactive effluents from the Loviisa NPP. The proportion of the releases as compared 
to the limit values is given in parenthesis.
Airborne effluents Liquid effluents 
excluding tritium 
[Bq]Year Noble gases Kr-87 ekv. [Bq]
Iodine I-131 ekv. 
[Bq]
Aerosols 
[Bq]
2013 6.50E+12 (0,05%) 2.49E+07 (0.01%) 8.35E+08 1.19E+09 (0.1%)
2014 5.83E+12 (0,04%) 4.01E+06 (0.002%) 3.22E+07 1.08E+08 (0.01%)
2015 5.90E+12 (0.04%) 5.07E+06 (0.002%) 3.85E+07 1.04E+08 (0.01%)
Table 5. Radioactive effluents from the Olkiluoto NPP. The proportion of the releases as compared 
to the limit values is given in parenthesis.
Airborne effluents Liquid effluents 
excluding tritium 
[Bq]Year Noble gases Kr-87 ekv. [Bq]
Iodine I-131 ekv. 
[Bq]
Aerosols 
[Bq]
2013 2.17E+11 (0.002%) 9.08E+07 (0.09%) 1.99E+07 9.11E+07 (0.03%)
2014 <MDA (<MDA) 2.50E+05 (0.0002%) 7.20E+06 7.74E+07 (0.03%)
2015 <MDA (<MDA) 8.46E+04 (0.0001%) 1.66E+07 1.03E+08 (0.03%)
MDA = minimum detectable activity.
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Figure 17. Calculated annual radiation exposures to the members of critical groups in the environment of 
the Finnish nuclear power plants. Doses have been clearly under the limit 100 μSv.
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pendent monitoring programme for the environ-
ment, to verify the results of the off-site environ-
mental monitoring programmes required from the 
licensees. Based on the IRRS recommendation, 
the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 
2015 to give STUK legal authority to carry out 
environmental monitoring as a regulatory activity. 
The corresponding Guide YVL C.7 “Radiological 
monitoring of the environment of a nuclear facility” 
is under preparation and it will be finalized and 
published in 2016.
Regulatory oversight
On the basis of documents submitted by the li-
censees, STUK approved in 2016 the use of the 
dosimetry service of the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto 
NPPs until 2021. In Olkiluoto the approval cov-
ers the agreement between the licensee and the 
outsourced services provided by the company 
Doseco Oy, responsible for routine dosimetry at the 
Olkiluoto NPP. STUK has audited the dose moni-
toring service at Doseco Oy.
The dosimeters used for measuring the occupa-
tional radiation doses of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plants have underwent STUK’s annual tests with 
acceptable results. These tests comprise irradiat-
ing a random sample of dosimeters at STUK’s ra-
diation standard laboratory and determination of 
the doses at the power plant (blind test).
STUK carries out annual radiation protection 
inspections on-site according to the periodic in-
spection programme, e.g. covering the resources, 
expertise and operation of the radiation protection 
organisation, dosimetry, radiation measurements 
in the plant, radioactivity measurements of efflu-
ents, and monitoring of radiation in the environ-
ment. STUK carries out on-site inspections related 
to radiation protection also during annual mainte-
nance outages. The inspections at the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPPs have shown e.g. that the plants 
have introduced technical and IT administration 
improvements in the field of radiation protection, 
which made it possible to enhance the control of 
occupational radiation doses and contamination. 
Both NPPs have modernized the installed radia-
tion measurements systems.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 15.
Article 16. Emergency preparedness
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that there are on-
site and off-site emergency plans that are 
routinely tested for nuclear installations 
and cover the activities to be carried out 
in the event of an emergency. For any new 
nuclear installation, such plans shall be 
prepared and tested before it commences 
operation above a low power level agreed 
by the regulatory body.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that, insofar as 
they are likely to be affected by a radio-
logical emergency, its own population and 
the competent authorities of the States in 
the vicinity of the nuclear installation are 
provided with appropriate information for 
emergency planning and response.
3. Contracting Parties which do not have a 
nuclear installation on their territory, in-
sofar as they are likely to be affected in the 
event of a radiological emergency at a nu-
clear installation in the vicinity, shall take 
the appropriate steps for the preparation 
and testing of emergency plans for their 
territory that cover the activities to be car-
ried out in the event of such an emergency.
Emergency preparedness on-site of NPPs
Regulations concerning emergency arrangements 
at the NPPs are given in the Nuclear Energy Act, 
the Nuclear Energy Decree and STUK’s Regulation 
on Emergency Arrangements at Nuclear Power 
Plants (STUK Y/2/2016). Detailed requirements 
and STUK’s oversight procedures are given in the 
Guide YVL C.5.
The renewed Government Decree on Emergency 
Response Arrangements at Nuclear Power plants 
became effective in 2013. Parallel to that the Guide 
YVL 7.4 was replaced by the Guide YVL C.5 tak-
ing also into account the lessons learned from the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.
The Government Decree was replaced by 
STUK’s Regulation (STUK Y/2/2016) at the begin-
ning of 2016 due to the changes in the Nuclear 
Energy Act. In connection to this latter replace-
ment no significant changes were implemented to 
the level of requirements.
In the new Regulation, design basis for emer-
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gency planning is a simultaneous accident at site’s 
all reactor units. In STUK’s decisions made on the 
basis of the national assessments and European 
Stress Tests for nuclear power plants, both TVO 
and Fortum were required to clarify and update 
their emergency plans and procedures with re-
spect to issues like qualification of the staff in the 
emergency organisation, management of access 
control and contamination control in the case when 
the normal arrangements are out of function and 
restoring the access routes and connections to 
the site in case of large-scale damage to the infra-
structure. There were some further requirements 
for licensees regarding site autononomy in case 
of external hazards in autumn 2015 when Guide 
YVL C.5 was enforced at the operating NPPs. The 
work for developing and improving the emergency 
preparedness arrangements continues.
Fortum and TVO have analysed accident 
and safety-impairing events at the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPPs. These analyses are documented in 
the safety analysis reports of the plants and have 
been used as the basis for planning the Finnish 
nuclear power plant emergency response arrange-
ments. Multiunit accident as design basis for emer-
gency planning has prompted licensees to analyse 
some new accident scenarios.
Emergencies are classified and described briefly 
in the plant’s emergency plan. The notifications 
and alarms to plant personnel and authorities 
required by different classes of emergencies, as 
well as the scope of operations of the emergency re-
sponse organisation pertaining to the type of emer-
gency, are described in the emergency procedures.
A person responsible for emergency response 
arrangements has been appointed both for the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. Due 
to the updated Nuclear Energy Act the nominated 
deputies for the persons responsible for emergency 
response arrangements have been appointed by 
the licensees and approved by STUK. The emer-
gency response organisation has been described 
in the emergency plan and procedures, updated 
with regard to personnel changes once a year. The 
more limited staffing of the emergency response 
organisation required for emergency standby state 
(alert) is defined in the shift supervisor guides for 
the emergency response.
The facilities of the emergency response organi-
sation at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plants include a system for displaying data di-
rectly from the process computer. Several hundred 
parameters are transmitted also to the STUK’s 
emergency response centre. The automatic data 
transfer and display system from the Olkiluoto 
NPP to STUK will be renewed according to the 
plans during 2016-2017. The new unit Olkiluoto 3 
and the unit’s training simulator are then added to 
the data transfer and display system.
Emergency training and exercises are arranged 
annually for the emergency response organisation 
of the nuclear power plants. The emergency train-
ing includes classroom and group-specific practical 
training as well as special training, such as first 
aid, fire and radiation protection training. In ad-
dition to severe accidents, emergencies covered by 
the emergency response exercises also includes 
conditions classified as alert. The content and 
scope of the training as well as feedback obtained 
from the training are assessed in the inspections of 
the STUK’s periodic inspection programme.
STUK verifies the preparedness of the organi-
sations operating nuclear power plants in yearly 
on-site inspections as well as supervising the licen-
see’s emergency training and exercises. Emergency 
preparedness at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto power 
plants meet the regulatory requirements.
At the Loviisa NPP, the objects of the inspection 
included the emergency response organisation’s 
personnel resources, facilities and equipment, 
training and alert arrangements, revision of the 
structure and content of emergency instructions, 
radiation measurements in the surroundings and 
meteorological measurements on-site. Emergency 
exercises and mustering exercises have been con-
ducted annually. In 2014 Loviisa NPP exercised for 
the first time a two unit’s simultaneous accident 
scenario. An unannounced emergency exercise was 
organised 2015 starting outside the normal work-
ing hours.
At the Olkiluoto NPP, the objects of the inspec-
tion included emergency organisation personnel 
resources, training, exercises, facilities and equip-
ment, alarm arrangements, radiation measure-
ments in the surroundings, meteorological meas-
urements on-site, emergency preparedness of the 
Olkiluoto unit 3 construction site and the work 
for revising the emergency preparedness instruc-
tions. During the national full command post ex-
ercise OLKI-14 actions and decision making of the 
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intermediate phase of the severe accident were 
exercised for the first time. In 2015 the annual 
emergency exercise was based on an unlawful ac-
tion scenario and the exercise was executed unan-
nounced at the same time in both Olkiluoto NPP 
and Loviisa NPP.
Both the Loviisa and Olkiluoto have networks 
of monitoring stations providing real time environ-
mental dose rate. Stations are arranged in circles 
around plant area. Olkiluoto has inner circle close 
to plant area and outer circle at 5 km distance 
from the plant. Three additional measurement sta-
tions will be installed in the vicinity of Olkiluoto 
unit 3 before the plant unit is in operation. At the 
Loviisa NPP, a new monitoring network including 
28 stations has been in operational use since sum-
mer 2015 after trial run that started in 2013. The 
design basis of the new measuring stations is at 
least 3 months autonomic operation in emergency 
situations with long-term batteries. At the Loviisa 
NPP, the licensee has renewed the weather moni-
toring system. The new on-site weather mast and 
the additional measuring point in the marine envi-
ronment are now in test operation. The additional 
measuring point gives more precise data from the 
sea breeze and the land breeze phenomena which 
can strongly affect the dispersion of releases.
Off-site preparedness arrangements
In addition to the on-site emergency plans estab-
lished by the licensees, off-site emergency plans 
required by the rescue legislation (379/2011) are 
prepared by regional authorities. The require-
ments for off-site plans and activities in a radia-
tion emergency are provided in the Decree of the 
Ministry of Interior (612/2015). STUK is an expert 
body who supports and provides recommendations 
to authorities responsible for making decisions and 
implementing protective actions in case of nuclear 
or radiological emergency.
STUK publishes VAL Guides for emergency re-
sponse. Guide VAL 1 (2012) “Protective Measures 
in Early Phase of a Nuclear or Radiological 
Emergency” and VAL 2 (2012) “Protective Measures 
in Intermediate Phase of a Nuclear or Radiological 
Emergency” provide detailed guidance. In the case 
of an accident the local authorities are alerted by 
the operating organisation of the plant.
The Ministry of Interior has published a guide 
“Nuclear or Radiological Emergencies: Roles and 
Responsibilities of All Actors” (MI publication 
38/2012), which contains the detailed information 
of the arrangements in the Finnish society in the 
case of a nuclear or radiological emergency.
STUK has an Emergency Preparedness Manual 
for its own activities in the case of a nuclear or ra-
diological emergency. STUK has an expert on duty 
on 24/7 basis. The messages of an exceptional event 
(alarm) are received from the operating organisa-
tions of the facilities, from the automatic radiation 
monitoring network that covers the whole country 
(approx. 250 measuring stations, see Figure 18), 
and from foreign authorities.
The off-site emergency plans include provisions 
to inform the population in the case of an accident. 
Written instructions on radiological emergencies, 
emergency planning and response arrangements 
have been provided to the population living within 
the 20 km Emergency Planning Zone. These in-
structions are regularly updated and distributed.
The regulations and guides are tested in off-site 
emergency exercises conducted every third year. Full 
Figure 18. The measuring stations of the 
radiation monitoring network.
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scale off-site emergency and rescue exercise OLKI14 
was carried out in 2014 based on the Olkiluoto nu-
clear power plant accident scenario. Over 70 different 
organisations participated in this exercise, which 
concentrated on the second day after a major acci-
dent when the release plume had left the area and 
majority of actions is switching to the planning and 
starting the decontamination activities.
In April 2016 a full scale off-site emergency 
and rescue exercise LOVIISA16 was held based on 
Loviisa nuclear power plant exercise. This exercise 
was an early-phase exercise with emphasis espe-
cially on the initial actions and starting operations 
outside office hours. The scenario continued for ap-
proximately eight hours after the initial event and 
included release that required protective actions 
for population to up to 50 km and protection of ag-
ricultural production to up to 250 km. Evacuation 
arrangements were also tested by moving pupils 
from three schools nearest the plant.
As a result of the studies made after the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, no needs for ma-
jor changes were identified in off-site emergency 
preparedness. However, some improvements were 
identified and implemented. They have improved 
accessibility to the site in case of extreme natural 
hazards, ensured that sufficient amount of radia-
tion protection equipment and radiation monitor-
ing capabilities for rescue services are available 
and the measures have improved the communica-
tion arrangements between emergency centres of 
NPPs, STUK, and Rescue Service.
The rescue planning is enhanced by the co-op-
eration between the nuclear power plant, regional 
rescue services, regional police departments and 
STUK. Permanent coordination groups have been 
established for both Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs 
in order to ensure coordinated and consistent 
emergency plans, to improve and develop emer-
gency planning and arrangements and to share 
lessons from the exercises, regulations and other 
information. Also extensive training is arranged 
by these groups. A National Nuclear Power Plant 
Emergency Preparedness Forum was also proposed 
after the Fukushima accident for co-operation 
and combination between permanent groups with 
participation from Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the regional 
rescue service authorities, STUK and the NPP 
licensees. However, after the initial proposals, the 
group’s field of responsibility was found to be most-
ly overlapping with other existing co-operation 
and co-ordination bodies. Therefore, it has been 
decided that creation of new group is not the best 
way to address the issue. Instead, the membership 
and responsibilities of existing groups have been 
adjusted. For example, Ministry of the Interior, 
medical services and emergency response centre 
administration are now also members in both of 
the regional groups.
Information to the neighbouring countries
Finland is a party to the Convention on Early 
Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the 
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear 
Accident or Radiological Emergency (Vienna 
1986). Being a member of the European Union, 
the Council Decision (87/600/EURATOM) on 
Community arrangements for the early exchange 
of information in the event of a radiological emer-
gency applies in Finland, too. In addition, Finland 
has respective bilateral agreements with Denmark, 
Germany, Norway, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine. 
Accordingly, arrangements have been agreed to di-
rectly inform the competent authorities of these 
countries in the case of an accident.
Nordic countries have published two joint docu-
ments that detail the cooperation arrangements in 
case of an radiological emergency. Nordic Manual 
(updated 2015) describes practical arrangements 
regarding communication and information ex-
change to fulfil the stated obligations in bilateral 
agreements between the Nordic countries. The ar-
rangements in this document include all phases 
of events, including intermediate and recovery 
phases. The second document, Nordic Flag Book 
(published 2014), describes joint guidelines, includ-
ing operational intervention levels, for protective 
measures concerning population and functions of 
society in case of nuclear or radiological emergen-
cies. These guidelines agreed by radiation and 
nuclear safety authorities in Denmark, Iceland, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden form a unique docu-
ment as it includes harmonised and practical 
criteria for early protective measures as well as re-
covery actions after contamination. Nordic Manual 
and Nordic Flag Book ensure that the response to 
any nuclear or radiological emergency in Nordic 
countries is harmonised and consistent between 
the countries.
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In addition to the domestic nuclear emergency 
exercises held annually on each nuclear power 
plant site, STUK has taken part in international 
emergency exercises. STUK has also participated 
as a co-player in emergency exercises arranged 
by the Swedish and Russian nuclear power plant 
operators and authorities. Neighbouring countries 
have been actively invited to take part in the 
Finnish exercises.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 16.
Article 17. Siting
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that appropriate proce-
dures are established and implemented:
i. for evaluating all relevant site-related fac-
tors likely to affect the safety of a nuclear 
installation for its projected lifetime;
ii. for evaluating the likely safety impact of a 
proposed nuclear installation on individu-
als, society and the environment;
iii. for re-evaluating as necessary all relevant 
factors referred to in sub-paragraphs (i) 
and (ii) so as to ensure the continued safety 
acceptability of the nuclear installation; 
for consulting Contracting Parties in the 
vicinity of a proposed nuclear installation, 
insofar as they are likely to be affected by 
that installation and, upon request provid-
ing the necessary information to such Con-
tracting Parties, in order to enable them to 
evaluate and make their own assessment of 
the likely safety impact on their own terri-
tory of the nuclear installation.
Regulatory approach to siting
Requirements for the siting of a nuclear power 
plant are provided in the Nuclear Energy Act and 
the Nuclear Energy Decree. The application for a 
Decision-in-Principle has to include e.g.:
•	 a description of settlement and other activities 
and town planning arrangements at the site 
and its vicinity
•	 a description of the suitability of the planned 
location for its purpose, taking account of the 
impact of local conditions on safety, security 
and emergency response arrangements, and the 
impacts of the nuclear facility on its immediate 
surroundings
•	 an assessment report in accordance with the 
Act on the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Procedure (468/1994) as well as a description of 
the design criteria which the applicant will ob-
serve in order to avoid environmental damage 
and to restrict the burden to the environment.
More detailed requirements on the Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) are provided in the 
Decree on Environmental Impact Assessment 
Procedure (713/2006). The Finnish EIA legislation 
complies with the EU Directive 2001/42/EU on the 
EIA procedure.
In the design of a nuclear power plant, site-re-
lated external events have to be taken into account. 
According to Section 8 of the STUK Regulation 
(STUK Y/1/2016) the impact of local conditions on 
safety and on the implementation of the security 
and emergency arrangements shall be considered 
when selecting the site of a nuclear power plant. 
The site shall be such that the impediments and 
threats posed by the plant to its vicinity remain 
extremely small and heat removal from the plant 
to the environment can be reliably implemented. 
Furthermore, STUK issued in 2013 the Guide YVL 
A.2, which describes generally all requirements 
concerning the site and surroundings of a nuclear 
power plant, gives requirements on safety factors 
affecting site selection and covers regulatory con-
trol. Requirements on seismic design are set forth 
in the Guide YVL B.7. Deterministic analyses are 
made to assess the impact of various natural phe-
nomena and other external events. The probabilis-
tic risk assessment required for the safety review 
of construction and operating Licence applications 
provides information on probabilities of releases 
of radioactivity caused by external events. The 
limits for radiation doses of the public and for ra-
dioactive releases in normal operation, anticipated 
operational occurrences and accidents (postulated 
accidents, design extension conditions and severe 
accidents) are given in the Nuclear Energy Decree. 
Design extension conditions include among other 
things accidents caused by a rare external event 
and which the facility is required to withstand 
without severe fuel failure.
The general principle in the siting of nuclear 
power plants is to locate the facilities in a sparsely 
populated area and remote from large population 
centres. In the vicinity of the plant, no industrial 
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or other activities are allowed that could pose an 
external threat to the plant. Site characterisation 
is performed based on geological, seismic, hydro-
logical and meteorological factors as well as on 
transport routes and risks, industrial activities, 
agriculture, nature and population. Extreme mete-
orological conditions and consequences (e.g. frazil 
ice formation) have to be taken into consideration 
in the site evaluation and plant design.
In connection with the decisions for construc-
tion of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs in the 
1970s, siting requirements related to population 
density and land use planning were quite easily 
and practically achievable in a sparsely populated 
country like Finland. The precautionary action 
zones have only a few tens of permanent inhabit-
ants. Similar attention was not given to the rec-
reational houses and the transient summertime 
population in the coastal area (mainland and 
islands) where the conditions might be demanding 
for efficient emergency preparedness and rescue 
action. The number of recreational houses on the 
seaside within 5 km radius of the existing plants 
is about 400–500. The precautionary action zone 
of the proposed Fennovoima’s Hanhikivi NPP has 
a few hundreds of permanent inhabitants and the 
number of recreational houses within 20 km radius 
is a few hundreds.
Finland is a party to the Convention on Environ-
mental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context, done in Espoo in 1991. The Convention 
is applied for Finnish nuclear facility projects by 
providing a full participation to all countries which 
announce the willingness to participate in the en-
vironmental impact assessment procedure in ques-
tion. In Finland, the EIA is conducted at an early 
stage of a NPP project, prior to the selection of the 
plant design, based on the power range of the plant 
and on general information on the available de-
signs. The EIA is required to be carried out before 
the Decision-in-Principle is taken, and the outcome 
of the EIA procedure is part of the material needed 
for the application of the Decision-in-Principle. The 
EIA procedure of the new NPP unit option for the 
proposed Hanhikivi NPP was completed in 2014. 
Further information about the EIA process of 
Hanhikivi NPP is presented in Annex 5.
The new Guide YVL A.2 includes a description 
of all relevant legal processes, including those 
based on non-nuclear legislation. Efficient co-oper-
ation between the utility and responsible authori-
ties is emphasised, e.g., for:
•	 maintaining the land use planning in the plant 
environment during the plant operational life 
time in line with the safety goal of avoiding 
dense population in the vicinity
•	 taking necessary actions to guarantee efficient 
road connections to the plant area also in case 
of a severe accident and extreme weather condi-
tions.
Quality, competence and comprehensiveness of the 
site survey and site confirmation are required and 
the results shall be assessed by STUK in differ-
ent licensing stages. The basic goals for population 
safety has not been changed in the revised guide.
The EIA and other site-related studies are con-
ducted by the licence applicant or licensee depend-
ing on the context. The safety related reports are 
reviewed by STUK. The Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy arranges the national public 
hearings and the Ministry of the Environment ar-
ranges the international hearings.
The bilateral agreements mentioned under 
Article 16 include provisions to exchange informa-
tion on the design and operation of nuclear facili-
ties. In the European Union a specific statement is 
also prepared for each new nuclear power plant 
unit in a member state before authorisation of 
the operation (Euratom Treaty, Article 37). This is 
based on a General Data report submitted by the 
member state and on its examination in a plenary 
meeting of Group of Experts. For Olkiluoto unit 3 
this process was conducted in 2010. Based on the 
legislation on land use planning, statements from 
neighbouring countries must be requested for the 
land use plans of a nuclear power plant. Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia were informed of initiating 
the regional planning process for Fennovoima’s 
two candidate sites (Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki and 
Karsikko in Simo) in Northern Finland and the op-
portunity to participate.
The detailed requirements on the determina-
tion of site-specific design bases for external events 
are presented in more detail in the new Guide YVL 
B.7.
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Re-evaluation of site related factors
The operating licence for a nuclear facility is grant-
ed for a fixed term. Periodic safety review (PSR) 
shall be conducted either in connection with the 
licence renewal or as a separate review with inter-
vals of about ten years at most. The site related fac-
tors are reviewed and, where necessary, updating 
is initiated in connection with the PSRs. Updating 
is also done between PSRs if it is called for by 
operating experience or research results. Plant 
modifications shall be implemented on the basis 
of the updated information on site-related factors 
if deemed appropriate according to the principle 
enacted in Article 7a of the Nuclear Energy Act.
The capacity of the NPP units to withstand 
external hazards is evaluated in deterministic 
safety analyses and in probabilistic risk assess-
ments (PRA). The PRAs of the Finnish units cover 
natural and man-made external hazards such as 
high seawater level, high wind including torna-
does, lightning, high- and low air temperature, 
high seawater temperature, frazil ice formation 
in cooling water intakes, algae and other organic 
material in seawater, and their combinations as 
well as oil spills from oil tanker ship accidents and 
earthquakes. During the past twenty-five years the 
results of external events PRAs have initiated sev-
eral safety improvements in the plants.
Research on the site related natural hazards 
is conducted continuously in the Finnish National 
Nuclear Safety Research Program SAFIR (http://
safir2018.vtt.fi/links.htm). STUK has a major role 
in steering the research and the results support 
STUK in the review of the reports submitted by 
the licensees. The research covers seismic haz-
ard and extreme meteorological phenomena and 
seawater level variations, including the effects of 
climate variability and change.
The current operating licence of the Loviisa 
units was granted by the Government in 2007 
for the unit Loviisa 1 until 2027 and for the unit 
Loviisa 2 until 2030. The licensee was required to 
conduct PSRs and submit the reports to STUK in 
2015 and in 2023. The first of them was submitted 
to STUK in 2015 according to the schedule.
For the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 the operating 
licence was granted in 1997 until the end of 2018 
and a PSR was submitted to STUK in 2008. The 
next operating licence renewal application and 
PSR is under preparation and will be submitted to 
STUK at the end of 2016.
For the periodic safety review of the Loviisa 
NPP in 2014–2016 and the Olkiluoto units 1 and 
2 in 2007–2009, comprehensive re-assessments of 
safety, including the environmental safety of the 
nuclear facility and the effects of external events 
on the safety of the facility, were conducted by the 
licensees and reviewed by STUK. The assessments 
covered meteorology, hydrology, geology, seismol-
ogy, population and use of land and sea areas. 
Re-evaluation of the seismic hazard studies for the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto sites is currently ongoing.
During the operation of a nuclear facility, the 
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), including its 
site-specific parts, has to be periodically reviewed 
and updated as needed. A detailed re-evaluation 
of the site related factors was also carried out 
in 2007–2009 for the Olkiluoto and Loviisa sites 
in connection with the Environmental Impact 
Assessment and Decision-in-Principle procedures 
for the proposed new NPP units Olkiluoto 4 and 
Loviisa 3. Olkiluoto site related factors will be re-
evaluated also in connection with the operating 
licence procedure for the Olkiluoto unit 3.
In addition to the normal PSRs, an extraordi-
nary review of site related issues was carried out 
after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident 
in connection with the so called European stress 
tests. National studies were initiated immediately 
after the accident and the EU stress tests were 
started in June 2011. The stress tests did not 
reveal any new site-related external hazards or 
vulnerabilities of the plants to external events. 
No need for immediate action was recognized, 
but some additional studies of external hazards 
and feasibility studies for plant modifications to 
improve robustness against external events were 
found justified.
The following examples of safety improvements 
and additional analyses of external events at the 
Loviisa NPP can be mentioned: enhanced pro-
tection against high seawater level, independent 
cooling units replacing the service water system 
in case of blockage of seawater intake have been 
installed, and detailed structural analysis of spent 
fuel pools to demonstrate integrity of the pools in 
the case of an earthquake with consequential boil-
ing in the pools.
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At the Olkiluoto NPP, system modifications to 
ensure the operation of the auxiliary feed water 
system in case of the loss of the ultimate heat sink 
(seawater systems) have been implemented at the 
unit 1 and will be implemented to unit 2 later. 
Structural analysis to demonstrate the integrity 
of the spent fuel pools in the case of an earthquake 
followed by pool boiling have been completed. 
Seismic walk-downs of the fire extinguishing water 
system have been carried out and some improve-
ments have been implemented. The emergency die-
sel generators will be replaced within the next few 
years. The new emergency diesel generators will be 
provided with alternative air and seawater cooling, 
while the existing diesels have only seawater cool-
ing. In addition, engineering is underway on sys-
tems to ensure residual heat removal in the case 
of total loss of AC power and/or loss of the ultimate 
heat sink due to external or internal events. The ef-
fects of extreme seawater levels on the accessibility 
of the site has been studied as well.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 17.
Article 18. Design and construction
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that:
i. the design and construction of a nuclear 
installation provides for several reliable 
levels and methods of protection (defence 
in depth) against the release of radioac-
tive materials, with a view to preventing 
the occurrence of accidents and to mitigat-
ing their radiological consequences should 
they occur;
ii. the technologies incorporated in the de-
sign and construction of a nuclear instal-
lation are proven by experience or quali-
fied by testing or analysis;
iii. the design of a nuclear installation al-
lows for reliable, stable and easily manage-
able operation, with specific consideration 
of human factors and the man-machine 
interface.
Implementation of defence in depth
Regulatory requirements regarding nuclear 
power plant design and construction
According to STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016), 
several levels of protection have to be provided in 
the design of a nuclear power plant. The design of 
the nuclear facility and the technology used is as-
sessed by STUK when reviewing the applications 
for a Decision-in-Principle, Construction Licence 
and Operating Licence. Design is reassessed 
against the advancement of science and technol-
ogy, when the Operating Licence is renewed and in 
the periodic safety reviews.
In the design, construction and operation, prov-
en or otherwise carefully examined high quality 
technology shall be employed to reduce the prob-
ability of operational transients and accidents and 
to mitigate their consequences. A nuclear power 
plant shall encompass systems by means of which 
operational transients and accidents can be quick-
ly and reliably detected and the aggravation of any 
event prevented. Effective technical and adminis-
trative measures shall be taken for the mitigation 
of the consequences of an accident. The design of a 
nuclear power plant shall be such that accidents 
leading to extensive releases of radioactive materi-
als must be highly unlikely.
Dispersion of radioactive materials from the 
fuel of the nuclear reactor to the environment 
shall be prevented by means of successive physi-
cal barriers which are the fuel and its cladding, 
the cooling circuit of the nuclear reactor and the 
containment building. Provisions for ensuring the 
integrity of the fuel, primary circuit and contain-
ment are included.
In ensuring safety functions, inherent safety 
features attainable by design shall be primar-
ily utilised. If inherent safety features cannot be 
made use of, priority shall be given to systems 
and components which do not require an external 
power supply or which, as a consequence of a loss 
of power supply, will settle in a state preferable 
from the safety point of view (passive and fail-safe 
functions).
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In order to minimize the frequency of accidents 
and mitigate the consequences thereof, a nuclear 
power plant shall be provided with systems for 
shutting down the reactor and maintaining it in 
a subcritical state, for removing decay heat gener-
ated in the reactor, and for retaining radioactive 
materials within the plant. Design of such systems 
shall apply redundancy, separation and diversity 
principles that ensure implementation of a safety 
function even in the event of malfunctions. The 
safety functions necessary for transferring the 
plant to, and maintaining a controlled state must 
be ensured, even if any individual system compo-
nent needed to fulfil the safety function (including 
the necessary supporting or auxiliary functions) 
is inoperable and if any other component needed 
for the function is simultaneously inoperable due 
to the necessity for its repair or maintenance. 
Common-cause failures shall only have minor im-
pacts on plant safety. A nuclear power plant shall 
have reliable off-site and on-site electrical power 
supply systems. The execution of safety functions 
shall be possible by using either of the two elec-
trical power supply systems. Due to the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, the Finnish require-
ments have been supplemented by requiring that 
the plants must have equipment and procedures 
to ensure that decay heat from nuclear fuel in the 
reactor and in spent fuel pools can be removed 
for a period of three days independent of external 
electricity and external water supplies in situa-
tions which are caused by rare external events or 
by a malfunction in the plant’s internal electricity 
distribution system.
The plant shall also be provided with sys-
tems, structures and components for controlling 
and monitoring severe accidents. These shall be 
independent of the systems designed for normal 
operational conditions anticipated operational 
occurrences and postulated accidents. Systems 
necessary for ensuring the integrity of the con-
tainment building in a severe accident shall be 
safety-classified, qualified for the environmental 
conditions and capable of performing their safety 
functions, even in the case of a single failure of an 
active component.
Special attention shall be paid to the avoid-
ance, detection and correction of any human er-
rors during design, construction, operation and 
maintenance. The possibility of human errors shall 
be taken into account in the design of the nuclear 
power plant and in the planning of its operation 
and maintenance, so that human errors and devia-
tions from normal plant operations due to human 
errors do not endanger plant safety. The impacts 
of human error shall be reduced by using various 
safety design methods, including defence-in-depth, 
redundancy, diversity and separation.
Limits of radiation exposure and releases of 
radioactive substances addressing also severe 
accidents are given in the Nuclear Energy Act 
1988/161, section 22b. The requirements for se-
vere accidents are that the release of radioactive 
substances arising from a severe accident shall 
not necessitate large scale protective measures 
for the public nor any long-term restrictions on 
the use of extensive areas of land and water. In 
order to restrict long-term effects the limit for the 
atmospheric release of cesium-137 is 100 terabec-
querel (TBq). The possibility of exceeding the set 
limit shall be extremely small. The possibility of a 
release requiring measures to protect the public in 
the early stages of the accident shall be extremely 
small.
The Finnish requirements for nuclear power 
plant design, siting and construction are inline 
with the goals 1 and 3 of the Vienna Declaration on 
Nuclear Safety. Detailed requirements are given 
in Guides YVL B.1, YVL B.2, YVL B.3, YVL B.4, 
YVL B.5, YVL B.6 and YVL B.7. Concerning goal 
2 of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety 
and the implementation of safety improvements 
(referred to in the second principle of the Vienna 
Declaration) at the operating NPP, Finnish regula-
tions state that a periodic safety review (PSR) shall 
be conducted at least every ten years. In addition, 
the Nuclear Energy Act states that the safety shall 
be maintained as high as practically possible. For 
further development of safety, measures shall be 
implemented that can be considered justified con-
sidering operating experience and safety research 
and advances in science and technology. Hence, 
the implementation of safety improvements has 
been a continuing process at both Finnish NPPs 
since their commissioning. Goals of the Vienna 
Declaration on Nuclear Safety are addressed in the 
regulations and also implemented in Finland.
An assessment of the design of the facility and 
related technologies is made by STUK for the 
first time when assessing the application for a 
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Decision-in-Principle. Later on, the evaluation is 
continued when the construction licence applica-
tion is reviewed. Finally, the detailed evaluation of 
systems, structures and components is carried out 
through their design approval process. The design 
of Loviisa plant units was reassessed by STUK in 
2015–2016 and Olkiluoto plant units in 2008–2009 
in the periodic safety review process. Design of 
the Olkiluoto unit 3 has been assessed for the con-
struction licence (2005) and during the construc-
tion phase. It will be reassessed when reviewing 
the plant’s operating licence application. Design of 
the Hanhikivi unit 1 will be assessed during ongo-
ing construction licence phase.
Application of defence in depth 
concept at the Finnish NPPs
The condition of the multiple barriers containing 
releases of radioactive substances has remained 
good both at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs. 
During the time period 2012-2015, no significant 
faults or signs of wear or ageing were detected in 
the integrity of equipment and structures critical 
to plant safety in Loviisa NPP. During annual out-
age 2015 at Olkiluoto 2, cracks were observed in a 
welded joint between a reactor core spray system 
nozzle and a safe-end (descripted in more detail 
below).
In connection with the Loviisa plant’s licence 
renewal, Fortum prepared a plan on actions aimed 
at further enhancing the safety of the plant units 
in the future. The most important ongoing plant 
modification project related to the Defence-in-
Depth concept at the Loviisa plant is the upgrade 
of the I&C systems of the plant units.
Fortum and TVO have also reviewed all of the 
analyses of transient and accident situations at 
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants in 
connection with the operating licence renewal and 
periodic safety review. Deterministic safety assess-
ment is described in more detail under Article 14.
Severe accidents were not taken into account 
in the original design of the operating Finnish 
nuclear power plants. However, since the commis-
sioning of the plants, major improvements have 
been implemented to prevent and mitigate the con-
sequences of severe accidents. Mitigation systems 
of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs are described in 
detail in Annexes 2 and 3.
For the Olkiluoto unit 3, application of the 
Defence-in-Depth principle was presented in the 
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR). The 
design follows the principles laid down in the 
Finnish regulations. Compared with the exist-
ing reactors, the possibilities for mitigation of the 
consequences of the severe accidents were taken 
into account already in the design phase. This 
was achieved by implementing features to ensure 
containment integrity. Design provisions included 
e.g. dedicated depressurisation of primary system 
to prevent high pressure core melt, core catcher for 
corium spreading and cooling, hydrogen recombi-
nation, and containment heat removal. In addition, 
aircraft crash protection design requirements for 
both a military aircraft and a large passenger air-
craft have been taken into account.
Defence in depth concept in Loviisa NPP
Several plant modifications improving safety 
have been carried out at the Loviisa NPP during 
the last ten years. Plates preventing vortices were 
installed in the intake pipes of the Loviisa plant 
emergency makeup water tanks during the 2009 
annual outage. The objective of the modification is 
to obstruct air suction into the reactor emergency 
injection system pumps when the tank water level 
drops. The Loviisa plant improved suction strain-
ers of the low pressure emergency cooling system 
and the containment spraying system by means of 
installing higher density mesh elements in them. 
The modification serves to ensure fuel cooling in 
accident conditions by means of preventing materi-
als coming loose from, for example, heat insulation 
material from being carried to the reactor core 
via the emergency cooling system. According to 
analyses, blockages in the core caused by large 
amounts of fibres could lead to overheating of the 
reactor core. The modifications were carried out at 
the Loviisa unit 2 in 2010 and at the Loviisa unit 
1 in 2011.
A project for the Loviisa NPP I&C renewal, 
ELSA, was launched in June 2014. The ELSA 
project will modernise a large part of the I&C sys-
tem of the plant, switching it to a software based 
platform. The plan is to install the first stage of 
the renewal in 2016. A watertight ceiling will be 
constructed to protect the control rooms of Loviisa 
NPP from any leaks at the feedwater tank level 
above control room level. Modernisation of the re-
actor coolant system pressure control has been car-
ried out at Loviisa 1 in 2012 and Loviisa 2 in 2014. 
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The modification aimed at improving the usability 
and reliability of the pressure control system. The 
modification included replacing of the pressurizer 
spray valves and relief valve. Each of the Loviisa 
NPP secondary circuit main steam lines has two 
safety valves (with staggered set pressures). These 
have been qualified for steam flow only. The safety 
valves with the lower set pressure (six valves) were 
replaced at Loviisa 2 in 2014. The new valves are 
qualified for steam, water and a mixture of the two. 
The plan is to implement a similar modification at 
Loviisa 1 in 2016.
Based on the safety analyses, it was considered 
necessary to make modifications in the operation 
of the Loviisa emergency water tanks of the low 
pressure emergency cooling system (accumula-
tors). The modification serves to ensure that heat 
transfer from the reactor can be reliably provided 
by preventing the nitrogen in the water tank 
from getting into the reactor. In order to ensure 
the tightness of the primary circuit, the sealing 
grooves of two inner sealing groove zones of the 
Loviisa units 1 and 2 reactor pressure vessel flange 
face were repaired. The tightness of the reactor 
pressure vessel and its lid is based on double seal 
grooves in which a nickel sealing wire is inserted. 
The first defects which required local repair were 
detected in these sealing grooves in periodic in-
spections at the Loviisa unit 2 in 2005. Similar de-
fects were also detected in subsequent inspections 
at the Loviisa unit 1. The repairs were done during 
the annual outage 2010 at the unit 1 and during 
the annual outage 2012 at the unit 2.
Due to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi acci-
dent, safety improvements have been initiated at 
the Loviisa NPP. Improvements implemented, un-
der planning and implementation for the Loviisa 
plant include among other things:
•	 Installation of independent air-cooled cooling 
units for decay heat removal from the reactor 
core and from the spent fuel pools. The cooling 
units provide an alternative ultimate heat sink 
in case of loss of sea water cooling. The units 
have been taken into use in 2014–2015.
•	 Flood protection. The utility has estimated the 
effects of high sea level to the plant behavior. 
The utility has submitted to STUK a detailed 
plan of improved flood protection in 2015. The 
plan is based on strengthening of flood protec-
tion of the buildings most important to safety. 
The plan will be implemented by 2018 (protec-
tion against high seawater level during annual 
maintenance shutdown already partly imple-
mented).
•	 Installation of diverse water supply to the spent 
fuel pools. STUK has approved the design plans. 
The plant modifications will be completed by 
2017.
•	 The licensee has conducted an evaluation of 
the availability of cooling water and emergency 
diesel fuel in case of accidents at both units. The 
volumes on site have been considered adequate. 
Furthermore, the diesel fuel distribution ca-
pabilities (connections between different fuel 
tanks) have been improved.
Plant modifications, including Fukushima related 
modifications at the Loviisa NPP are described in 
more detail in Annex 2.
Defence in depth concept in Olkiluoto NPP
Several plant modifications improving safety have 
also been carried out at the Olkiluoto NPP units 1 
and 2 during the last ten years. The main steam 
line isolation valves inside the containment were 
replaced at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 during 
annual maintenances in 2010 and 2011. The func-
tion of the valves is to isolate the reactor pressure 
vessel and prevent the loss of reactor coolant and 
releases of radioactive substances outside the con-
tainment. The valves also function as a backup for 
the isolation valves outside the containment. One 
reason for the valve replacement was the tendency 
of the old valves to close as the steam flow increas-
es. In a situation where one valve closes, the steam 
flow through the other valves increases and this 
can make them close, too.
TVO has replaced in 2010 all rubber collar pipe 
penetrations below elevation +10 in the rooms 
containing emergency cooling system pumps with 
type-approved fire and pressure penetrations. All 
in all, the modification involved over 60 penetra-
tions. STUK had earlier made a remark about the 
condition of the penetrations. TVO examined all 
the similar original penetrations at the plant by 
means of testing and assessing their compliance 
with fire, ventilation and water-tightness require-
ments, and analysed the risks to plant safety. 
Based on the risk analysis results, the share of the 
impact of the conditions of the penetrations was 
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about 3% of the total annual core damage frequen-
cy based on the PRA model.
TVO has made a decision to replace all cur-
rent emergency diesel generators (EDGs) of the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 with their auxiliary sys-
tems to correspond to the changed need for emer-
gency power, taking also into account any increases 
in the need for power due to possible future plant 
modifications as well as the lessons learnt from 
the Fukushima accident in relation to securing the 
power supply. The low voltage switchgears were 
replaced at both units in 2010–2016.
In 2014, STUK approved TVO’s conceptual de-
sign plans on replacing the reactor coolant pumps 
and the frequency converters needed when control-
ling and supplying power to the pumps. The pumps 
are planned to be replaced because of their ageing. 
In connection with the replacement, a flywheel will 
be added to the reactor coolant pump shaft to en-
sure sufficient cooling of the nuclear fuel in case of 
a trip if electrical power is unavailable. The plan is 
to commission the first new reactor coolant pump 
at Olkiluoto 1 during the 2016 annual outage, all 
of the six pumps at Olkiluoto 2 during the 2017 
annual outage and the remaining five pumps of 
Olkiluoto 1 in 2018.
An emergency control room has been commis-
sioned at Olkiluoto 2 in 2015 and at Olkiluoto 1 in 
2016.
Safety improvements due to the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident implemented or un-
der planning and implementation at the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2 include among other things:
•	 Assessing possibilities for ensuring cooling of 
the reactor core in case of total loss of AC sup-
plies and systems. The arrangement will consist 
of high and low pressure systems. The high 
pressure system is based on a steam driven 
turbine. The low pressure system pumps cool-
ant into the core from the fire fighting system. 
STUK has approved the design plans. The sys-
tems will be implemented in 2017-2018.
•	 Ensuring operation of the auxiliary feed water 
system pumps independently of availability of 
the sea water cooling systems. The modification 
has been implemented at Olkiluoto 1 in 2014. 
Abnormal vibration and pressure oscillations 
have been observed during the testing of one 
subsystem and the reasons are under investiga-
tion. The modification will be implemented at 
Olkiluoto 2 when the vibration and oscillation 
issues have been resolved.
•	 Diverse cooling water supply to the spent fuel 
pools have been completed in 2015. To improve 
monitoring of the water temperature and level 
in the spent fuel pools is in progress and will be 
completed in 2016.
•	 The utility has acquired new mobile equipment 
(aggregates, pumps).
•	 The utility has evaluated the availability of 
cooling water and emergency diesel fuel in case 
of accidents at multiple reactor units and other 
nuclear facilities at the same site.
Fukushima related modifications, as well as other 
latest ongoing improvements at the Olkiluoto NPP 
are described in more detail in Annex 3.
Integrity of nuclear fuel
At Olkiluoto unit 1, the first indication of a fuel 
leakage was observed due to an increased activity 
of exhaust gases in February 2016. The detected 
release of neptunium in the reactor water shortly 
after the release of gaseous fission products indi-
cated a larger leakage. By the end of March 2016, 
the concentrations of noble gases and iodine were 
observed to continuously increase. However, the 
total concentrations were not exceeding the limits 
set by the Technical Specifications. TVO performed 
a flux tilting in the beginning of April and three 
leaking assemblies were detected. TVO decided to 
perform an additional outage to remove the leak-
ing assemblies from the reactor. After sipping of 
the core the three leaking assemblies were identi-
fied and visually inspected. The observations seem 
to indicate a Pellet Cladding Interaction (PCI) type 
of failure mode. Shortly after the additional main-
tenance outage a new indication of leaking fuel 
was observed. In May 2016 during the planned 
annual outage the core was sipped and three addi-
tional leaking assemblies were identified, removed 
and visually inspected during the outage. The root 
cause analysis continues with the fuel vendor.
Integrity of other barriers
The Loviisa unit 1 primary and secondary circuits 
were subjected to pressure tests in 2012. The pres-
sure tests are performed every eight years. In the 
tests, the structural strength and leak tightness of 
the circuits are tested using a pressure 1.3 times 
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the design pressure, i.e. 178 bar abs for the prima-
ry circuit and 73 bar abs for the secondary circuit. 
Results of the tests were accepted by STUK.
The steel liner of the Loviisa NPP containment 
is subjected to a leak tightness test at four-year 
intervals using the design pressure of 1.7 bar 
abs. The test has been carried out in 2014 at the 
Loviisa unit 2 and in 2012 at the Loviisa unit 1. 
Results of the tests have fulfilled the acceptance 
criteria. The reactor containment at the Olkiluoto 
NPP is subjected to a leak tightness test three 
times during a 12-year period. In addition, leak 
tightness tests have been made systematically to 
containment isolation valves, personnel airlocks 
and containment penetrations during the annual 
outages. The results show that the leak tightness 
of the containment building has remained accept-
able at the both Olkiluoto reactor units. The overall 
leak tightness of the Olkiluoto unit 2 reactor con-
tainment was tested during the annual outage of 
2013 and that of the Olkiluoto unit 1 containment 
during the outage of 2016. Results of the test have 
fulfilled the acceptance criteria. Olkiluoto unit 3 
containment pressure test was conducted in 2014 
with acceptable results.
During the period 2013-2015, no significant 
failures were observed at the Loviisa plant in the 
safety functions or in the systems, structures and 
components executing them. No significant faults 
or signs of wear have been detected during in the 
integrity of equipment or structures critical to 
plant safety.
At the Olkiluoto NPP, cracks of various sizes 
were found on the inside surface of main feedwater 
runpipe at the both units during the annual outage 
in 2014. All cracks were in the base material. The 
cracks were at a mixing point of pipelines from the 
feedwater system and the shutdown cooling sys-
tem. They occurred due to thermal fatigue, which 
was induced by the mixing of the cold feed water 
(20 °C) and the about 250 °C warmer shut down 
cooling line water. STUK made a decision in 2014 
that required amendment of the operating method 
and replacement of the cracked pipe sections dur-
ing the next annual outages. These pipeline mixing 
points were replaced in 2015-2016. In addition, IRS 
report 8439 ”Thermal fatigue cracks in feed water 
piping Tee” was prepared.
At Olkiluoto 2, a crack in one of the welded 
joints of the reactor feedwater system has been 
monitored by means of ultrasound and eddy cur-
rent examinations during in-service inspections 
since the indication was detected in 2003. The 
crack is located in a weld in between the reactor 
pressure vessel nozzle butt weld and its joint (safe-
end) on the inside of the nozzle. The crack may 
be a manufacturing fault that was originally left 
undetected and whose actual depth could not be 
determined until the new inspection techniques 
were employed. On the other hand, the crack may 
also be a fault caused by stress corrosion that has 
grown over time and may continue to grow. In an 
inspection by TVO during the 2013 annual outage, 
the depth of the internal crack was determined 
as 23 mm. The acceptable crack depth in terms of 
operation is max. 25 mm. The inspection was done 
using phased array ultrasonic testing from the 
outside of the nozzle. During the 2013 annual out-
age, STUK approved a strength analysis submitted 
by TVO and a procedure where the crack would 
be monitored for the next three years. Based on 
inspections done during the 2014 and 2015 annual 
outage, the crack has not grown. The inspections 
were done using two techniques from the inside of 
the nozzle and one using technique from the out-
side. TVO installed a leak detection system that is 
based on temperature in the area during the 2014 
annual outage. TVO has already made prepara-
tions for repairing the crack. The repair plan states 
that the crack will be removed by machining a 
groove that covers the entire circumference of the 
nozzle in the cracked area and then welding the 
groove shut.
When inspecting the internals of the reactor 
pressure vessel during annual outage 2015 at 
Olkiluoto 2, cracks were observed in a welded joint 
between a reactor core spray system nozzle and a 
safe-end. Fault indications regarding the welded 
joint of said nozzle were already observed in 2011 
and 2013, and the fault indication was classified as 
an internal failure. During the inspections made 
in 2015, it was observed that the failure extends 
to the inner surface of the nozzle, which means 
that the threshold value laid down in the approval 
standard has been exceeded. STUK approved a 
procedure proposed by TVO where the weld will 
be inspected more often for at least the next three 
years by means of both a qualified eddy current 
method and the traditional phased array ultrason-
ic testing method. STUK also required that TVO 
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must continue to study the causes of the cracks in 
the reactor pressure vessel nozzles and continue 
its work on preventing new indications and pre-
venting the old indications from spreading. At the 
end of 2015, TVO submitted to STUK for approval 
a plan on related further measures, repair plans 
and a review on the adequacy of the current noz-
zle inspection programme. The review applies to 
all nozzles in the reactor pressure vessels of plant 
units 1 and 2 that have been manufactured in the 
same manner.
Inspections carried out in Doel unit 3 in 
Belgium in July 2012 revealed indications in the 
reactor pressure vessel (RPV) material, believed 
to have been created during manufacture due to 
deficient hydrogen removal heat treatment. In 
Finland there are no pressure vessels from this 
manufacturer. However, in March 2013, STUK 
sent clarification requests to the operating plants 
at Loviisa and Olkiluoto as well as Olkiluoto unit 3 
regarding verification of the integrity of the plant 
units’ pressure vessels, as well as in the case of the 
pressurised water reactors also the pressurizers 
and the steam generators. According to a report 
submitted by TVO, the manufacturing technology 
of the Olkiluoto unit 1 and Olkiluoto unit 2 reac-
tor pressure vessels is so different than that used 
in the Belgian reactors that the risk of deficient 
hydrogen removal heat treatment can, for a justi-
fied reason, be considered minor. Furthermore, 
such faults would have been detected in the non-
destructive testing conducted after manufacture. 
The reactor, steam generators and pressurizer in 
Olkiluoto unit 3 were manufactured in 2003 and 
2004. At that time, the manufacturing require-
ments for hydrogen content were clearly stricter 
than those used when the reactors of the Belgian 
plant units were manufactured in the 1970s. The 
same applies to the requirements on non-destruc-
tive testing. STUK deemed this report acceptable. 
According to a report by Fortum, manufacturing 
methods that limit the hydrogen content were 
used also in the manufacture of Loviisa unit 1 and 
Loviisa unit 2, and the non-destructive testing 
method has been assessed as accurate enough to 
detect any hydrogen flaking indications. However, 
there were some defects in the manufacturing 
documentation, which is why STUK demanded 
that the licensee try to obtain supplementary data 
and assess the integrity of the reactor’s supporting 
structures and pipe nozzles in more detail to detect 
any hydrogen flaking indications. Fortum proposed 
additional RPV base metal UT-inspections from 
the core area. Such a verification inspection was 
performed at Loviisa unit 2 during the 2014 an-
nual outage. Nothing to report was observed dur-
ing the inspection. The pressure vessel of Loviisa 
unit 1 will undergo a similar inspection during the 
2016 annual outage.
Incorporation of proven technologies
According to STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016), 
the nuclear plant is equipped with systems that 
function automatically and reliably to prevent se-
vere fuel damage in postulated accidents and in 
design extension conditions. In addition, it is stat-
ed in many YVL Guides that proven or otherwise 
carefully examined high-quality technology shall 
be employed in the design, construction and opera-
tion of a nuclear power plant.
Practical implementation of the new safety 
requirements and procedures to ensure adequate 
reliability of software based instrumentation and 
control systems in the modernisation projects of 
the operating power plants and in the design of 
the new nuclear power plant can be considered as 
one of the major challenges for the next years. This 
includes also the issues related to the highly inte-
grated control rooms.
At the Loviisa NPP, I&C systems are currently 
being renewed. The project began in 2002 with 
basic conceptual design; implementation begun in 
2004 with construction of new buildings to accom-
modate the new systems. The first phase was im-
plemented at the Loviisa unit 1 in 2008 and at the 
unit 2 in 2009, including the upgrade of I&C of re-
actor preventive and control rod position measure-
ment and control functions, part of reactor in-core 
monitoring system and I&C of some non-safety 
auxiliary systems. A continuation project “ELSA” 
for the Loviisa NPP I&C renewal, was launched 
in June 2014. The ELSA project will modernise a 
large part of the I&C system of the plant, switch-
ing it to a software based platform. The plan is to 
install the first stage of the renewal in units 1 and 
2 during the 2016 annual maintenance outage.
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, changes in I&C 
systems are made gradually. Software based in-
strumentation and control technology has already 
been implemented in the modernised systems. The 
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safety systems, with the exception of new protec-
tive relays of electrical systems and neutron flux 
measurement system, are still of conventional 
technology.
STUK has reviewed the licensing documents 
related to the I&C modernisation project of the 
Loviisa units 1 and 2 and the construction project 
of the Olkiluoto unit 3. The licensing path covers 
different layers of the design from architectural 
design of I&C (including Defence-in-Depth, sepa-
ration and diversity assessments) to system level 
design and down to I&C platform and equipment 
suitability and licensing. During the licensing, 
STUK is reviewing that proven and qualified solu-
tions are used.
The critical part of the licensing is how to dem-
onstrate that the prevention of failure propagation 
and independency of different defence-in-depth 
levels are adequate. Proofing that platforms and 
equipment fulfil requirements can also be labori-
ous work and must be carefully planned if the 
equipment has not been originally designed for 
safety critical use. Cyber security threats must 
also be considered.
Design for reliable, stable and 
manageable operation
STUK Regulation Y/1/2016 requires that a nuclear 
power plant’s control room shall contain equip-
ment which provide information about the plant’s 
operational state and any deviations from normal 
operation as well as systems which monitor the 
state of the plant’s safety systems during opera-
tion and their functioning during operational tran-
sients and accidents. Furthermore, it requires that 
a nuclear power plant shall contain automatic sys-
tems that maintain the plant in a controlled state 
during transients and accidents long enough to 
provide the operators sufficient time to consider 
and implement the correct actions. Special atten-
tion shall be paid to the avoidance, detection and 
repair of human errors. The possibility of human 
errors shall be taken into account both in the de-
sign of the nuclear power plant and in the planning 
of its operation so that the plant withstands well 
errors and deviations from planned operational ac-
tions.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 18.
Article 19. Operation
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that:
i. the initial authorization to operate a nu-
clear installation is based upon an appro-
priate safety analysis and a commissioning 
programme demonstrating that the instal-
lation, as constructed, is consistent with 
design and safety requirements;
ii. operational limits and conditions derived 
from the safety analysis, tests and opera-
tional experience are defined and revised 
as necessary for identifying safe bounda-
ries for operation;
iii. operation, maintenance, inspection and 
testing of a nuclear installation are con-
ducted in accordance with approved pro-
cedures;
iv. procedures are established for respond-
ing to anticipated operational occurrences 
and to accidents;
v. necessary engineering and technical sup-
port in all safety-related fields is available 
throughout the lifetime of a nuclear instal-
lation;
vi. incidents significant to safety are reported 
in a timely manner by the holder of the rel-
evant licence to the regulatory body;
vii. programmes to collect and analyse op-
erating experience are established, the re-
sults obtained and the conclusions drawn 
are acted upon and that existing mecha-
nisms are used to share important experi-
ence with international bodies and with 
other operating organizations and regula-
tory bodies;
viii. the generation of radioactive waste re-
sulting from the operation of a nuclear 
installation is kept to the minimum prac-
ticable for the process concerned, both in 
activity and in volume, and any necessary 
treatment and storage of spent fuel and 
waste directly related to the operation and 
on the same site as that of the nuclear in-
stallation take into consideration condi-
tioning and disposal.
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Initial authorisation
According to Section 19 of STUK Regulation (STUK 
Y/1/2016), in connection with the commissioning of 
a nuclear power plant, the licensee shall ensure 
that the systems, structures and components and 
the plant as a whole operate as designed. At the 
commissioning stage, the licensee shall ensure that 
an expedient organisation is in place for the future 
operation, alongside a sufficient number of quali-
fied personnel and instructions suitable for the 
purpose.
Requirements for the commissioning pro-
gramme are set forth in the Guide YVL A.5. 
According to the Guide YVL A.5, the purpose of the 
commissioning programme is to give evidence that 
the plant has been constructed and will function 
according to the design requirements. Through 
the programme possible deficiencies in design and 
construction can also be observed. The Operating 
Licence is needed before fuel loading into the reac-
tor. Authorisation for fuel loading is given by STUK 
after its specific inspection where readiness of the 
power plant and operating organisation is checked. 
Furthermore, according to the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, the various steps of the commissioning, i.e., 
criticality, low power operation and power ascen-
sion, are subject to the approval of STUK.
The commissioning programme is described in 
the Preliminary and Final Safety Analysis Reports. 
The participation of the operating staff in the com-
missioning programme is a requirement of the 
Guide YVL A.4. The commissioning programme is 
to be submitted to STUK for approval. The detailed 
commissioning test programmes and test reports of 
safety-classified systems are submitted separately 
to STUK for approval. STUK witnesses commis-
sioning tests and assesses the test results before 
giving stepwise permits to proceed in the commis-
sioning.
Olkiluoto unit 3 commissioning
Commissioning of the Olkiluoto unit 3 is ongoing. 
On the turbine island, system commissioning tests 
are completed as far as possible without steam and 
other connections to nuclear island. Commissioning 
for I&C and electrical system is ongoing, and com-
missioning for process systems has been started 
during the spring 2016. Commissioning is divided 
into four actual commissioning phases followed 
by a-30-day demonstration run before provision-
al take-over of the plant. The first commissioning 
phase consists of component and system testing. 
This is followed by overall system tests – cold and 
hot functional tests – before core loading. For fuel 
loading, Operating licence and STUK´s authorisa-
tion are required. Hot functional tests with core 
in sub-critical state and first criticality can then 
follow. After first criticality, the commissioning pro-
ceeds with power tests at various power levels up 
to rated power. During power tests, transient tests 
are performed. The transient tests will cover at 
least reactor trip, turbine trip, loss of off-site power, 
house load operation, trip of one main circulation 
pump or main feedwater pump, as well as other 
minor operational transients.
All commissioning documentation is part of 
Commissioning Manual which includes also or-
ganisational procedures. Vendor has prepared an 
Overall Commissioning Programme as well as 
system level commissioning documentation and 
TVO and STUK have approved some of these docu-
ments. Preparations for plant level commissioning 
are still underway, e.g. preparation of detailed 
commissioning programs for the later phases of 
commissioning. STUK oversees the commissioning 
of safety classified systems and related result docu-
mentation is provided for STUK´s review.
Before commissioning activities of a system can 
be started, the system goes through a commission-
ing inspection. This step certifies that components 
and system are properly installed and all activities 
preceding commissioning have been completed. 
This is also part of the pressure equipment re-
quirements.
As the STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016) 
states, one aim of the commissioning is to ensure 
that an expedient organisation is in place for the 
future operation. TVO’s personnel (e.g. future op-
erators and maintenance personnel) are partici-
pating in the commissioning activities in order to 
gain familiarity with the plant. The documentation 
for operation, like operating and testing proce-
dures, is validated during the commissioning tests. 
The Operational Limits and Conditions are being 
prepared, and trained to TVO’s personnel. TVO is 
also preparing itself for the future operation of the 
plant by planning refuelling outages, data systems, 
waste management, radiation protection and other 
issues related to the plant operation.
As part of the construction inspection pro-
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Figure 19. Number of exemptions and deviations from the Operational Limits and Conditions in the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPPs.
gramme inspections, STUK oversees TVO´s actions 
for ensuring that the plant is commissioned ap-
propriately.
Operational Limits and Conditions
Nuclear Energy Decree requires that the applicant 
for an Operating Licence must provide STUK with 
the Operational Limits and Conditions (OLCs). 
The OLCs shall at least define limits for the pro-
cess parameters that affect the safety of the facility 
in various operating states, provide regulations on 
operating restrictions that result from component 
failures, and set forth requirements for the test-
ing of components important to safety. Technical 
and administrative requirements and restrictions 
for ensuring the safe operation of a nuclear power 
plant shall be set forth in the plant’s OLCs. Guide 
YVL A.6 requires that the minimum staff availa-
bility in all operational states and the limits for the 
releases of radioactive substances are also defined 
in the document.
The OLCs have been established for each nu-
clear power plant unit and are updated based 
on operational experiences, tests, analyses and 
plant modifications. The OLCs are subject to the 
approval of STUK prior to the commissioning of 
a facility. Strict observance of the OLCs is veri-
fied by STUK’s continuous oversight, reporting 
requirements and through a periodic inspection 
programme. The OLCs, operating procedures and 
other plant documentation need to be updated as 
part of plant modification process.
Fortum has established the OLCs for the 
Loviisa units 1 and 2, and STUK has reviewed 
and accepted them. The OLCs are continuously 
updated, and all the changes need to be approved 
by STUK. The limitations and conditions of the 
reactor and plant operation, the requirements for 
periodic tests and the essential administrative in-
structions are presented in the OLCs.
Fortum has renewed the OLCs for Loviisa units 
1 and 2 in 2015 and the pertinent documentation 
of OLCs was sent to STUK in December 2015 for 
review. The intention of the renewal was to make 
some smaller changes and to get FSAR references 
up to date. Some requirements were also clarified.
The OLCs for the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 deter-
mine the limits of process parameters that affect 
the plant safety, for different operating modes, 
set the provisions for operating limits caused by 
component inoperability and set forth the require-
ments for the tests that are conducted regularly 
for components important to safety. Furthermore, 
the OLCs include the bases for the set provisions. 
TVO has an ongoing development project to update 
the OLC for the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2. The goal 
of the development project is to clarify limits and 
conditions and expand bases and justifications. The 
project originally started in 2008 and STUK re-
ceived first updated OLC chapters in 2012. Project 
is planned to be completed by the end of 2016. 
Furthermore, minor changes to the OLC has been 
made regularly based on plant modifications and 
organizational changes.
The OLCs for the Olkiluoto unit 3 is part of the 
operating licence application and STUK’s review 
for OLCs is ongoing. STUK received a preliminary 
version of the OLCs for information in 2015. STUK 
reviewed the general principles of the OLCs, but 
not yet the details. The OLCs for the Olkiluoto 
unit 3 define safety limits for the plant, limiting 
conditions and surveillance requirements for plant 
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systems, as well as administrative controls. The 
OLCs also include bases and justification for the 
conditions.
Figure 19 presents the number of exemptions 
and deviations from the Operational Limits and 
Conditions. The main reason for the large number 
of exemptions at the Loviisa NPP in years 2002-
2003 was the project to renew the radiation moni-
tors that required exemptions in all operational 
states. Based on the results of the last 10 years, 
the Loviisa NPP applied for STUK’s approval for 
exemptions from the OLCs on the average six 
times per year. Hence, the number of applica-
tions in 2013–2015 (total 21) was a little higher 
than the average. During the period 2013–2015, 
most of exemption applications concerned plant 
modifications and testing of equipment or overdue 
repairs of component failures. In 2013–2015, there 
were fifteen events at the Loviisa plant in which 
the Operational Limits and Conditions were devi-
ated. The figure 19 trend is showing a noticeable 
increase in deviations. Deviations have occurred 
three times per year on average during past ten 
years (2006–2015).
Based on the results of the last 10 years, the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant applied for STUK’s 
approval for exemptions from the OLCs on the 
average seven times per year. Hence, the number 
of applications in 2013–2015 (total 20) is close to 
the average. Most of the applications were related 
to plant modifications. For example renewal of the 
radiation measurement system and enlargement 
of the spent fuel storage required several exemp-
tions from the OLCs. In 2013–2015, there were 
ten events at the Olkiluoto plant in which the 
Operational Limits and Conditions were deviated. 
The number of events is close to the yearly average 
of the last 10 years (3 events per year). Many of 
these events were linked to human errors and im-
proper procedures such as separation of auxiliary 
feed water subsystem without work permit and 
failure of monthly iodine measurement due to miss 
of flow in the measurement channel. In all of these 
events the safety meaning was considered low 
because there was enough defence-in-depth safety 
layers available to handle the event.
Procedures for operation, maintenance, 
inspection and testing
STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016) Section 20, re-
quires that the control and supervision of a nuclear 
power plant shall utilise written procedures that 
correspond to the current structure and state of 
the plant. Written orders and related procedures 
shall be provided for the maintenance, testing and 
repair of components. Section 23 requires that the 
plant shall have a condition monitoring and main-
tenance programme for ensuring the integrity and 
reliable operation of systems, structures and com-
ponents. More detailed requirements are presented 
in the Guides YVL A.1, YVL A.4 and YVL A.6. The 
procedures for operation, maintenance, inspection 
and testing have been established for both Finnish 
nuclear power plants. The procedures shall be ap-
proved by the licensee itself, and most of them are 
required to be submitted to STUK for information. 
STUK verifies by means of inspections and con-
tinuous oversight performed by resident inspec-
tors that approved procedures are followed in the 
operation of the facility.
Loviisa NPP
A structured system of procedures exists at the 
Loviisa plant. The procedures cover work processes 
and functions important to safety and availability. 
The system of procedures is a part of the quality 
system of the plant. Strict requirements have been 
set in the Quality Assurance Manual for the cover-
age, responsibilities, updating and observance of 
the procedures. According to the Manual the evalu-
ation of the system of procedures is included in the 
annual review of the applicability and effective-
ness of the management system. Procedures are 
maintained, evaluated and developed systemati-
cally and in a controlled way. The most important 
procedure types are:
•	 Administrative procedures including Organisa-
tional Manual and Administrative Rules,
•	 Operating procedures and testing procedures,
•	 Procedures for emergency and transient situa-
tions,
•	 Fuel handling procedures,
•	 Radiation protection procedures, and
•	 Maintenance procedures.
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Loviisa plant has upgraded computer systems used 
in managing documentation and permit-to-work 
system. By means of a work order system it is 
ensured that the plant operators are aware of the 
state and configuration of the unit. Fortum has 
developed, and develops further, its work order sys-
tem based on accumulated operating experiences. 
In addition to the work order system the operators 
in the main control room of the units follow fail-
ures, repairs and preventive maintenance of the 
components referred to in the Operating Limits 
and Conditions. A shift supervisor gives a permit 
to start a specific work when he has evaluated the 
work plans specified in the work order system, tak-
ing into account the operability requirements of 
the systems and components set in the Operational 
Limits and Conditions.
The maintenance activities of the Loviisa units 
1 and 2 cover preventive, predictive and repairing 
maintenance as well as implementation of modifi-
cation works, spare part maintenance and activi-
ties during outages. The scheduling of the modifi-
cation planning for the next maintenance outage is 
fixed in order to get enough time for preparations. 
Minor modifications are concentrated to every sec-
ond annual maintenance outage and major works 
are carried out every fourth year. This is accom-
plished by starting from a long term investment 
planning which converts into a long term modifica-
tion plan.
The functioning of the systems and components 
is ensured with regular tests. The systems and 
components to be tested and the time periods of the 
tests are presented in the Operational Limits and 
Conditions. At least the respective periodic tests 
are required after the modification and repair-
ing works and maintenance activities requiring 
dismounting. The performance test programme to 
be carried out after an essential modification is 
required to be approved by STUK in advance. In 
addition, inspections regarding to the functioning 
and condition of components are carried out when 
necessary based on operating experiences from 
other plants and on the advancement of techni-
cal knowledge. Other operating organisations of 
VVER-type reactors have been essential sources of 
operating experiences in this respect.
STUK oversees monitoring and maintenance 
activities as well as repair and modification works 
with regular inspections and continuous oversight 
performed by resident inspectors. Goal of the in-
spections is to ensure that the utility has adequate 
resources, such as a competent staff, instructions, 
a spare part and material storage as well as tools 
for the sufficiently effective implementation of the 
monitoring and maintenance activities. Special 
subjects are the condition monitoring programmes 
for the carbon steel piping and their results. Special 
attention has also been paid to the reliable ac-
tivities of subcontractors as well as to the technical 
competence of external human resources. Both the 
utility and STUK oversee companies that perform 
inspection activities and the technical competence 
of organisations that carry out various duties.
Olkiluoto NPP
The measures that are followed in the operation 
and maintenance of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 are 
based on written procedures. The administrative 
and technical procedures needed in the operation 
of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 have been gathered 
into the Operating Manual. The Operating Manual 
contains also necessary transient and emergency 
procedures for unusual conditions. The most im-
portant procedures have been reviewed by STUK. 
Updating and comprehensiveness of the proce-
dures are among the inspection issues included in 
the STUK’s periodical inspection programme. TVO 
updates the procedures when necessary and checks 
systematically that the procedures are up-to-date 
in four-year-intervals.
The Work Request System ensures that the 
operators of the plant are aware of the plant state. 
TVO has developed its Work Request System and 
will continue to do so, on the basis of operational 
experience. In the main control room of the plant 
units, the operators follow, in addition to the Work 
Request System, the failures, repairs and pre-
ventive maintenance of the components specified 
in the Operational Limits and Conditions. The 
Shift Supervisor grants the permission to begin a 
single work after inspecting the work plans and 
taking into account the operability requirements 
for the systems and components set forth in the 
Operational Limits and Conditions.
The maintenance activities of the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2 cover preventive and corrective 
maintenance as well as the design and execution 
of modifications, spare part service, outage actions 
and the related quality control. The Maintenance 
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Department plans and implements the annual 
maintenance outages together with the Operation 
Department and Technical Support Department. 
Special attention has been paid to the reliable 
work of the subcontractors and to the technical 
competence of the external work force. The techni-
cal expertise of testing laboratories and contrac-
tors is controlled both by the power company and 
STUK.
The systems and the components that will be 
tested as well as the test dates are presented in 
the Operational Limits and Conditions. Periodical 
testing that corresponds at least to the aforemen-
tioned is required after maintenance measures 
that require modifications, repairing or disassem-
bling. STUK’s approval is required in advance for a 
functional test programme that is conducted after 
a significant modification. Inspections that concern 
the operability and condition of components are 
also conducted, if necessary, on the basis of op-
erational experience received from elsewhere and 
development of technical knowledge. The most sig-
nificant sources of operational experience, in this 
sense, have been the Swedish BWR plants.
STUK oversees the condition monitoring and 
maintenance as well as the modification and re-
pair work by regularly repeated inspections. The 
inspections aim to ensure that the power company 
has adequate resources such as a competent per-
sonnel, instructions, a spare part and material 
storage as well as the tools for adequately efficient 
implementation of condition monitoring and main-
tenance actions. Special items are the condition 
monitoring programmes of the carbon steel pipe-
lines and their results.
Procedures for responding to operational 
occurrences and accidents
STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016) Section 20 
gives basic requirements for operating and emer-
gency procedures.
At both Finnish nuclear power plants, proce-
dures for anticipated operational occurrences and 
accidents are in use. To the extent found necessary, 
the procedures have been verified during operator 
training at the plant simulators. At both nuclear 
power plants there are also advanced safety panels 
for monitoring critical safety functions. STUK has 
independently evaluated the appropriateness and 
comprehensiveness of the procedures for antici-
pated operational occurrences and accidents.
TVO has an ongoing development project to 
update event-oriented operating procedures for 
events within the scope of the design. These tran-
sient operating procedures will be updated by 
adding a symptom based chart in the beginning 
of each procedure. The chart guides operator to 
choose the right procedure for the ongoing situa-
tion. The development work started in 2012 and 
is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2016. 
To cope with emergency conditions beyond design, 
including severe accidents, a set of symptom-based 
emergency operating procedures (EOPs) is avail-
able. The focus of the severe accident EOPs is on 
ensuring the containment integrity. The symptom 
oriented accident management procedures (includ-
ed in EOPs) apply to shutdown states, as well, 
although prevention of core damage is essential 
especially in situations with open containment. As 
a lesson learnt from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-
ichi accident, the licensee has improved EOPs to 
support heat removal from spent fuel pools by pool 
boiling and supplying make-up water to the pools. 
Also possibility to shutdown the plant from an 
emergency control room is added to EOPs.
At the Loviisa NPP, immediate Severe Accident 
Management (SAM) measures are carried out 
within the EOPs. After carrying out immediate 
actions successfully, the operators concentrate on 
monitoring the SAM safety functions with SAM 
procedures. The SAM procedures focus on monitor-
ing the leak tightness of the containment barrier, 
and on the long-term issues. As a lesson learnt 
from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, the 
licensee will improve EOPs and SAM procedures to 
support heat removal from spent fuel pools by pool 
boiling and supplying additional water to the pools. 
EOPs were developed in 2012 for shutdown states 
covering the immediate recovery of SAM systems.
Engineering and technical support
STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016) Section 25 
requires that the organisation shall have access 
to professional expertise and technical knowledge 
required for the safe operation of the plant, the 
maintenance of equipment important to safety, and 
the management of accidents. The requirements 
in the Guide YVL A.4 also cover technical sup-
port. Competence of the engineering and technical 
support is supervised by the licensee. In addition, 
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Figure 20. Annual total number of event reports (operational transient reports) submitted by Loviisa and Olki-
luoto nuclear power plants.
STUK carries out inspections and audits by which 
also the competence of the support staff is evalu-
ated.
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj has longstanding ex-
pertise in nuclear operations. TVO uses external 
expertise regularly in various design and modifi-
cation activities when needed. Fortum has under 
corporate structure own unit for technical support 
that provides support to the Loviisa NPP among 
other projects. There are also on-site experts at the 
Loviisa NPP for various engineering and technical 
support functions.
Reporting of incidents significant to safety
Guide YVL A.10 provides in detail the reporting 
requirements on incidents. The Guide provides a 
number of examples of operational disturbances 
and events, which have to be reported to STUK. 
It also defines requirements for the contents of 
the reports and the administrative procedures for 
reporting, including time limits for submitting of 
various reports. STUK publishes information con-
cerning significant events (INES ≥ 1) as press re-
leases. Information from other events is published 
on STUK´s website. STUK describes the events 
also in yearly reports on nuclear safety that are 
also available to the general public through inter-
net.
Loviisa NPP submitted to STUK on an aver-
age 19 operational event reports per year (in 
2013–2015) and Olkiluoto NPP on an average 18 
operational event reports per year (in 2013–2015).
Figures 20 and 21 present the total number of 
reported events and INES classified (≥ 1) events at 
the Finnish nuclear power plants.
INES-classified events
At the Loviisa NPP, seven events in 2013, five 
events in 2014 and five events in 2015 were clas-
sified on the International Nuclear Event Scale 
(INES). Three of these events were rated at level 1, 
others being of level 0:
•	 Faulty connections in Loviisa 1 I&C system at 
Loviisa unit 1 in 2013
•	 Ice condenser system was not properly returned 
in operation at Loviisa 2 in 2013
•	 Relay faults in emergency diesel generators at 
Loviisa power plant in 2013
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Figure 21. Annual total number of events at INES Level 1 and above at the Finnish nuclear power plants.
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These incidents are described in more detail in 
Annex 2.
At the Olkiluoto NPP, four events in 2013, three 
events in 2014 and six events in 2015 were classi-
fied on the International Nuclear and Radiological 
Event Scale (INES). Two of these events were 
rated at level 1, others being of level 0:
•	 Replacing carbon grounding brushes of the gen-
erator during power operation at Olkiluoto unit 
1 in 2014
•	 Open penetrations in containment during work 
on recirculation pumps at Olkiluoto 1 and Olki-
luoto 2 in 2013–2015.
These incidents are described in more detail in 
Annex 3.
Operational experience feedback
According to the Section 21 of the STUK 
Regulation (STUK Y/1/2016), nuclear power plant 
operational experience feedback (OEF) shall be 
collected and safety research results monitored, 
and both assessed for the purpose of enhancing 
safety. Safety-significant operational events shall 
be investigated for the purpose of identifying the 
root causes as well as defining and implementing 
the corrective measures. Improvements in techni-
cal safety, resulting from safety research, shall be 
taken into account to the extent justified on the 
basis of the principles laid down in Section 7 a of 
the Nuclear Energy Act.
STUK requires that all incidents at nuclear fa-
cilities and activities are analysed and reported to 
STUK according to the reporting criteria and the 
reports are assessed by STUK. Based on the analy-
sis, corrective actions are planned and implement-
ed by the operators. Regulatory requirements are 
given in STUK’s Regulatory Guide YVL A.10. The 
guide provides detailed requirements and admin-
istrative procedures for the systematic evaluation 
of operating experiences, and for the planning and 
implementation of corrective actions. Operational 
events at other nuclear power plants and foreign 
operational occurrences have to be systematically 
assessed as well, from their applicability and their 
significance for the nuclear facilities in Finland.
The licensees have developed the required pro-
cedures for analysing operating experiences and 
root causes for events. The licensees are using 
WANO and IRS reports as basic material to be 
screened for external OEF and they have OEF 
groups for screening, analysing of OE entry into 
processing and following the corrective actions. The 
licensees have also their internal audit programme 
and OEF is one topic in these programmes.
STUK verifies by means of inspections and by 
reviewing licensee´s event reports that the ac-
tivities of the licensees as regards incident evalu-
ation are effective. In STUK's periodic inspection 
programme there is inspection focusing to OEF, 
namely ‘Operational experience feedback’. When 
necessary, a special investigation team is appoint-
ed by STUK to evaluate a certain incident or group 
of incidents. The evaluation of foreign operational 
occurrences and incidents is based on the reports 
of the IRS Reporting System (IAEA/NEA) and on 
the reports of other national regulatory bodies.
Following targets for development have been 
recognised during 2013–2015: training in the 
methods of investigation (personnel of licensees 
and authority) and evaluation of the effectiveness 
of the preventive and corrective actions.
For review and assessment of OE informa-
tion abroad STUK has an internal OEF Group 
for international events with a coordinator and 
technical experts (18) covering all expertise ar-
eas of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Nuclear 
Waste and Materials Regulation departments. The 
group meets monthly and based on the expert as-
sessment in STUK’s own IRS database the group 
members make together an judgement whether 
there is a need for regulatory or licensee measures 
on the basis of lessons learned assigning the IRS 
report into categories with respect to actions to be 
taken (categories 1 to 3), or not needed (category 
0). In the case that an expert to whom the report 
is assigned for review cannot immediately say if 
an event requires actions at Finnish plants the 
report is classified into category 1 (particular is-
sues need clarification) and clarifications of the 
applicability are initiated with the plant contact 
persons. After clarifications the event is reclassi-
fied. Classification into category 2 (Lessons learned 
need to be taken into account in certain activities) 
means that concrete actions are not required but 
the report contains information which should be 
considered in inspections by STUK. If actions are 
required at the Finnish nuclear power plants in op-
eration or under construction the report is classi-
fied into category 3 (Actions required). Examples of 
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such events are unexpected failures of components 
being installed also into the systems or equipment 
of Finnish plants, or events revealing deficiencies 
in procedures of the plants. Category 4 (Good prac-
tise in Finland) means that actions to prevent an 
event have already taken or an occurrence of such 
an event has taken into account in the original 
design of the plant, or there are special procedures 
and regulatory requirements in place (YVL guides) 
preventing a similar event.
Figure 22 shows the distribution of IRS reports 
into different categories in STUK’s review and as-
sessment from 2013 to 2015. Altogether 337 IRS-
reports were assessed during that period and most 
of them (82 %), 276 reports, fell into category 0 
requiring no further actions. 11 % (38 IRS reports) 
of reviewed reports were classified into category 2 
and applicability of lessons learned were checked 
in the inspections of STUK’s periodic inspection 
programme or evaluated in some other inspec-
tions. In the case of 4 reported events review re-
sulted specific actions at the Finnish nuclear power 
plants:
•	 IRS 8211: “Broken control rod shaft extenders”, 
Sweden
•	 IRS 8242: “Use of incorrect microfuses on in-
strumentation and control module assemblies 
in German NPPs”
•	 IRS 8315: “EDG failed to start after undetected 
loss of two phases on 400 kV incoming offsite 
supply”, Sweden
•	 IRS 8243: “Potential draining of the spent fuel 
storage pool due to the absence of a siphon 
breaker on its cooling circuit line”, France.
In the 13 events it was realised that similar kind 
of events were already well prevented by technical 
or administrative arrangements, and thus we have 
good practices in use.
Reports for the IRS System on safety-signif-
icant occurrences at the Finnish nuclear power 
plants are written by STUK. STUK has delivered 
six (6) new IRS-reports during 2013-2015.
STUK oversees the utilisation of international 
OE by licensees.
STUK has also participated in co-operation 
between international organisations such as the 
IAEA, the OECD/NEA and the EU (Clearinghouse), 
which exchange information on safety issues and 
operating events. In the OECD/NEA/CNRA work-
ing groups for e.g. WGOE (Operating Experience) 
and WGRNR (Regulation of New Reactors) im-
proves nuclear safety by sharing experience and 
lessons learnt from nuclear installations. Other 
forums that STUK uses to obtain information are 
WENRA, MDEP workgroups, the VVER Forum as 
well as some bilateral agreements. A special ex-
change of information between Rostechnadzor and 
STUK on the operation of the Kola and Leningrad 
nuclear power plants and of Finnish nuclear power 
plants is also ongoing activity. The similar informa-
tion exchange is arranged also to Sweden (SSM) 
and France (ASN).
At the Loviisa NPP, VVER reactor operating 
experience is collected, screened and evaluated by 
a dedicated operating experience feedback group 
composed of engineers from the plant operation or-
ganisation and from Technical Support. The main 
information to be handled comes from WANO 
(Moscow Centre) which links all the VVER reac-
tor operators. Additional information and reports 
are received from the IAEA, OECD/NEA, NRC 
(U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) and FROG 
(Framatome owners group). The activities of the 
operating experience feedback group are not lim-
ited only to VVER reactors. The plant managers 
of VVER-440 reactors have periodic meetings. 
The plant operation problems, modernisation, 
back-fitting, plant life management and safety 
questions are handled and experiences are ex-
changed in these meetings and in further indi-
vidual contacts.
TVO has also an operating experience feed-
back group. This onsite group gives recommen-
dations to the line organisation that makes deci-
sions on eventual corrective actions. The industry 
operating experience from similar reactor types 
No further actions (276)
Particular issues need clarification (9)
Lessons learned need to be taken into 
account in certain activities (38)
Actions required (4)
Good practise in Finland (10)
73%
11%
3%
3%
1%
Distribution of IRS-reports into different categories 
in STUK‘s review and assessment in 2013–2015
Figure 22. Distribution of IRS-reports into different catego-
ries in STUK’s review and assessment in 2003–2015.
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is followed by several means. The main sources of 
information are NordERF (cooperation between 
Nordic NPPs) with connection to KSU (Swedish 
nuclear training centre) and WANO. Information 
is also coming directly from several sources (IAEA 
and OECD/NEA, IRS), Loviisa power plant (e.g. op-
erating experience meetings and reports), vendors 
(Westinghouse Atom, Alstom Power Sweden AB), 
component manufacturers, BWROG (BWR Owners 
Group) and BWR Forum (FANP).
IRS reports are also received directly by the li-
censees via WBIRS and evaluated by them. Almost 
all plant modifications, as improvements in sys-
tems, structures, and components, which have 
emerged from foreign experience originate from 
plants that are of the same type as the Finnish 
plants.
Management of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste on the site
Management of the operational low and inter-
mediate level nuclear wastes and the disposal of 
these wastes takes place at the NPP sites. Disposal 
facilities for low and intermediate level waste are 
in operation at Loviisa and Olkiluoto sites. Since 
the disposal facilities are operated by the nuclear 
power plant operators, the technical feasibility and 
economic motivation to minimise the generation of 
radioactive waste are evident.
The requirement for radioactive waste minimi-
sation is included in the Guide YVL D.4. It calls 
for a limitation of waste volumes in particular 
from repair and maintenance works, and segrega-
tion of waste on the basis of activity. Clearance of 
waste from regulatory control, prescribed in the 
Nuclear Energy Decree and in the Guide YVL D.4, 
aims at limiting the volumes of waste to be stored 
and disposed of. Same guide includes also more 
specific requirements for the conditioning and in-
terim storage of waste and it requires that besides 
the short-term radiation protection objectives, also 
the long-term properties of waste packages with 
respect to disposal shall be taken into account in 
the conditioning and storage of waste. The Guide 
YVL B.4 provides for prevention of fuel failures, 
which also contributes to the limitation of activity 
accumulation in waste from reactor water cleanup 
systems.
The Guide YVL D.5 calls for a waste type de-
scription, to be approved by STUK, for each cat-
egory of waste to be disposed of. In the description 
of waste type, the most important characteristics 
of waste with respect to the safety of disposal are 
defined. The Guide includes also specific require-
ments for planning, design and operation of the 
disposal facility and demonstration of compliance 
with safety requirements.
Low and intermediate level waste
The policy to minimise the waste production 
at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs has included 
the high quality requirements for the fuel, care-
ful planning of the maintenance work and decon-
tamination. The segregation and monitoring of the 
operational waste have been effective, enabling 
the clearance from the regulatory control of waste 
below the clearance levels. Some large metal com-
ponents from both Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs 
have been transported for treatment to Studsvik 
facility in Sweden. The purified metal has been re-
cycled in Sweden. Parts of components containing 
activation products or external contamination have 
been separated and transported back to Finland 
for disposal.
At the Loviisa NPP, the design, construction 
and commissioning activities of the liquid waste 
solidification plant has continued. The plant is de-
signed for conditioning and disposal of liquid low 
and intermediate level waste. The commissioning 
continued in 2014-2015 with the system and plant 
tests. The commissioning program included also 
e.g. the operating personnel training and updating 
the plant design documentation and procedures. 
The system and plant tests were finalized and the 
results of the tests approved by STUK in 2015. 
Loviisa NPP sent the application for the solidifica-
tion plant operating phase to STUK in 2015. STUK 
performed the regulatory commissioning inspec-
tions and review of the application at the same 
year. STUK’s approval for starting the solidifica-
tion plant operation was issued in the beginning 
of 2016.
At the Loviisa NPP site, the repository for the 
low and intermediate level waste is located at the 
depth of 110 meters in granite bedrock. It consists 
of three tunnels for solid low level waste and a 
cavern for solidified intermediate level waste. The 
commissioning of the third tunnel, built during 
2010-2012, will be done in 2016, after the commis-
sioning inspection made by STUK. Loviisa NPP 
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delivered STUK the periodic safety review of the 
repository at the end of 2013. STUK reviewed the 
document and approved it. STUK follows the de-
velopment projects presented in the periodic safety 
review of Loviisa NPP repository.
The repository for the low and intermediate 
level waste at the Olkiluoto NPP site consists of 
two silos at the depth of 60 to 95 meters in tonalite 
bedrock, one for solid low level waste and the other 
for bituminised intermediate level waste.
The original plan presented in the construc-
tion licence application for unit Olkiluoto 3 was to 
dispose all the low and intermediate level waste in 
the existing repository in Olkiluoto. However, the 
waste packages of the conditioned intermediate 
level waste have different dimensions compared 
to the waste packages from operating units in 
Olkiluoto. Therefore TVO will in the operating 
licence application propose that the conditioned in-
termediate level waste is first stored on-site in the 
existing waste storage facility, and later disposed 
of in the extension of the repository. The solid low 
level waste from Olkiluoto unit 3 can be disposed of 
in the existing repository.
At the end of 2015, 6390 cubic meters of low and 
intermediate level operating waste has accumu-
lated at the Olkiluoto NPP and 3571 cubic meters 
at the Loviisa NPP. About 95 % of Olkiluoto waste 
and 55 % of Loviisa solid waste has been disposed 
of in the on-site repositories. Low and intermediate 
level waste not yet disposed of is stored inside the 
plants.
Decommissioning
The Guide YVL D.4 requires that provision for 
a nuclear power plant’s decommissioning shall 
be made already during the plant’s design phase. 
One criterion when deciding the plant’s materials 
and structural solutions shall be that volumes of 
decommissioned waste are to be minimized. The 
Guide YVL C.1 requires selection of such construc-
tion materials that limit the degree of activation 
and spread of contamination and makes decon-
tamination of surfaces feasible.
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree the 
licence applications must include the plans for 
decommissioning. The utilities are obliged to keep 
the decommissioning plans up-to-date and sub-
mit them to the Ministry of Employment ant the 
Economy every six years. Review of the decommis-
sioning plan is coordinated by MEE because na-
tional waste management fund is administrated by 
MEE. STUK participates in the review by giving 
its statement to MEE. Last review for Loviisa NPP 
decommissioning plan was made in 2012-2013 and 
for Olkiluoto NPP decommissioning plan in 2014. 
Next update of the existing decommissioning plans 
for Loviisa NPP will be in 2018.
The assumption in the decommissioning plan 
of the Loviisa NPP is that both units will be shut 
down after 50 years operation in 2027 and 2030. 
The dismantling starts immediately and lasts ap-
proximately 11 years. Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 are 
planned to be shut down after 60 years operation 
in 2038 and 2040. The decommissioning strategy 
for units 1 and 2 is deferred and dismantling starts 
after 30 years of safe storage period. The main rea-
son for delayed dismantling is the radiation protec-
tion of the personnel. Olkiluoto unit 3 is planned 
to shut down after 60 years operation in 2070’s. 
The decommissioning strategy for the unit 3 is im-
mediate dismantling. Dismantling of all units is 
expected to be done in one campaign.
According to STUK’s opinion expressed to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy, the 
decommissioning plans at this phase of the NPP 
operation are reasonably comprehensive and de-
tailed. The decommissioning can be carried out as 
planned, and the plans are sufficient to be used in 
the cost estimations.
Spent fuel
Spent fuel from the Loviisa NPP was transport-
ed back to Russia until 1996. Amendment of the 
Nuclear Energy Act issued in 1994 requires that 
spent fuel generated in Finland has to be treat-
ed, stored and disposed of in Finland. Accordingly, 
spent fuel shipments to Russia were terminated, 
and the necessary extension of the wet type spent 
fuel storage facility was commissioned in 2001. 
The installation of the high density racks into the 
storage facility started in 2007 and continues until 
Posiva starts transferring spent fuel to Olkiluodo 
for final disposal. The capacity of the storage facil-
ity will be adequate for the total amount of the 
spent fuel 1100 tU allowed in the operating licence 
issued in 2007. This amount covers all spent nucle-
ar fuel that is estimated to be produced in Loviisa 
NPP until the decommissioning of the reactors.
After the stress tests due to the TEPCO 
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Fukushima Dai-ichi accident some safety improve-
ments were identified for the Loviisa NPP spent 
fuel interim storages. The improvements concerned 
the availability of external cooling water and con-
nections to feed the cooling water from external 
sources. The water level and temperature monitor-
ing of the fuel pools were planned to be modified to 
function in all conditions. Also exhaust routes for 
the vapour were considered to be modified. Fortum 
has proceeded to the design phase of these planned 
modifications. Implementations of the modifica-
tions are planned to be completed by the end of 
2018.
At the Olkiluoto NPP, the wet type spent fuel 
interim storage facility was commissioned in 1987. 
The original capacity of 1200 tU was extended to 
1800 tU in 2015. TVO completed the enlargement 
of the Olkiluoto interim storage in summer 2015. 
The extension included three new pools and it was 
designed and implemented according the updated 
safety requirements (Government Decree 717/2013 
in force at the time of the review). Extension has 
been included in Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2 oper-
ating licence and has been handled as plant modi-
fication. STUK gave approval to take enlargement 
in operation in summer 2015.
After the stress tests some safety improvements 
for the Olkiluoto NPP spent fuel interim storage 
were identified. The possibility to feed the cooling 
water from external source and to monitor spent 
fuel pool water level and temperature in all cases 
were the most important safety features to be im-
plemented. These safety features were included 
and implemented in the spent fuel storage enlarge-
ment. The connection for feeding the cooling water 
from external source was already included in the 
design of enlargement of the Olkiluoto spent fuel 
interim storage before Fukushima accident.
At the end of 2015, the spent fuel accumulation 
at the Olkiluoto NPP was 1432 tons of uranium 
and at the Loviisa NPP 606 tons of uranium.
Fennovoima submitted the construction licence 
application in 2015. Fennovoima plans to store 
spent fuel in the interim storage which will be 
either pool type wet storage or dry storage. The 
amount of spent fuel is estimated to be between 
1200–1800 tU.
In the construction license application docu-
ments Fennovoima provided STUK the licensing 
plan of the spent fuel interim storage. Fennovoima 
will make the decision for the storage solution (wet 
or dry) at the latest in October 2016 and the de-
tailed documentation of the license application will 
be submitted to STUK by May 2017.
The power companies Fortum and TVO estab-
lished in 1995 the joint company Posiva to take 
care of spent nuclear fuel disposal. Research, devel-
opment and planning work for spent fuel disposal 
is in progress and the disposal facility is envisaged 
to be operational in about 2023. The Decision-in-
Principle on the spent fuel disposal facility in deep 
crystalline bedrock was made by the Government 
in 2000 and ratified by the Parliament in 2001. 
It covers the disposal of the spent fuel from the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 and Loviisa units 1 and 2. 
A separate Decision-in-Principles for the disposal 
of the spent fuel from the Olkiluoto unit 3 was 
made in 2002. The spent fuel disposal facility will 
be constructed in the vicinity of Olkiluoto NPP site. 
To confirm the suitability of the site, construction 
of the underground rock characterization facility 
ONKALO was started in 2004. The excavation of 
ONKALO was almost completed during 2015, but 
some extensions will be excavated during 2016.
Posiva submitted a construction licence ap-
plication for an encapsulation plant and disposal 
facility for spent nuclear fuel to the Ministry of 
Employment and Economy in the end of 2012. The 
detailed technical documentation of the applica-
tion was reviewed by STUK during 2013-2014 and 
based on the review STUK gave a statement and 
safety assessment for the Ministry of Employment 
and Economy in February 2015. The construction 
licence was granted for Posiva by the Government 
in November 2015. The construction licence in-
cludes both the encapsulation plant and the under-
ground disposal facility. Licence conditions require 
that Posiva shall start facility construction in two 
years time. The capacity of the disposal facility is 
restricted in the construction licence to 6500 tU 
which covers the spent nuclear fuel from the NPP 
units in operation (Olkiluoto 1 & 2, Loviisa 1 & 2) 
and under construction (Olkiluoto 3).
Fennovoima presented in its Decision-in-
Principle application similar general principles 
as Posiva for the spent nuclear fuel disposal. The 
positive Decision-in-Principle for a new reactor 
unit ratified by the Parliament in 2010 included 
a requirement for Fennovoima either to negotiate 
a contract with the other Finnish NPP operators 
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under waste management obligation on spent nu-
clear fuel management co-operation, or to start 
an environmental impact assessment process for 
another disposal site for the spent nuclear fuel 
from Hanhikivi unit 1. Based on the Decision-in-
Principle, Fennovoima had six years to fulfill this 
requirement, until end of June 2016. Fennovoima 
submitted in June 2016 Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) programme to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy. According to the 
programme Fennovoima will start assessment for 
spent nuclear fuel encapsulation and disposal fa-
cility in two alternative municipalities Eurajoki 
and Pyhäjoki. In Eurajoki municipality, where also 
Olkiluoto site is situated, Fennovoima plans for 
site investigation covers in first stage the whole 
municipality area. In Pyhäjoki municipality, where 
Hanhiki site is also located, the investigation 
area is in Sydänneva south from planned NPP 
site. Fennovoima has proposed that EIA process 
is finalized in year 2040 after they will apply for 
Decision-in-Principle. Fennovoima has planned to 
start spent fuel disposal earliest in 2090’s.
Safety regulation for spent fuel handling, 
storage and disposal is included in the STUK 
Regulation on the safety of disposal of nuclear 
waste (STUK Y/4/2016) and STUK Guides YVL D.3 
and D.5.
A detailed description of spent fuel and radio-
active waste management and related regulation 
is included in the 4th Finnish National Report as 
referred to in Article 32 of the Joint Convention 
on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and 
on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 
(STUK-B 180, October 2014).
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 19.
STUK-B 205
91
ANNEX 1 List of main regulations
Legislation (as of 1st July 2016)
1. Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987)
2. Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988)
3. Act on Third Party Liability (484/1972)
4. Decree on Third Party Liability (486/1972)
5. Radiation Act (592/1991)
6. Radiation Decree (1512/1991)
7. Act on the Finnish Centre for Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety (1069/1983)
8. Decree on the Finnish Centre for Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety (618/1997)
9. Decree on Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safe-
ty (164/1988).
STUK Regulations
•	 STUK Regulation on the Safety of Nuclear 
Power Plants (STUK Y/1/2016)
•	 STUK Regulation on Emergency Response Ar-
rangements at Nuclear Power Plants (STUK 
Y/2/2016)
•	 STUK Regulation on the Security in the Use of 
Nuclear Energy (STUK Y/3/2016)
•	 STUK Regulation on the Safety of Disposal of 
Nuclear Waste (STUK Y/4/2016)
•	 STUK Regulation on the Safety of Mining and 
Milling Operations aimed at Producing Ura-
nium or Thorium (STUK Y/5/2016)
The Regulations are available on the Internet at 
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/viranomaiset/normi/555001/ 
(in English).
Regulatory Guides on nuclear 
safety (YVL Guides)
Group A: Safety management 
of a nuclear facility
Guide YVL A.1 Regulatory oversight of safety in 
the use of nuclear energy, 22.11.2013
Guide YVL A.2 Site for a nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL A.3 Management system for a nuclear 
facility, 2.6.2014
Guide YVL A.4 Organisation and personnel of a 
nuclear facility, 2.6.2014
Guide YVL A.5 Construction and commissioning of 
a nuclear facility, 2.6.2014
Guide YVL A.6 Conduct of operations at a nuclear 
power plant, 5.6.2014
Guide YVL A.7 Probabilistic risk assessment 
and risk management of a nuclear power plant, 
15.11.2013
Guide YVL A.8 Ageing management of a nuclear 
facility, 20.5.2014
Guide YVL A.9 Regular reporting on the operation 
of a nuclear facility, 15.8.2014
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Guide YVL A.10 Operating experience feedback of 
a nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL A.11 Security of a nuclear facility, 
15.11.2013
Guide YVL A.12 Information security management 
of a nuclear facility, 22.11.2013
Group B: Plant and system design
Guide YVL B.1 Safety design of a nuclear power 
plant, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL B.2 Classification of systems, structures 
and components of a nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL B.3 Deterministic safety analyses for a 
nuclear power plant, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL B.4 Nuclear fuel and reactor, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL B.5 Reactor coolant circuit of a nuclear 
power plant, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL B.6 Containment of a nuclear power 
plant, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL B.7 Provisions for internal and external 
hazards at a nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL B.8 Fire protection at a nuclear facility, 
15.11.2013
Group C: Radiation safety of a 
nuclear facility and environment
Guide YVL C.1 Structural radiation safety at a nu-
clear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL C.2 Radiation protection and exposure 
monitoring of nuclear facility workers, 20.5.2014
Guide YVL C.3 Limitation and monitoring of radio-
active releases from a nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL C.4 Assessment of radiation doses 
to the public in the vicinity of a nuclear facility, 
17.3.2015
Guide YVL C.5 Emergency arrangements of a nu-
clear power plant, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL C.6 Radiation monitoring at a nuclear 
facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL C.7 Radiological monitoring of the envi-
ronment of a nuclear facility,(underdrafting)
Group D: Nuclear materials and waste
Guide YVL D.1 Regulatory control of nuclear safe-
guards, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL D.2 Transport of nuclear materials and 
nuclear waste, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL D.3 Handling and storage of nuclear 
fuel, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL D.4 Predisposal management of low 
and intermediate level nuclear waste and decom-
missioning of a nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL D.5 Disposal of nuclear waste, 
15.11.2013
Guide YVL D.6 Production of uranium and thorium 
in mining and milling activities (underdrafting)
Guide YVL D.7 Barriers and rock engineering of 
nuclear waste disposal facility (underdrafting)
Group E: Structures and equipment 
of a nuclear facility
Guide YVL E.1 Authorised inspection body and 
the licensees in-house inspection organisation, 
15.11.2013
Guide YVL E.2 Procurement and operation of nu-
clear fuel, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL E.3 Pressure vessels and piping of a 
nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL E.4 Strength analyses of nuclear power 
plant pressure equipment, 15.11.2013
STUK-B 205
93
ANNEX 1 List of main reguLations
Guide YVL E.5 In-service inspection of nuclear 
facility pressure equipment with non-destructive 
testing methods, 20.5.2014
Guide YVL E.6 Buildings and structures of a nu-
clear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL E.7 Electrical and I&C equipment of a 
nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL E.8 Valves of a nuclear facility, 
15.11.2013
Guide YVL E.9 Pumps of a nuclear facility, 
15.11.2013
Guide YVL E.10 Emergency power supplies of a 
nuclear facility, 15.8.2014
Guide YVL E.11 Hoisting and transfer equipment 
of a nuclear facility, 15.11.2013
Guide YVL E.12 Testing organisations for mechan-
ical components and structures of a nuclear facil-
ity, 20.5.2014
The guides are available on the Internet at http://
www.stuk.fi/web/en/regulations/stuk-s-regulatory-
guides/regulatory-guides-on-nuclear-safety-yvl- (in 
English)
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1 and 2 under operation
The Loviisa plant comprises of two PWR units 
(pressurised water reactors, of VVER type), oper-
ated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum). The 
plant units were connected to the electrical grid in 
February 8, 1977 (Loviisa 1) and November 4, 1980 
(Loviisa 2). The nominal thermal power of both of 
the Loviisa units is 1500 MW (109% as compared to 
the original 1375 MW). The increase of the power 
level was licensed in 1998. The Operating Licences 
of the units are valid until the end of 2027 (unit 
1) and 2030 (unit 2). According to the conditions 
of the licences, two periodic safety reviews are re-
quired to be carried out by the licensee (by the end 
of the year 2015 and 2023). The assessment of the 
first periodic safety review has completed during 
the year 2016.
Most significant plant modifications at the 
Loviisa NPP during the plant lifetime
Several plant changes have been carried out dur-
ing Loviisa NPP plant lifetime. The most impor-
tant projects since the plant commissioning have 
been modifications made for protection against 
fires, modifications based on the development of 
the PRA models, severe accident management pro-
gramme, reactor power uprating, and construction 
of training simulator, interim storage for spent fuel 
and repository for reactor operational waste.
Among the earliest modifications in 1982, a hy-
drogen removal system was installed in the contain-
ment building in order to eliminate the risk of explo-
sion during an accident when hydrogen is released 
from the core. The system consisted of 60 glow plugs 
that can ignite a controlled hydrogen burn.
In 1993, strainer area in the floor sumps of the 
emergency cooling system and the containment 
spray system was significantly enlarged by new de-
sign, and the sump systems were improved so as to 
provide more reliable pumping of the water accu-
mulated in the two sumps during a loss of coolant 
accident (when the emergency make-up water tank 
is empty) back into the reactor and to the spray 
nozzles. The sumps were equipped with several 
hundreds of strainer units, a nitrogen flush system 
to blow any insulation debris off the strainers, and 
control instrumentation. The amount of debris the 
strainer system can cope with increased ten-fold.
In connection with the PRISE project in 1994–
1995 (protection from primary to secondary leaks), 
the plant protection system was modified to pro-
vide automatic isolation of the damaged steam 
generator at high water level (the steam and feed 
water lines are closed), and to stop the respective 
reactor coolant pump. The aim was to protect the 
steam line from water hammer. Also new measur-
ing equipment, based on the detection of nitro-
gen-16 isotope, was installed in the steam lines in 
order to ensure the detection of any leaks from the 
primary circuit.
Protection against fires at the Loviisa NPP
The possibility of fires and nuclear accident risks 
caused by them were not adequately taken into ac-
count initially in the functional design and the lay-
out design of the Loviisa plant. Therefore, fire com-
partments were not implemented so that the plant 
safety functions could be maintained during all fire 
situations considered possible. For this reason the 
significance of an active fire fighting (fire alarm 
and extinguishing systems as well as operative fire 
fighting) is important along with structural fire 
protection arrangements.
Fire safety has been improved with several 
measures at the Loviisa plant after its commis-
sioning. These measures have been implemented 
in various fields of fire protection. As a result, the 
plant safety against the effects of fires has been es-
sentially improved.
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For a provision against oil fires in the turbine 
hall several measures have been taken. Fire insu-
lators of the load-bearing steel structures of the 
turbine building have been installed. The turbine 
hall has been equipped with an automatic sprin-
kler system and the significant parts of the tur-
bines have been protected. Later on, the fire wall of 
the turbine hall has been built up to protect com-
ponents important to reactor decay heat removal. 
Furthermore, the additional emergency feedwater 
system has been built for the case that all feed-
water and emergency feedwater systems would 
be lost in a turbine hall fire. At the Loviisa NPP 
the decay heat removal systems are in the turbine 
hall. Thus, a separate building for additional decay 
heat removal system outside turbine hall was built 
in 2005. The new system is needed for cooling the 
plant to cold shutdown, if normal systems are not 
operable.
The main transformers have been protected 
with a sprinkler system which essentially reduces 
the risk that a fire would spread into the sur-
rounding buildings, especially into the turbine 
hall. The risk to lose the AC-power (station black-
out) during transformer fires has been reduced by 
protecting the diesel generators against fires. The 
110  kV net connection has been physically sepa-
rated from the 400 kV connection so that the loss 
of both connections as a result of a transformer fire 
is improbable. Several improvements against fires 
have been done in off-site power supply arrange-
ments and in diesel generators. The original fire 
water pumps are supplied only from the off-site 
electrical network. Therefore, an additional fire 
water pump station has been constructed at the 
plant. It has been equipped with diesel-driven fire 
water pumps and with a separate fire water tank. 
Fire water piping and fire extinguishing systems 
as well as their coverage have been improved. A 
new addressed fire alarm system was completed in 
1999 at Loviisa 1 and in 2001 at Loviisa 2. Several 
structural improvements for fire safety have been 
done, or are under design.
The level of the operative fire protection has 
been improved by establishing a plant fire fight-
ing crew which is permanent, constantly ready to 
depart and has the proper equipment. As regards 
fire protection and fire risks also plant instructions 
have been complemented.
Severe Accident Management 
implementation at Loviisa NPP
The Loviisa severe accident management pro-
gramme, which includes plant modifications and 
severe accident management procedures, was initi-
ated in the end on 1980’s in order to meet the re-
quirements of STUK. For Loviisa NPP, the severe 
accident management approach focuses on ensur-
ing the following top level safety functions:
•	 depressurisation of the primary circuit
•	 absence of energetic events, i.e. hydrogen burns 
and steam explosions
•	 coolability and retention of molten core in the 
reactor vessel
•	 long term containment cooling
•	 ensuring subcriticality
•	 ensuring containment isolation.
The developed severe accident management (SAM) 
strategy lead to a number of hardware changes at 
the plant as well as to new severe accident guide-
lines and procedures.
The primary system depressurisation is an 
interface action between the preventive and miti-
gation parts of SAM. If the primary feed function 
is operable, the depressurisation may prevent the 
core melt (primary system cooling by feed and 
bleed). At the same time the mitigation actions and 
measures to protect the containment integrity and 
mitigate large releases are initiated, in case the 
core cooling cannot be restored. Manual depres-
surisation capability has been designed and imple-
mented through motor-operated high capacity re-
lief valves. Depressurisation capacity will be suffi-
cient for bleed & feed operation with high-pressure 
pumps, and for reducing the primary pressure be-
fore the molten corium degrades the reactor vessel 
strength. Depressurisation is to be initiated from 
indications of superheated temperatures at core 
exit thermocouples. The depressurisation valves 
were installed at the same time with the renewal 
of the pressuriser safety valves in 1996.
The cornerstone of the SAM strategy for Loviisa 
is the coolability of corium inside the reactor pres-
sure vessel (RPV) through external cooling of the 
vessel. Due to in-vessel retention of molten corium 
all the ex-vessel corium phenomena such as ex-
vessel steam explosions, direct containment heat-
ing and core-concrete interactions can be excluded. 
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Some of the design features of the Loviisa plant 
make it most amenable for using the concept in-
vessel retention of corium by external cooling of 
the RPV as the principle means of arresting the 
progress of a core melt accident. Such features in-
clude the low power density of the core, large water 
volumes both in the primary and in the second-
ary side, no penetrations in the lower head of the 
RPV, and ice condensers which ensure a passively 
flooded cavity in most severe accident scenarios. 
On the other hand, if in-vessel retention was not 
attempted, showing resistance to energetic steam 
generation and coolability of corium in the reactor 
cavity could be laborious for Loviisa NPP, because 
of the narrow, water filled cavity with small floor 
area and tight venting paths for the steam out of 
the cavity.
An extensive research programme regarding 
the thermal aspects was carried out by Fortum. 
The work included both experimental and analyti-
cal studies on heat transfer in a molten pool with 
volumetric heat generation and on heat transfer 
and flow behaviour at the RPV outer surface. 
Based on experiments, the in-vessel retention con-
cept for Loviisa was finalised. STUK approved the 
conceptual design in December 1995. The modifica-
tions were completed in 2002. The most laborious 
one of them was the modification of the lower neu-
tron and thermal shield such that it can be lowered 
down in case of an accident to allow free passage 
of water in contact with the RPV bottom. Also a 
strainer facility was constructed in the reactor cav-
ity in order to screen out possible impurities from 
the coolant flow and thereby prevent clogging of 
the narrow flow paths around the RPV.
Due to in-vessel retention of molten corium, 
the only real concern regarding potential energetic 
phenomena is due to hydrogen combustion events. 
The Loviisa NPP reactors are equipped with ice-
condenser containments, which are relatively large 
in size (comparable to the volume of typical large 
dry containments) but have a low design pres-
sure of 0.17 MPa. The ultimate failure pressure 
has been estimated to be well above 0.3 MPa. An 
intermediate deck divides the containment in the 
upper (UC) and lower compartments (LC). All 
the nuclear steam supply system components are 
located in the lower compartment and, therefore, 
any release of hydrogen would be directed into the 
lower compartment. In order to reach the upper 
compartment, which is significantly larger in vol-
ume, the hydrogen and steam have to pass through 
the ice-condensers.
In the 1990’s an extensive research programme 
was carried out at Fortum to assess the reliability 
and adequacy of the existing igniters system. The 
experiments and the related numerical calcula-
tions demonstrated that the global convective loop 
around the containment for ensuring well mixed 
conditions will be created and maintained reliably 
provided that the ice-condenser doors will stay 
open. A new hydrogen management strategy for 
Loviisa was formulated which concentrates on two 
functions: ensuring air recirculation flow paths 
to establish a well-mixed atmosphere (opening 
of ice condenser doors) and effective recombina-
tion and/or controlled ignition of hydrogen. Plant 
modifications included installation of autocata-
lytic hydrogen recombiners, modifications in the 
igniters system (igniters were removed from the 
upper compartment and the system in the lower 
compartment was modified and rearranged) and 
a dedicated system for opening the ice-condenser 
doors. The modifications were completed in 2003.
The studies on prevention of long term over-
pressurisation of the containment showed that the 
concept of filtered venting was not possible at the 
Loviisa NPP because the capability of the steel lin-
er containment to resist subatmospheric pressures 
is poor. An external spray system was then de-
signed to remove the heat from the containment in 
a severe accident when other means of decay heat 
removal from the containment are not operable. 
Due to the ice condenser containment, the time de-
lay from the onset of the accident to the start of the 
external spray system is long (18–36 hours). Thus 
the required heat removal capacity is also low, only 
3 MW (fraction of decay power is still absorbed by 
thick concrete walls). The system is started manu-
ally when the containment pressure reaches the 
design pressure 0.17 MPa. Autonomous operation 
of the system independently from plant emergency 
diesels is ensured with dedicated local diesel gen-
erators. The active parts of the system are inde-
pendent from all other containment decay heat 
removal systems. The containment external spray 
system was implemented in 1990 and 1991.
The SAM strategy implementation included 
also a new, dedicated, limited scope instrumenta-
tion and control system for the SAM systems, a 
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dedicated AC-power system and a separate SAM 
control room which is common to both units and 
to be used in case the main control room has to be 
abandoned during a severe accident. These were 
implemented mainly in year 2000 for Loviisa unit 
1 and in 2002 for unit 2.
In addition to the hardware modifications, se-
vere accidents guidance for the operating person-
nel has been implemented. It consists of SAM pro-
cedures for the operators and of a so-called Severe 
Accident Handbook for the Technical Support 
Team. The SAM procedures are started after a 
prolonged uncover of the reactor core indicated by 
highly superheated core exit temperatures. The 
procedures are symptom oriented and their main 
objective is the protection of containment integ-
rity through ensuring the top level severe accident 
safety functions.
Modernisation and power uprating 
of Loviisa NPP in 1994–1997
The key aspects in the project for the modernisa-
tion and power uprating of the reactor units of 
the Loviisa NPP were to verify the plant safety, 
to improve production capacity and to give a good 
basis for the extension of the plant’s lifetime to 50 
years, which corresponds to the additional 20 years 
of operation applied for both units of the Loviisa 
NPP in 2006.
In the first phase, before starting the project, a 
feasibility study for uprating of the reactor thermal 
power was carried out. The main result was in short 
that no technical or licensing issues could be found 
which would prevent the raising of the reactor ther-
mal output up to 1500 MW from the original level of 
1375 MW. The feasibility study gave also a good pic-
ture of the necessary plant modifications. It focused 
on the following tasks: the optimisation of the power 
level and definition of the new parameters of the 
main process, reactor core and fuel studies, includ-
ing RPV irradiation embrittlement, safety analyses 
and licensing, the main components and systems, 
and project planning and risk assessment.
The reactor thermal power uprating from 1375 
MW to 1500 MW was planned on the basis of op-
timising the need for major plant modifications. In 
the primary side and the sea water cooling system, 
the mass flow rates were not affected, but the tem-
perature difference has been increased in propor-
tion to the power upgrading. In the turbine side, 
the live steam and the feedwater flow rate were 
increased by about 10%; the live steam pressure 
was not changed.
The reactor fuel loading was considered on the 
basis of the previous limits set for the maximum 
fuel linear power and fuel burn-up. The increase in 
the reactor thermal output was carried out by op-
timising the power distribution in the core and the 
power of any single fuel bundle was not increased 
above the maximum level before power upgrading. 
In parallel with this work, more advanced options 
related to the mixing rate of the cooling water in 
the fuel subchannels and the increasing of fuel en-
richment were investigated. The dummy elements 
installed on the periphery of the core at the Loviisa 
units 1 and 2 were preserved to minimise irradia-
tion embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel.
The VVER 440 design margins in the primary 
side are rather large and the hardware modifica-
tions needed there were quite limited. Replacement 
of the pressuriser safety valves was indicated al-
ready during the feasibility study as a necessary 
measure because of the power upgrading. Most of 
the other substantial measures in the primary side 
were carried out on the basis of the continuing effort 
to maintain and raise the safety level of the plant, 
and they were not directly included in the power 
upgrading.
It was necessary to carry out more extensive 
measures in the turbine plant and to the electri-
cal components. Steam turbines were modified to a 
higher steam flow rate. Because of these measures, 
also the efficiency and operation reliability have 
improved. Certain modifications were carried out in 
the electrical generators and the main transformers 
to ensure reliability in continuous operation with 
the upgraded power output.
The implementation of the modernisation project 
was carried out in co-operation between Loviisa 
NPP and the Fortum Group's own nuclear engineer-
ing company. In addition, many other organisations 
such as the Technical Research Centre of Finland 
(VTT) participated in the work. The last step in the 
process to uprate the reactor thermal power was the 
long-term trial run to verify the main process pa-
rameters as well as plant operation in both steady 
state and transient situations. Normal operation 
and in a limited way also transient behaviour of 
the plant were studied in the trial tests. Studies 
were made by means of the plant simulator and the 
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results of transient analyses were used in the plan-
ning of the trial test programme. Due to the small 
number of plant modifications required for the 
power increase of the Loviisa plant, a simple trial 
test programme supported by the simulator studies 
was considered as appropriate and acceptable.
The first trial run at 103% reactor power could 
be started in January 1997. Test runs continued 
step by step during the year, and the last transient 
test at final reactor power 109% was completed 
successfully in December 1997. Transient tests de-
fined in the test programme were performed with a 
reactor thermal power of 105% and 109%. The test 
results corresponded very well with all analyses and 
calculations. All the acceptance criteria for the tests 
were fulfilled. Measures to improve the efficiency of 
the steam turbines continued in the annual mainte-
nance outages until the year 2002.
STUK was closely involved at every stage of 
the project, from the early planning of the concept 
to the evaluation of the results from the test runs. 
STUK examined all the modification plans that 
might be expected to have an impact on plant safety. 
Individual permits were granted stage by stage, 
based on the successful implementation of previous 
work.
The renewal of the operating licence for the 
increased reactor power was carried out according 
to the nuclear safety legislation. First the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy (former Ministry 
of Trade and Industry) gave a permission to make 
plant modifications and test runs with upgraded 
reactor power under the existing operating licence 
and under the control of STUK. Then the assess-
ment of the environmental impact (EIA-procedure) 
of the project was carried out. STUK approved the 
Final Safety Analyses Report (FSAR), the safety-re-
lated plant modifications, and the test programmes 
and the results. Finally the Government granted 
the renewed operating licence in April 1998. The 
licence was awarded to 1500 MW nominal reactor 
thermal power until the end of the year 2007.
The revision of emergency operating 
procedures (2000–2005)
The emergency operating procedures of Loviisa 
nuclear power plant were revised in the so called 
HOKE project, launched in 2000. The project en-
compassed the drawing up of diagnosis procedures 
for transients and emergencies arising from prima-
ry and secondary leaks, procedures for operators 
and the safety engineer as well as action sheets for 
onsite measures.
In accordance with the new procedures, nuclear 
power plant operators follow their own separate 
procedures and initiate the necessary actions in 
their fields of responsibility in the event of an 
emergency or a transient. The shift manager co-or-
dinates these actions and reviews the main actions 
and parameters using his own procedures. The 
safety engineer in parallel with the operators inde-
pendently oversees safety functions using separate 
procedures to ensure that plant behaviour is as 
planned.
The revised procedures consist of guidelines 
and instructions presented as flow charts. The 
guidelines define strategy and give grounds for 
operator actions during emergencies and tran-
sients. It serves as a basis for actual control room 
procedures containing operator procedures. The 
guidelines are used for training purposes as well.
The validation and verification of the proce-
dures and their background material ascertains 
authenticity of the procedures i.a. by comparison 
with the plant and by simulator tests. Verification 
authenticates i.a. correlation and functioning of 
the new procedures with other plant procedures. 
The project included training given to the control 
room personnel of the Loviisa plant in the use of 
the new procedures. Due to the revision’s signifi-
cance STUK required that shift supervisors and 
operators working in the control room have given 
shift-specific proof of workmanship prior to the in-
troduction into use of the revised procedures.
In December 2005, STUK authorised the in-
troduction into service of the revised emergency 
operating procedures.
Examples of latest plant modifications 
at the Loviisa NPP (2012–2016)
Modernisation of the primary 
system pressure management
Modernisation of the pressuriser system at the 
Loviisa unit 1 was carried out in 2012. The modi-
fication was done because of restrictions to use the 
emergency spray of the pressuriser in a pressure 
higher than 12 bars. At the same time, the valves of 
the pressuriser spray system were replaced and the 
spray lines coming from the high pressure emergen-
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cy core cooling system were moved to the low pres-
sure core cooling system. In addition, the capacity of 
the relief train of the pressuriser was increased. The 
modification also involved I&C, electrical and piping 
changes. The same modification was implemented 
at the Loviisa unit 2 during the 2014 annual main-
tenance outage.
Construction of new off-
site diesel power plant
Construction of a new diesel powered off-site gener-
ator plant was carried out in 2011-2012. The power 
of the plant is 10 MW and it can be used as a peak 
power plant for electrical grid or as a power supply 
for the nuclear plants. It is not safety classified, but 
it can supply power as a last resort to the safety and 
non-safety classified systems of the nuclear plants. 
It’s also used as a back up diesel for the systems 
used in the loss of ultimate heat sink as an air-
cooled diesel which is located on the highest place 
of the site.
Steam generator safety valves
Each of the Loviisa NPP steam generators has two 
secondary side safety valves (with staggered set 
pressures). These have been qualified for steam flow 
only. The safety valves with the lower set pressure 
(six valves) were replaced at Loviisa 2 in 2014. The 
new valves are qualified for steam, water and a mix-
ture of the two. The plan is to implement a similar 
modification at Loviisa 1 during the annual outage 
in 2016.
Steam line radiation monitors
New steam line radiation monitors were installed 
in 2015 to the Loviisa unit 2. Each of the Loviisa 
NPP secondary circuit main steam lines has one 
radiation monitor to detect primary-to-secondary 
leakages (PRISE). The old system has had no longer 
technical support and modernisation had to be done 
to ensure the operation and to guarantee availabil-
ity of spare parts to the end of the operating licence. 
Detection of the PRISE will also be improved with 
the higher accuracy of the new monitors. The plan 
is to implement the same modification at Loviisa 1 
in 2016.
Construction and commissioning of a 
liquid waste solidification facility
A solidification facility for liquid radioactive waste 
has been constructed on the Loviisa plant site. The 
solidification facility processes the evaporation resi-
dues generated at the power plant and the radioac-
tive ion exchange resins from the purification filters. 
The power company initiated the commissioning 
phase of the solidification facility implementation 
project during 2006 by carrying out system and 
plant level tests using inactive substances. Plant 
level tests continued in 2008 using radioactive evap-
oration residues and in 2009 with radioactive ion 
exchange resins. Based on the results of the com-
missioning tests of the plant some system modifica-
tions were designed and implemented during 2011-
2012. The commissioning continued in 2013 with 
operating personnel training activities and updat-
ing the plant design documentation and procedures.
The concrete containers used in solidification at the 
end of 2013 were found defect, and thus the trial 
runs were discontinued to study their cause. STUK 
deemed the conclusions made based on reports cor-
rect. The commissioning continued in 2014-2015 
with the system and plant tests. The commissioning 
program included also e.g. the operating personnel 
training and updating the plant design documen-
tation and procedures. The system and plant tests 
were finalized and the results of the tests approved 
by STUK in 2015. Loviisa NPP sent the applica-
tion for routine operation to STUK in 2015. STUK 
performed the regulatory commissioning inspec-
tions and review of the application at the same year. 
STUK’s approval for starting the solidification plant 
routine operation was issued in early 2016.
Examples of latest incidents at 
the Loviisa NPP (2013–2015)
Faulty connections in Loviisa 
unit 1 I&C system
During the in-service testing of the I&C system 
at Loviisa 1 on 10 January 2013, it was noted 
that two of the boron feed pumps would not have 
operated properly in the event of an accident. The 
pumps would not have started automatically if the 
reactor had cooled down too quickly.
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Automatic starting of the pumps had been 
prevented when the plant unit was shut down 
for repairs on 25 September 2012. At that time, 
representatives of the power plant noted that pre-
venting automatic starting of the pumps was not 
necessary during the repair outage in question. 
They failed to remove this task from the plant’s 
shutdown instruction, however, which means that 
automatic starting of the pumps was prevented 
by bypassing them. Such bypassing is usually re-
corded in the plant’s work management system so 
that all temporary connections can be reliably re-
moved prior to the subsequent startup of the plant 
unit. Using forms that are manually filled out is 
also allowed in some cases. The form filled out in 
connection with this bypassing incident could not 
be traced when investigating the event. It is likely 
that the form was not properly archived in a folder 
in the control room. Thus, no information about 
the bypassing was available during the startup of 
the plant unit and the bypass connection was not 
removed.
The reactor of a nuclear power plant is shut 
down with the help of the control rods in the event 
of an accident. The detected fault would not have 
prevented the shutting down of the reactor. Boron 
is supplied to the reactor under specific accident 
conditions to verify that the reactor has shut down. 
The detected fault would have prevented automat-
ic starting of the pumps, but they could still have 
been started manually. Furthermore, the plant has 
other safety systems that can be used to supply bo-
ron to the reactor. Thus, the event did not pose any 
risk to the plant, people or the environment.
The representatives of the power plant elimi-
nated the fault immediately after its detection. 
They also inspected other similar connections at 
both plant units and found no other non-conform-
ances. The power plant has specified its procedures 
to prevent reoccurrence of the event. In the future, 
all such entries will be made in a new work man-
agement system that has been commissioned in 
2015.
There was a similar event at Loviisa 2 in 2008: 
at that time, I&C system connections had not been 
restored, either. An extensive and thorough inves-
tigation of the event and its underlying causes was 
conducted. It was observed that the simulation 
practices have not been properly specified and are 
not consistent. The power plant implemented cor-
rective measures after the event to prevent its re-
occurrence. The underlying causes of the new event 
are not the same, and thus it cannot be deemed to 
have been caused by improper corrective measures 
of the previous event.
On the INES scale, the event 2013 is rated at 
Level 1 (basic rating, no additional factors).
Ice condenser system was not 
properly returned in operation
Maintenance outage took place at Loviisa 2 in 
October 2013. Under hatches of the ice condenser 
system in containment building were shut with 
wedges to avoid unnecessary operation. This is nor-
mal procedure during the outages. Wedges should 
be removed before starting up the plant. This was 
not done.
Deviation was noted two days after the plant 
start-up. Wedges were removed immediately. 
Procedures were updated as a corrective action. 
The event was rated as INES Level 1 (basic rating, 
no additional factors).
Relay faults in emergency diesel 
generators at Loviisa power plant
Two of the emergency diesel generators of Loviisa 
2 did not operate as planned during testing in 
December 2013. The generators started operating 
normally during retesting, however. The underly-
ing cause of both unsuccessful testings was a tem-
porary malfunction of a relay (electromechanical 
switch). The relays in all diesel generators at the 
Loviisa power plant were replaced.
Both Loviisa plant units have four diesel gen-
erators that start when necessary to supply power 
to the plant’s safety systems. Operability of the 
diesel generators is verified by testing them every 
four weeks. The relay malfunction was such that 
it would have delayed the automatic emergency 
startup of the diesel generator and, if escalated, 
could have prevented automatic emergency start-
up of the diesel generator when needed. In addi-
tion to the diesel generators, the plant includes 
other electricity supply systems that can be used 
to maintain the safety functions if normal power 
supply is lost. The event was rated as INES Level 1 
(basic rating INES 0, common cause failures as an 
additional factor).
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Periodic safety reviews at the Loviisa NPP
During the years 1996–1998 the overall safety re-
view of the Loviisa plant was carried out by the 
licensee and independently by STUK in connection 
to the renewal of operating licences of nuclear pow-
er plant units. The safety documentation, includ-
ing safety assessments done by the licensee, was 
submitted to STUK at the end of 1996. In addition 
to the review of the licensing documents such as 
Final Safety Analysis Report, STUK also made an 
independent safety assessment. The statement of 
STUK was given to the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy (former Ministry of Trade and 
Industry) in March 1998. As regards radiation and 
nuclear safety, the main conclusions in the state-
ment were that the conditions of the Finnish nu-
clear energy legislation are complied with.
The relicensing of the operation of the plant 
took place in 2005–2007. The operating licence 
application was addressed to the Government and 
was handled by the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy. Fortum filed the application to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy in 
November 2006. Legislative and regulative re-
quirements for the application of the operating 
licence are described in the Nuclear Energy Decree 
(161/1988) Sections 33, 34, 36 and in the Guide 
YVL 1.1 (currently in YVL A.1).
The Loviisa plant was reaching its original 
design age in 2007–2010, but the technical and 
economical lifetime of the plant is estimated to be 
at least 50 years according to the current knowl-
edge of the plant ageing. Due to consistent plant 
improvements, the safety level of the plant has 
been increased as shown by the probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA).
Based on the application, STUK carried out a 
comprehensive review of the safety of the Loviisa 
plant. The review was completed in July 2007 
when STUK provided the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy with its statement on the safety 
of the plant. The Finnish Government granted in 
July 2007 to Fortum new licences for unit 1 until 
the end of 2027 and for unit 2 until the end of 2030. 
The length of the operating licences corresponds to 
the current goal for the plant's lifetime, which is 
50 years. Two periodic safety reviews (by the end 
of the year 2015 and 2023) carried out by the li-
censee was set as a licence condition according the 
Nuclear Energy Act (11.12.1987/990) §24.
The first periodic safety review in the current 
licence period was carried out 2013-2016, where 
the evaluation of the documents was performed 
by STUK 2015–2016. Fortum sent to STUK for 
approval the periodic safety review related docu-
ments 2014–2015. These documents include e.g. 
summary of the most significant changes to the 
licensing documents, report on fulfilment of the 
requirements given in Government Regulation and 
Nuclear Regulatory Guides (YVL), summary of the 
renewed safety analyses and conclusions drawn 
from these results, descriptions of safety and man-
agement culture and how operating experience 
feedback and R&D results are utilized to improve 
safety. Based on the assessment, STUK considered 
that the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant meets the set 
safety requirements for operational nuclear power 
plants. Key issues in assessment were ageing man-
agement, organisational issues and deterministic 
and probabilistic safety analyses and the status 
of safety improvements. The implementation of 
the revised regulatory YVL Guide requirements 
was carried out during 2015 as a separate project. 
Hence, there was no need in PSR to go through all 
the modified regulatory requirements in detail as 
the decisions of implementation were just refer-
enced in the PSR.
The design basis has been laid down during 
the 1970s. However, substantial modernisations 
have been carried out at the Loviisa NPP since 
its commissioning to improve safety. Risk factors 
have been systematically identified and eliminated 
using operating experience, research and develop-
ment and probabilistic risk analysis. Fortum has 
also many ongoing projects for enhancing safety 
and reducing the accident risk. This is in line with 
the principle of continuous improvement of safety 
provided in section 7 a of the Nuclear Energy 
Act. The recent risk reducing modifications are 
connected to the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident: 
including improvements to the plant residual heat 
removal, protections against the flooding and 72 
hours operability for safety systems. Others are 
for example the improvements aiming at reducing 
the risk arising from heavy load lifting with the 
structural reliability of the polar crane and devel-
oping the procedures relating to lifting. The project 
was established already after the operating licence 
renewal in 2007, but it has been delayed. The pro-
ject is now at the planning phase – commissioning 
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would be just before 2017 outages. At shutdown 
the most significant initiating events are drop of 
heavy loads.
 As a part of the ageing management the safety 
of the reactor was assessed in connection with the 
plant’s periodic safety review. Fortum stated dur-
ing the last operating licence renewal process that 
the brittle fracture risk can be managed until the 
end of the 50 years plant lifetime. The primary 
circuits of both Loviisa plant units are still in good 
condition. The validity of the operating licence of 
the reactor pressure vessel of the Loviisa unit 2 
was extended in 2010 until the end of 2030, i.e., 
to the end of the plant unit’s current operating 
licence. Similarly, STUK assessed the renewal of 
the reactor pressure vessel operating licence for 
the Loviisa unit 1 in 2012 and the validity of the 
operating licence of the reactor pressure vessel of 
the Loviisa unit 1 was extended until the end of 
the plant unit’s current operating licence. STUK 
has had some concerns about the embrittlement 
margins of LO2 reactor pressure vessel before the 
expected end of life in 2030. Related to PSR 2015 
assessment Fortum will send at the end 2016 to 
STUK for information the documents concerning 
the actions to increase the embrittlement margins 
of Loviisa unit 2 reactor pressure vessel in the 
future.
As a summary of the review of the issues and 
documentation pertaining to the periodic safety 
review and the continuous oversight results, STUK 
noted that the prerequisites for safe operation of 
Loviisa NPP have been met.
Planned and ongoing activities to 
improve safety at the Loviisa NPP
In Finland, the continuous safety assessment and 
enhancement approach is presented in the nu-
clear legislation. Actions for safety enhancement 
are to be taken whenever they can be regarded 
as justified, considering operating experience, the 
results of safety research and the advancement 
of science and technology. The implementation of 
safety improvements has been a continuing pro-
cess at the Loviisa nuclear power plants since its 
commissioning and there exists no urgent need to 
upgrade the safety of this plant in the context of 
the Convention.
For continued safe operation, plant improve-
ment projects are still necessary. The largest ongo-
ing investment is the complete renewal of the plant 
I&C system. Also some improvement measures 
will be done based on the lessons learnt from the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.
Safety assessments and improvements 
based on the lessons learnt from 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident
Based on the results of assessments conducted af-
ter the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident on 11 
March 2011, it is concluded that no such hazards 
or deficiencies have been found as would require 
immediate actions at the Loviisa NPP. However, 
the areas where safety can be further enhanced 
have been identified and there are plans on how 
to address these areas. Main changes are aimed at 
decreasing the dependency on plant’s normal elec-
tricity supply and distribution systems as well as 
on the sea water cooled systems for residual heat 
removal from the reactor, containment and spent 
fuel pools. There are also ongoing activities to im-
prove protection against external flooding.
Natural hazards
The renewed regulations and YVL Guides pub-
lished in 2013 include updated requirements on 
provisions for external hazards, including, e.g., 
earthquakes, high sea water level, harsh weather 
conditions and hazards related to transport and 
industrial activities. For the operating units the 
fulfilment of the new requirements was evaluated 
separately and new Guides implemented 2015.
According to the PRA results, the risk caused 
to the operating units by external events is a 
relatively small fraction of the total risk. However, 
there are areas where possibilities for further risk 
reduction exist, for example improving the protec-
tion against high seawater level.
Safety margins were assessed by the licensee 
and reviewed by STUK. Based on the results, 
STUK required further clarifications on the follow-
ing main points:
•	 seismic resistance of spent fuel pools including 
situations with water temperature exceeding 
the design bases;
•	 seismic resistance of fire fighting systems; and
•	 plans for improving flooding margin for the 
Loviisa plant by end of 2013.
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Seawater level variations in the Baltic Sea are 
moderate. Due to geological conditions and the 
shallow water strong tsunami type phenomena 
are not considered possible in the Baltic Sea. At 
the Loviisa NPP, the observed maximum seawater 
level is +1.77 m above the mean sea level (N60 
reference system). The design basis of the Loviisa 
NPP is about +3 m during power operation and 
about +2.1 m during refuelling shutdown. Based 
of extreme value distribution fitting, the annual 
probability of exceeding the level +3 m is about 
4·10-7. The refuelling shutdowns are scheduled 
for summer and early autumn when the seawater 
level variations are small. The design basis of the 
Loviisa NPP is considered sufficient in the short 
term. Although the estimated annual probability of 
exceeding the design value is very small, the conse-
quences of flooding of the basement of the Loviisa 
NPP would be severe, as all cooling systems might 
be lost. Therefore, to ensure safe operation in the 
long term, the possibilities for decreasing the risk 
of seawater flooding had to be examined.
Loviisa NPP has improved in 2012 flood protec-
tion during certain annual shutdown states with 
open hatches in the condenser cooling seawater 
system; the design water level was increased from 
+2.1 m to +2.45 m and further increase to +2.95 m 
is considered.
The licensee was required to submit plans to 
improve protection against external flooding by the 
end of 2013. The licensee has been examining site 
area protection with leeves and protected volume 
approach and also their combination to improve 
of the flooding resistance of the Loviisa plant. The 
work has turned out to be more challenging than 
originally estimated. The utility has estimated 
the effects of high sea level to the plant behaviour. 
The decisions made are based on updated flood-
ing hazard estimates contracted from the Finnish 
Meteorological Institute. The utility submitted a 
detailed plan of improved flood protection in 2015. 
The plan is based on strengthening of flood pro-
tection of the buildings most important to safety 
(the auxiliary emergency feedwater and auxiliary 
residual heat removal buildings). The plan will be 
implemented by 2018 (protection during annual 
maintenance shutdown already partly implement-
ed).
Design issues
At the Loviisa NPP, the systems needed for residu-
al heat removal from the reactor, containment and 
fuel pools require external power and the ultimate 
heat sink is the sea. A reliable supply of electrical 
power to the systems providing for basic safety 
functions at the Loviisa NPP is ensured by the 
Defence-in-Depth concept. As a result of multiple 
and diversified electrical power sources at differ-
ent levels, the probability of loss of all electrical 
supply systems is considered very low. However, 
as a result of the studies made after the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, further changes 
were implemented. Main changes implemented are 
decreasing the dependency on plant’s normal elec-
tricity supply and distribution systems as well as 
on the sea water cooled systems for residual heat 
removal from the reactor, containment and spent 
fuel pools.
At the Loviisa NPP, the availability of an alter-
nate heat sink depends on the plant state and feed 
water availability. If primary circuit can be pres-
surised (i.e. reactor vessel head is in place), atmos-
phere can be used as an alternate heat sink as long 
as there is enough water available for dumping 
steam into atmosphere from the secondary circuit. 
There is a separated diesel driven auxiliary emer-
gency feed water system with two pumps which 
feed water to the steam generators in case of loss 
of AC power. It is also possible to transfer heat to 
spent fuel cooling system and hence to intermedi-
ate cooling system, giving time for restoring ulti-
mate heat sink.
In addition, the licensee has evaluated meas-
ures needed to secure the availability of the aux-
iliary emergency feedwater system in the case of 
loss of electrical power, water supply for the diesel 
driven auxiliary emergency feed water pumps, and 
electricity supply for instrumentation needed in 
accidents. The modifications were realised during 
2012 and 2013, with the exception of improving the 
instrumentation by 2016.
The licensee at the Loviisa NPP has completed 
also the modification to ensure the long-term decay 
heat removal in case of loss of seawater by imple-
menting an alternative ultimate heat sink. The 
modification consists of two air-cooled cooling units 
per plant unit powered by an air-cooled diesel-gen-
erator. The other cooling unit would remove decay 
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heat from the reactor and the other one ensures 
the decay heat removal from the spent fuel pool in-
side the containment and from the separate spent 
fuel interim storage pools. The cooling unit is con-
nected to the intermediate cooling circuit, and it 
backs up the seawater cooled heat exchangers. The 
cooling units for the reactors are dimensioned to be 
able to remove the decay heat after 72 h, and until 
then the heat removal can be carried out by steam 
dumping into the atmosphere from the steam gen-
erator secondary side. The modifications create a 
possibility to closed-loop operation also in case of 
loss of ultimate heat sink. The cooling units were 
installed in 2014–2015. The commissioning of the 
system was performed during the outages in 2015.
The experiences from the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident were taken into consideration in the 
renewal of the Finnish Regulatory Guides (YVL 
Guides). For example there is a new requirement 
for arrangements that enable the decay heat re-
moval from the reactor out of the containment 
and arrangements to ensure sufficient cooling of 
the fuel in spent fuel storages. In spite that there 
are fixed severe accident management systems in-
stalled at Loviisa operating units, STUK required 
the licensee to investigate needs and possibilities 
to use mobile power supply and mobile pumps 
in accidents. Loviisa NPP has studied the possi-
bilities to utilise mobile power supply and mobile 
pumps to support safety functions.
At the Loviisa NPP, the current AC power sup-
ply systems include connections to 400 kV and 110 
kV power grids, main generator (house load opera-
tion), four emergency diesel generators per unit, a 
diverse diesel power plant and a dedicated connec-
tion to a nearby hydropower plant, two SAM diesel 
generators, and the possibility to supply electricity 
from the neighbouring NPP unit. No modifications 
are planned to the current design concerning AC 
power supply.
At the Loviisa NPP, there is enough diesel fuel 
in the emergency diesel generator (EDG) tanks 
for at least 72 h of operation, and with realistic 
loads in case of an accident, the duration is evalu-
ated to be twice as long. Currently the emergency 
diesel generators (EDGs) at the Loviisa NPPs use 
conventional diesel fuel, which is available only in 
limited scope. An investigation of replacing conven-
tional diesel with widely available biodiesel was 
performed by the licensee and the diesel engine 
manufacturer. Based on the investigations biodies-
el is allowed to use in exceptional circumstances. 
In 2012, the licensee of the Loviisa NPP purchased 
a container to transfer diesel fuel at the site. The 
purpose of this container was to make fuel transfer 
between the tanks on-site easier and faster. In ad-
dition, to improve the delivery of the fuel and to 
ensure the 72 h operation, the licensee has built 
during 2015-2016 a new fuel line from the new air-
cooled diesel power plant fuel storage tank to the 
emergency diesel customers (emergency diesel fuel 
storage tank, diesel driven auxiliary emergency 
feed water pumps daily tank) and made a new ex-
tra storage tank for SAM diesels.
At the Loviisa NPP, the depletion times of some 
DC batteries are considered to be rather short. The 
duration of DC power supply has been considered 
to be enhanced. Especially the reactor coolant 
pump seal water system functionality must be 
ensured. The licensee submitted a plan regarding 
these improvements to STUK at the end of 2012. 
There is also an ongoing automation renewal pro-
ject in which the depletion time of the batteries 
will be lengthened substantially. It is possible to 
charge the batteries using the AC power sources. 
The licensee installed two new separate under-
ground cables from the new diesel power plant to 
the 6.3 kV diesel busbar in 2012–2013, which will 
furthermore ensure and enhance battery charging 
possibilities.
Regarding spent fuel pools, the approach in 
Finland is to “practically eliminate” the possibil-
ity of fuel damage. The licensee have evaluated 
alternative means of decay heat removal from fuel 
pools in case of loss of existing systems, and to sup-
ply coolant to fuel pools (including potential need 
for new instrumentation). There has been done 
further analysis before starting the detailed design 
work. The more detailed analysis was performed in 
2013. STUK has approved in 2015 the design plans 
concerning the installation of diverse water supply 
to the spent fuel pools. The plant modifications will 
be completed by 2017. Furthermore, the licensee 
will improve Emergency Operating Procedures 
(EOPs) and SAM Guidelines to support heat re-
moval from spent fuel pools by pool boiling and 
supplying additional water to the pools. Licensee 
has also studied the seismic resistance of the spent 
fuel storage pools as well as the influence of pool 
water boiling to the pool structures.
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Severe accident management
A comprehensive severe accident management 
(SAM) strategy has been developed and imple-
mented at Loviisa 1&2 plant units during 1990’s 
after the accidents in TMI and Chernobyl (see 
above). These strategies are based on ensuring the 
containment integrity which is required in the ex-
isting national regulations. STUK has reviewed 
these strategies and has made inspections in all 
stages of implementation.
As a result of the studies made after the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, no major changes at 
the plants are considered necessary. However, the 
licensee is expected to consider spent fuel pools in 
the SAM procedures as well as any implications 
on them possibly arising from simultaneous multi 
unit accidents. In addition, there are many actions 
related to the update of the emergency plans.
At the Loviisa NPP, the design basis for all 
SAM safety functions is that the actions can be 
done, when the other supplies have been lost, with 
dedicated independent SAM electrical systems and 
dedicated independent SAM I&C from SAM con-
trol room or main control room. The SAM strate-
gies and their implementation at the Loviisa NPP 
follow the requirements set in the Government 
Decree 733/2008 (in force at the time) and the YVL 
Guides. The approach and the plant modifications 
have been approved by STUK. Since the systems 
for management and mitigation of severe acci-
dents have already been implemented at Loviisa 
operating units and the corresponding procedures 
are in place, no further measures for this purpose 
are foreseen at the moment. However, the sound-
ness and adequacy of the accident management 
schemes is being constantly assessed against the 
latest knowledge and experience obtained from dif-
ferent international sources.
Loviisa NPP is investigating possibilities to 
implement additional injection points for mobile 
pumps to provide more flexibility to the water sup-
ply of the containment external spray. These con-
nections could provide capability to inject enough 
water for both units with one pump. The different 
possibilities were analysed in more detail in 2013. 
Currently, the containment external spraying for 
heat removal from the containment can be carried 
out by fire trucks, individually for the both units, in 
case of failure of the fixed pumps. Investment deci-
sion for mobile power supply and mobile pumps 
will be made jointly with the decision of compre-
hensive solution for flooding protection by 2018.
At the Loviisa NPP, immediate SAM measures 
are carried out within the Emergency Operation 
Procedures (EOP). After carrying out immediate 
actions successfully, the operators concentrate on 
monitoring the SAM safety functions with SAM 
procedures. The SAM procedures focus on monitor-
ing the leak tightness of the containment barrier, 
and on the long-term issues. At the Loviisa NPP, 
licensee will improve EOPs and SAM procedures 
to support heat removal from spent fuel pools by 
pool boiling and supplying additional water to the 
pools. New EOPs for shutdown states, which cover 
the immediate recovery of SAM systems, have been 
developed in 2012.
I&C renewal project at Loviisa NPP
A continuation project for the Loviisa NPP I&C 
renewal, ELSA, was launched in June 2014. The 
ELSA project will modernise a large part of the 
I&C system of the plant, switching it to a digi-
tal equipment platform. The delivery contract has 
been made with the Rolls-Royce. The plan is to 
install the first stage of the renewal in 2016. The 
second and the third stage of the ELSA project 
including safety classified parts are intended to be 
implemented during the annual outages of 2017 
and 2018 at the both reactor units.
Preliminary planning of the renewal project 
started several years ago and in the beginning of 
2005 the licensee signed the delivery contract with 
the consortium of Framatome and Siemens. New 
buildings at the plant site have been constructed 
and will accommodate the main equipment of 
the safety and operational I&C. The first phase of 
this LARA project included e.g. the renewal of the 
reactor preventive protection I&C and was imple-
mented in the outage 2008 at Loviisa unit 1 and 
at Loviisa unit 2 in the outage 2009. The change 
of the supplier was made before the second phase 
of the LARA project including the renewal of the 
reactor protection system.
The scope of the ELSA renewal is not as exten-
sive as it was at the LARA project. The assessment 
concerning the scope change impacts for safety rel-
evant functions and other modernisation projects 
was made as a part of the periodic safety review 
in 2015.
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1 and 2 under operation
The Olkiluoto plant comprises of two BWR units 
that are operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oyj 
(TVO). The plant units were connected to the elec-
trical network in September 2, 1978 (Olkiluoto 1) 
and February 18, 1980 (Olkiluoto 2). The present 
nominal thermal power of both Olkiluoto units is 
2500 MW, which was licensed in 1998. The new 
power level is 115.7% as compared to the earlier 
nominal power 2160 MW licensed in 1983. The 
original power level of both units was 2000 MW. 
The Operating Licences of the units are valid until 
the end of 2018. According to the conditions of the 
licences, the licensee carried out a periodic safety 
review and submitted it to the regulator at the end 
of 2008.
Most significant plant modifications at the 
Olkiluoto NPP during the plant lifetime
Several plant changes have been carried out dur-
ing Olkiluoto NPP plant lifetime. The most impor-
tant projects since the plant commissioning have 
been two reactor upratings, severe accident man-
agement programme, modifications based on the 
development of the PRA models, construction of 
training simulator, interim storage for spent fuel 
and repository for operational waste, and investi-
gation programme for disposal of spent fuel. The 
first power uprating project was carried out in 
1983–1984. Thermal power was uprated from 2000 
MW to 2160 MW (8%). The plant modifications 
included for example a new relief valve that was 
installed in the reactor primary system, changes in 
the reactor protection system, and increase of cool-
ing capacity of some heat exchangers.
Severe Accident Management 
implementation at the Olkiluoto NPP
Several new research programmes were launched 
in the beginning of 1980’s, whose objective was both 
to clarify the character and magnitude of loads 
arising from a severe accident and to find means 
for controlling the loads on the containment. The 
main provisions for severe accident management 
were installed at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 dur-
ing the SAM project which was completed in 1989. 
The measures implemented were
•	 containment overpressure protection
•	 containment filtered venting
•	 lower drywell flooding from wetwell
•	 containment penetration shielding in lower dry-
well
•	 containment water filling from external source
•	 containment instrumentation for severe acci-
dent control
•	 Emergency Operating Procedures for severe 
accidents.
The means for managing severe accidents had to 
be adjusted to the existing design, and so an opti-
mal implementation of all chosen solutions was not 
possible. Subsequent development of the accident 
management procedures and additional minor 
plant modifications at Olkiluoto plant have taken 
place during the years after that when new aspects 
on the issue have emerged.
To secure depressurisation of the reactor pri-
mary system in severe accident situations and to 
prevent a new pressurisation of the reactor, two 
valves of the relief system were modified. It is now 
possible to keep the valves open with the help of 
nitrogen supply or water supply from outside the 
containment.
One of the most significant deficiencies at the 
Olkiluoto plant containments, from the standpoint 
of controlling severe accidents, has been the small 
size of the containment, which may cause the con-
tainment to pressurise due to the hydrogen and 
steam generation during an accident (common fea-
ture for BWRs). Another deficiency is the location 
of the reactor pressure vessel inside the contain-
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ment, which is such that the core melt erupting 
from the pressure vessel may expose the structures 
and penetrations which ensure the tightness of the 
containment, to pressure loads and thermal stress-
es. To eliminate these deficiencies, the containment 
was e.g. provided with a filtered venting system. 
Gases that pressurise the containment can be re-
moved through a filter designed for the purpose, if 
the pressure inside the containment threatens to 
increase too much. The part of the containment un-
derneath the reactor pressure vessel can be flooded 
with water in order to protect the containment 
bottom and penetrations from the thermal effect 
of core melt. Some penetrations of the contain-
ment have been protected from the direct effect of 
core melt also by structural means. To ensure the 
cooling of reactor debris, the plant units are also 
provided with a water filling system, by the means 
of which the water level inside the containment 
can be raised all the way to the same level with the 
upper edge of the reactor core.
The cooling of reactor core melt and the protec-
tion of containment penetrations requires that the 
lower dry well of the containment is flooded at such 
an early stage of the accident that if the pressure 
vessel melts through, the erupting core melt falls 
into a deep water pool. When the core melt falls 
into the water a so-called steam explosion, which 
causes a strong and quickly propagating pressure 
wave in the water pool, may occur. A lot of research 
has been done on steam explosions. The results 
show that the core melt discharged through the 
pressure vessel cools down as it travels through 
the water pool and cannot create a steam explo-
sion. However, the structures of the lower equip-
ment hatch have been enforced to decrease the 
risk for loss of containment integrity due to loads 
caused by limited steam explosions.
Research results have demonstrated that in 
unfavourable conditions iodine may form organic 
compounds that are not easily absorbed in the 
containment or in the filter. Such conditions may 
occur at the Olkiluoto plant, if the water inside the 
containment is acidified due to chemicals released 
during the accident. Organic iodine may also be 
generated in the primary circuit, if iodine reacts 
with the hydrocarbons that are released, when 
the boron carbide contained in the control rods be-
comes oxidised during the core damage. To improve 
the possibilities for retaining organic iodine in the 
filtered venting system, chemicals have been added 
to the water in the scrubber tank of the system. 
To minimise the formation of organic iodine, it is 
also possible to control the pH of the containment 
water volume by a specific system. The function 
of the system is based on addition of NaOH to the 
fire fighting water reservoir which is used for fill-
ing of the containment in post-accident conditions. 
The lower drywell will be flooded from the wetwell 
prior to the NaOH supply and the lower drywell 
water pool pH will be kept above 7.
Protection against fires at the Olkiluoto NPP
The possibility of fires and the risks of nuclear 
power plant accidents arising from fires have been 
taken into account in the functional and layout 
design of the existing Olkiluoto plant. Fire safety 
has been improved in different areas of the fire 
protection at the existing Olkiluoto plant after 
commissioning. Although the loss of external elec-
trical supply has been taken into account in the 
plant design, both units were provided with e.g. 
second start-up transformer, based on the experi-
ence gained from the fire of the electric supply unit 
in 1991, to improve the independency of plant’s 
external grid connections. Furthermore, the main 
transformers, in-house transformers and start-up 
transformers are protected with a sprinkler ex-
tinguishing system, which reduces essentially the 
risks arising from transformer fires. The use of 
halon is forbidden in Finland since the year 1999 
with the exception of some special items. Due to 
this the halon extinguishing systems at the exist-
ing Olkiluoto plant were replaced with other extin-
guishing systems by the year 2000. Fire risks have 
been assessed in a probabilistic risk assessment 
that concentrates on fire issues. Based on this the 
fire protection of cables, that are crucial to safety, 
have been improved by renewing fire detectors and 
improving fire extinguishing systems in cable tun-
nels. On the basis of the probabilistic risk assess-
ment these improvements reduce the risks arising 
from fires considerably.
Modernisation and power uprating 
of Olkiluoto NPP in 1994–1998
The main goals of the modernisation project at 
the Olkiluoto NPP were the reviewing of safety 
features and enhancing safety, when feasible, im-
proving the production related performance, iden-
108
STUK-B 205 OlkiluOtO NPP uNits 1 aNd 2 uNder OPeratiON ANNEX 3
tifying factors limiting the plant lifetime and elimi-
nating them, when feasible, and enhancing the 
expertise of the own staff and improving productiv-
ity. In order to achieve the safety goal, the existing 
plant design was reviewed and compared by the 
TVO to the present and foreseeable safety re-
quirements. Compliance with the European Utility 
Requirements (EUR) was also reviewed. The feasi-
bility of fulfilling new requirements set for the new 
nuclear power plants was considered case by case. 
The living PRA model of the plant was utilised in 
this context.
The most important safety related modifica-
tions included in the modernisation programme 
are listed below:
•	 Reactor pressure relief system was diversified 
by installing two additional relief valves.
•	 ATWS behaviour was improved by modifying 
some trip signals and making boron injection 
automatic and more effective.
•	 Additional severe accident mitigation measures 
were implemented.
•	 Earthquake resistance of the plant was checked 
and related modifications were made.
•	 Partial scram function was strengthened.
•	 Generator breaker was replaced with a new 
one, which is able to break also short circuit 
current.
•	 Protection against frazil ice at the seawater in-
take was improved.
•	 Protection against snowstorms at the air intake 
of the emergency diesels was improved.
Modification of the safety features in connection 
with the modernisation programme as a whole re-
duced the severe core damage frequency estimate 
by a factor of three.
The radiation exposure of the population was 
reduced in accordance with the ALARA principle. 
Liquid releases were reduced by a factor of ten 
by improving the liquid waste handling systems. 
Also occupational doses were reduced. In practice, 
this meant minimising the cobalt content in the 
primary circuit. Renewal of steam dryers reduced 
the occupational doses remarkably, because the 
moisture of the steam was reduced.
The development of the BWR technology, mar-
gins revealed by operational experience, and plant 
modifications due to other reasons made also pow-
er uprating possible. Thermal power was uprated 
from 2160 MW to 2500 MW (15.7%). The most im-
portant changes were made in fuel technology. The 
operation was changed from with 8×8 bundles to 
10×10 bundles. The new bundles have 40 percent 
lower average linear heat rating than the old ones. 
Some additional design changes implemented due 
to the uprating were the increasing of inertia of the 
main circulation pumps electrically, steam separa-
tors replacement, high-pressure turbine and feed 
water system modifications, decay heat removal 
system capacity increasement, and generator and 
main transformers replacements. The low pressure 
turbines were also replaced and in that way about 
30 MW additional production capacity in each unit 
was achieved.
The modernisation programme of the Olkiluoto 
plant units 1 and 2 was started in 1994 and com-
pleted in 1998. The installations were performed 
during the refuelling outages of the years 1996–
1998. Some later installations were realised during 
outages in 1999. In spite of large modifications the 
refuelling outage times were reasonable, between 
15 and 20 days. The test programme was quite the 
same as in the case of a new plant.
Test operations were conducted in stages at 
different power levels under STUK’s supervision 
and within the frames permitted by STUK. Before 
uprating the reactor power to a higher power level 
STUK conducted a safety review concerning the 
test operation for the power level in question and 
asked the Nuclear Safety Advisory Committee for 
a statement concerning the review before granting 
the test operating licence.
Test operation programmes that included the 
entire plant units and were drawn up by TVO, were 
based on the original commissioning programmes 
that were run through during the start-up phase 
and that were modified taking into account the test 
requirements caused by the modernised systems. 
For the long-term test operation of the plant units 
the thermal power of both reactor units was up-
rated step by step from the nominal power of 2160 
MW to 2500 MW.
The most significant plant transient tests of the 
test operation were the load rejection test, turbine 
trip test and the by-pass test of the high-pressure 
preheaters. STUK considered it necessary to con-
tinue the test operation at the 2500 MW power 
level for about two months before issuing a state-
ment in favour of continuing the operation of the 
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plant units at the 2500 MW power level.
Licensing steps related to the modernisation 
programme included an uprated Safety Analysis 
Report (PSAR, for example) and an uprated 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (level 1 PSA), 
which were reviewed and approved by STUK. 
Design modifications and test runs were accepted 
by STUK before implementation. The Final Safety 
Analysis Report (FSAR) and the related Topical 
Reports were rewritten. It meant also that al-
most all transient and accident analyses were 
redone taking into account the uprated power 
level and modified plant design. The FSAR and 
Topical Reports were submitted to STUK at the 
end of 1996. An operating licence renewal applica-
tion, covering design modifications and the power 
uprating, was submitted to the Government at the 
end of 1996. The licence was granted in 1998. The 
power uprating was reviewed also according to the 
Environmental Impact Legislation.
Modernisation and power uprating project con-
tained several safety, ageing and efficiency reme-
dies. Influences of modifications have been positive 
in most cases. A negative finding has been a slight 
increase of steam moisture. To improve this the 
steam dryers in both units were replaced in out-
ages 2005–2007. Another slightly negative finding 
was increase of condensate clean up temperature, 
which decreased the life cycle of clean up resins. 
To avoid this problem the location of condensate 
clean up system was changed in the process. In this 
context the first LP-preheaters were replaced and 
modernised as well.
The modernisation of turbine plant was contin-
ued with replacement of steam reheater moisture 
separators (MSR). They were replaced with mod-
ern two stage MSR’s. This replacement required 
modernisation of HP-turbine as well. These re-
placements were performed in annual outages 
2005 and 2006. In the same outages the I&C sys-
tem of the turbine plant process was be replaced 
with a modern digital one.
Turbine plant process automation 
system renewal (2004–2006)
A new computerised turbine plant automation sys-
tem was installed in the Olkiluoto unit 2 in 2005 
annual maintenance outage (equivalent modifica-
tion was performed at Olkiluoto unit 1 in 2006). 
One reason to switch from analogue to programma-
ble technology was the obsolescence the old system. 
In addition, the modifications made in the turbine 
plant process in 2005, and in 2006, required some 
additional modifications to the automation system. 
The new system improves information manage-
ment and control of the turbine plant as well as fa-
cilitates component maintenance. Another system 
renewal objective has been to increase reliability 
and reduce by adding redundancy susceptibility to 
malfunctions.
The new automation system has been imple-
mented by programmable technology. This allows 
an increased number of process status measure-
ments and versatile information handling possibil-
ities. As regards turbine automation, it facilitates 
for turbine operators improved information man-
agement, process control at operating work sta-
tions, trend monitoring and setting of safety limits. 
Safety limit settings enable turbine operator reac-
tion to even minor process changes. The control 
desk for the turbine side in the control room was 
replaced with a safety function control desk and a 
turbine systems control and monitoring board with 
operator’s work stations. The control room was also 
fitted with a screen display. In addition, the pro-
cess computer system capacity had to be upgraded 
in connection with the control system renewal to 
handle the large volume of data yielded by the 
turbine automation. The automation interface was 
introduced at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 training 
simulator in September 2004, which made possible 
the training of operating personnel in its use.
Examples of latest plant modifications 
at the Olkiluoto NPP (2013–2015)
Upgrade of the plant radiation 
measurement systems
In a radiation measurement equipment upgrade 
project, practically all stationary radiation meas-
urement equipment were replaced at the Olkiluoto 
units 1 and 2. The first new devices were installed 
and operational in 2008. Apart from the existing 
measurements, some completely new measure-
ments were installed in the project. The purpose 
of the test operation was to compare the measure-
ment results of the new devices with the measure-
ment results of the old devices. The aim has been 
to place the new devices in more representative 
places according to operating experience gained. 
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Another aim has been to find alarm limit set val-
ues that would be optimal in terms of radiation 
safety and plant process monitoring.
The latest upgrades were improvements of re-
lease and activity measuring in case of an accident 
in the vent stack and room radiation measuring 
systems. During the 2013 annual outage, two 
upgraded and one new measuring channel were 
commissioned in Olkiluoto 2. All of the new moni-
tors used for measuring during an accident were 
commissioned by the end of 2013.
During the 2014 annual outages, the radio-
nuclide specific activity measuring instruments 
used in fuel leak detection were replaced at both 
units. The new measuring instruments are easier 
to maintain than the old ones: the cooling system 
used for radionuclide analytics can be modernised 
so that it is electrically cooled. The project was fi-
nalized during year 2015 when the radiation meas-
uring instruments used to monitor releases during 
normal operation of the plant was upgraded.
Low-voltage switchgear replacement project
TVO has implemented a project for replacing the 
switchgears of the low-voltage distribution systems 
(the SIMO project) at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2. 
The primary reason for replacing the switchgears 
was the increase in maintenance costs due to the 
ageing of original equipment, as well as the need 
to modernise the switchgear to correspond to the 
current requirements regarding plant and person-
nel safety. The replacement mainly concerns the 
switchgears and associated transformers of elec-
trical systems important to safety. TVO replaced 
the medium-voltage switchgear (6.6 kV) in 2005 
and 2006. The voltages in the low-voltage networks 
of the units vary from 24 V DC to 660 V AC. The 
switchgears are used to supply the required elec-
trical power to the I&C systems and components of 
the units. TVO has continued the work during last 
years. The project was finalized in 2016 by replac-
ing the last remaining switchgear train during the 
annual outage of Olkiluoto 1.
Construction of an emergency control room
Pursuant to a STUK Regulation Y/1/2016 (previ-
ously Government Decree 733/2008), a nuclear 
power plant shall have a supplementary control 
room independent of the main control room, and 
the necessary local control systems for shutting 
down and cooling the nuclear reactor, and for re-
moving residual heat from the nuclear reactor and 
spent fuel stored at the plant in a situation where 
operations in the main control room are not pos-
sible.
TVO has constructed emergency control rooms 
for the Olkiluoto units currently in operation in 
compliance with the requirements set out in the 
latest periodic safety review of the Olkiluoto NPP 
in 2009. The emergency control rooms have been 
commissioned at Olkiluoto unit 2 in 2015 and at 
unit 1 in 2016. The emergency control rooms have 
been redesigned and relocated to provide better 
coordination and control for plant shutdown and 
safety function monitoring. Plant units can now be 
brought to stable state solely by the controls from 
the emergency control room. Cooling the reactor 
down to a cold state can be carried out after the 
shutdown by using emergency control room and 
some local control posts.
Enlargement of the spent 
fuel interim storage
TVO completed the enlargement of the spent fuel 
interim storage (the so-called KPA storage) in sum-
mer 2015. In the project three additional pools 
were built, and the storage structures has also 
been modified to comply with the current safety 
requirements (e.g. taking into account the require-
ment to protect the facility against large civil air-
craft crashes). The extension increases the capac-
ity to comply with the spent fuel coming from the 
Olkiluoto plant units 1, 2 and 3. TVO submitted 
the documentation regarding extension of the stor-
age to STUK for approval at the end of 2009.
Extension of the interim storage has been in-
cluded in Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2 operating 
licence and has been treated as plant modification. 
In 2014, system modifications pertaining to the 
extension were completed and some systems were 
commissioned. Two STUK’s commissioning inspec-
tions regarding the entire facility were carried out 
and STUK gave approval to take the extension in 
operation in summer 2015.
After the stress tests some safety improvements 
for the Olkiluoto NPP spent fuel interim storage 
were identified. The possibility to feed cooling wa-
ter from external source and to monitor spent fuel 
pool water level and temperature in all cases were 
the most important safety features to be imple-
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mented. These safety features were included and 
implemented in the spent fuel storage extension 
project. The connection for feeding the cooling wa-
ter from external source was already included in 
the design before the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident.
Examples of latest incidents at the 
Olkiluoto NPP (2013–2015)
Replacing carbon grounding brushes of 
the generator during power operation
After the annual outages of Olkiluoto NPP in May 
and June of 2014, it was observed that the main 
generator carbon grounding brushes were being 
worn through faster than normal. The worn out 
components of Olkiluoto 2 were replaced in the 
summer during an extra outage so that occupa-
tional safety and radiation protection issues could 
be taken into account.
The plan was to inspect the grounding brushes 
of Olkiluoto 1 on 30 September 2014 when the 
unit was in power operation. It had been observed 
in connection with an inspection that the car-
bon brushes could be simultaneously replaced. 
However, the shift supervisor of the unit (Olkiluoto 
1) was not informed of the replacement of the car-
bon brushes and there was no work permit for the 
replacement of the brushes. The task took place in 
a room that has been classified in the Operational 
Limits and Conditions (OLCs), based on the radia-
tion level, as a room where work may not be per-
formed without a radiation work permit but there 
was no such permit for the task.
The event did not influence the unit’s nuclear 
security or nuclear safety but it was still classified 
as a Level 1 event on the International Nuclear 
Event Scale (INES) due to the fact that the OLCs 
were not followed and the event indicated defects 
in the safety culture (basic rating INES 0, safety 
culture issues as an additional factor).
Open penetrations in containment 
during work on recirculation pumps
Annual outages at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 
have included maintenance and replacement work 
on penetrations. Repair and replacements projects 
of penetrations have been carried out in a sys-
tematic manner since 2011. When work has been 
carried out on penetrations located in the contain-
ment, the effect of open penetrations has not been 
taken into account as concerns potential bottom 
leaks in the reactor pressure vessel during the an-
nual outage. A bottom leak in the reactor pressure 
vessel through the penetration of the shaft of a 
recirculation pump is a highly improbable event.
TVO took actions to prevent the recurrence of 
this type of event. Before work is started on recir-
culation pumps, TVO will make sure that the pen-
etrations of the pump level are leak-tight and there 
is no possibility of a water leak from penetrations 
and pipe nozzles to the outside of the containment. 
The event was rated as INES Level 1 (basic rating 
INES 1, no additional factors).
Periodic safety reviews at the Olkiluoto NPP
During the years 1996–1998 the overall safety re-
view of the Olkiluoto plant was carried out by the 
licensee and independently by STUK in connection 
to the renewal of operating licences of nuclear pow-
er plant units. The safety documentation, includ-
ing safety assessments done by the licensee, was 
submitted to STUK at the end of 1996. In addi-
tion to the review of the licensing documents such 
as Final Safety Analysis Report, STUK also made 
an independent safety assessment. The statement 
of STUK was given to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry in June 1998. As regards radiation and 
nuclear safety, the main conclusions in the state-
ment were that the conditions of the Finnish nu-
clear energy legislation are complied with.
The latest overall safety review of the Olkiluoto 
plant took place in 2007–2009 in connection of 
the periodic safety review. The operating licence 
for Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2, required that a 
comprehensive periodic safety review (PSR) shall 
be carried out by the end of 2008. The operating 
licence also covers the interim storage facilities 
for spent fuel and medium and low activity opera-
tional waste, so these facilities were also included 
in the PSR. Regulatory Guide YVL 1.1 (currently 
YVL A.1) specifies the contents of the PSR. For 
a separate periodic safety review, STUK shall be 
provided with similar safety-related reports as in 
applying for the operating licence.
TVO began preparations for the periodic safety 
review a few years after the existing operating 
licence was granted. The PSR documentation was 
submitted to STUK for approval in the end of 2008. 
STUK made a decision concerning the PSR in 
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October 2009. In the STUK’s decision the licensee’s 
PSR was approved as a comprehensive periodic 
safety review according to the licence condition. 
The decision included also STUK’s safety assess-
ment which provided a summary of the reviews, 
inspections and continuous oversight carried out 
by STUK.
The issues addressed in the assessment and 
the related evaluation criteria are set forth in the 
nuclear energy and radiation safety legislation and 
in the regulations issued thereunder. Based on the 
assessment, STUK considered that the Olkiluoto 
Nuclear Power Plant units 1 and 2 meet the set 
safety requirements for operational nuclear power 
plants, the emergency preparedness arrangements 
are sufficient and the necessary control to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been 
appropriately arranged. The physical protection 
of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was not yet 
completely in compliance with the requirements 
of Government Decree 734/2008, which came into 
force in December 2008. Further requirements 
concerning this issue based also on the principle of 
continuous improvement were included in the deci-
sion relating to the periodic safety review.
The safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
was assessed in compliance with the Government 
Decree on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 
(733/2008), which came into force in 2008. The 
decree notes that existing nuclear power plants 
need not meet all the requirements set out for new 
plants. Most of the design bases pertaining to the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units were 
set in the 1970s. Substantial modernisations have 
been carried out at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units since their commissioning to 
improve safety. This is in line with the principle 
of continuous improvement of safety provided in 
section 7 a of the Nuclear Energy Act. The safety 
of the plant will be further improved during the 
current operating licence period. Based on the 
periodic safety review, TVO submitted to STUK 
action plans for the observed points requiring im-
provement. STUK included also some additional 
requirements in the decision relating to the peri-
odic safety review. Systematic assessment and de-
velopment of the diversity principle was required, 
including investigation of possibilities for residual 
heat removal to be independent of seawater. TVO 
submitted a report regarding the adequacy of the 
diversification at the plants and an action plan for 
developing the plants at the end of 2010. STUK 
approved the report in 2012. Another requirement 
considered plant modifications to improve safety in 
situations involving spurious opening of the tur-
bine bypass valves. TVO has submitted required 
report and STUK has approved TVO's disquisition 
and action plans to improve the situation.
As a summary of the review of the issues and 
documentation pertaining to the periodic safety 
review and the continuous oversight results, STUK 
noted that the safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plant units 1 and 2 is sufficient and the licensee 
utilises the necessary arrangements to continue 
the safe operation of the plants.
The next periodic safety review will be carried 
out during 2016–2018 when the Olkiluoto NPP ap-
plies for a renewal of operating licence.
Planned and ongoing activities to 
improve safety at the Olkiluoto NPP
In Finland, the continuous safety assessment 
and enhancement approach is presented in the 
nuclear legislation. Actions for safety enhancement 
are to be taken whenever they can be regarded 
as justified, considering operating experience, the 
results of safety research and the advancement 
of science and technology. The implementation of 
safety improvements has been a continuing pro-
cess at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant units 1 
and 2 since their commissioning and there exists 
no urgent need to upgrade the safety of these plant 
units in the context of the Convention.
There are several ongoing and planned safety 
upgrading measures at the Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plant. For example renewal of the diesel genera-
tors and reactor coolant pumps and their frequen-
cy converters. Furthermore, systems for ensuring 
cooling of the reactor core in case of total loss of AC 
supplies as well as diversification of reactor water 
level measurements are under design.
Safety assessments and improvements 
based on the lessons learnt from 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident
Natural hazards
Safety margins were assessed by the licensee and 
reviewed by STUK. Based on the results, STUK re-
quired further clarifications on the following main 
STUK-B 205
113
ANNEX 3 OlkiluOtO NPP uNits 1 aNd 2 uNder OPeratiON
points:
•	 seismic resistance of spent fuel pools including 
situations with water temperature exceeding 
the design bases; and
•	 seismic resistance of fire fighting systems.
The licensee of the Olkiluoto NPP was also re-
quested to carry out a more detailed assessment on 
the effects of exceptionally high seawater level on 
the cooling systems of the spent fuel interim stor-
age and their electric power supply. Cooling system 
pumps are situated at the +0.5 m level. The spent 
fuel interim storage is designed as watertight up 
to the seawater level +1.2 m. At higher seawater 
levels some seepage of water through the soil to 
the drainage system is anticipated. According to 
the licensee, the seepage would be stable and slow 
and the water could be removed with submersible 
pumps. Fast flooding of the interim storage would 
be possible through the doors if the seawater level 
exceeds +3.5 m and through the seam between the 
seawater pumping station and seawater pipe cul-
vert at the level +2.5 m. The licensee has submit-
ted plans for tightening the aforementioned seam 
and submitted by the end of 2012 plans for further 
improving the protection of the interim storage 
against flooding, including increase of the capacity 
of the submersible pumps.
TVO has carried out seismic walkdowns for the 
fire extinguishing water systems of Olkiluoto. In 
2014, TVO improved seismic resistance of the fire 
water systems by reinforcing pipe supports and the 
supports of electrical cubicles and relay cabinets in 
the relay rooms.
Design issues
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, sea water is the 
primary ultimate heat sink and an alternative heat 
sink exists only partially. Both units can evaporate 
residual heat from the reactor core to atmosphere 
by conducting the steam produced inside the reactor 
pressure vessel to the condensation pool through 
the safety relief valves, by letting the condensa-
tion pool to boil, and by venting the steam from 
the containment to atmosphere through the filtered 
venting system. However, the systems required to 
pump water into the reactor pressure vessel are 
either dependent on the sea water based component 
cooling systems or on the condensation pool water, 
which means that the complete loss of sea water as 
the ultimate heat sink will eventually prevent the 
supply of water to the reactor pressure vessel.
Licensee is planning plant modifications on 
the current residual heat removal chain to de-
crease the dependence on the sea water cooling. 
A modification in the auxiliary feed water system 
is planned to enable cooling of the components by 
demineralised water in addition to sea water based 
cooling chain. By this modification system can 
remain operational for a significant period of time 
even during the loss of the primary ultimate heat 
sink (sea water). The new recirculation line modi-
fication was implemented at Olkiluoto 1 in 2014. 
Abnormal vibration and pressure oscillations have 
been observed during the testing of one subsys-
tem. This did not influence operation of the pump, 
however, and the fault would not have prevented 
the supply of water to the reactor in case of need. 
Studies to eliminate this problem are ongoing. The 
modification will not be implemented at Olkiluoto 
2 until the observations at unit 1 are resolved.
In addition, an independent way of pumping 
water to the reactor pressure vessel is under de-
sign by the licensee in case of loss of AC power. 
The arrangement will consist of high and low 
pressure systems. The low pressure system pumps 
coolant into the core from the fire fighting system. 
The high pressure system will consist of a steam 
driven turbine pump: the steam will be drawn 
from the main steam line and supplied through 
a dedicated line to the pump turbine. The water 
will be supplied to the reactor by the system via 
one auxiliary feedwater line. The exhaust from the 
turbine is routed to the wet-well suppression pool. 
Such a high pressure system is necessary because, 
based on studies conducted by TVO, it is apparent 
that the a low pressure system with supply via 
the fire water system alone would not be enough 
to guarantee integrity of the reactor core in case 
of a total loss of power. The high pressure system 
will offer more time to guarantee adequate pres-
sure decrease for starting the low pressure system. 
STUK approved a conceptual design plan of the 
new system in 2015. More detailed system design 
is currently ongoing and the implementation is 
planned to be made in 2017-2018.
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, the current AC 
power supply systems include connections to 400 
kV and 110 kV power grids, main generator (house 
load operation), four emergency diesel generators 
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per unit, a gas turbine, a dedicated connection to 
a nearby hydropower plant, and the possibility to 
supply electricity from the neighbouring NPP unit. 
The licensee has decided to renew all the eight 
emergency diesel generators. Renewal of the diesel 
generators is descripted in more detail below.
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, the depletion 
times of DC batteries are well above 10 h, in some 
cases tens of hours. It is possible to charge the bat-
teries using the AC power sources. DC batteries 
supplying the severe accident monitoring systems 
can also be recharged by mobile generators for in-
stance, during long-lasting accidents.
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, the licensee has 
evaluated that water injection into the pool and 
boiling of the pool water could be used as an alter-
native means to remove decay heat from the pools 
inside the reactor building. To support monitoring 
of the water level in the reactor building spent fuel 
pools, there is a plan to equip the fuel pools with 
a level measurement system. The implementation 
is planned to be made in 2016. The fixed pipelines 
from the fire water system dry risers to the fuel 
pools at both units has been installed in 2014-2015.
At the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, the licen-
see started the investigation of needs and tar-
gets for mobile power supply in autumn 2011. 
Investigation includes also renewal of the present 
mobile SAM diesel generators. Today there are 
four new mobile aggregates and two old mobile ag-
gregates. Enhancing charging of batteries has also 
been found feasible to improve the availability of 
DC power. The licensee has investigated the possi-
bilities for fixed connection points for recharging of 
all safety important batteries and other important 
consumers (e.g. weather tower) using transport-
able power generators, and the decision to install 
fixed connection points has been made.
Severe accident management
A comprehensive severe accident management 
(SAM) strategy has been developed and imple-
mented at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 during 
1980’s and 1990’s after the accidents in TMI and 
Chernobyl (see above). These strategies are based 
on ensuring the containment integrity which is re-
quired in the existing national regulations. STUK 
has reviewed these strategies and has made in-
spections in all stages of implementation.
As a result of the studies made after the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, no major 
changes at the plants are considered necessary. 
However, the licensee is expected to consider also 
spent fuel pools in the SAM procedures as well as 
any implications on them possibly arising from 
simultaneous multi unit accidents. In addition, 
there are many actions related to the update of the 
emergency plans.
Hydrogen leakages out of the containment dur-
ing severe accidents has been analysed for all 
Olkiluoto NPP units, and the results show that de-
sign leakages do not cause a threat to the contain-
ment integrity. For spent fuel pools, the approach 
in Finland is to “practically eliminate” the possibil-
ity of fuel damage. The possibility of top venting of 
reactor hall has been studied at the Olkiluoto units 
1 and 2 for the steam release in case of spent fuel 
pool boiling. Hydrogen possibly formed in the spent 
fuel pools or leaked from the containment could be 
exhausted through this route as well. Minor plant 
modifications are required, which will be imple-
mented in near future.
Diversification of reactor water 
level measurements
The reactor water level measurement system con-
sists of four parallel subsystems, two of which are 
sufficient for implementing the protection func-
tion (from high and low level). The subsystems are 
based on differential pressure measurement. TVO 
has studied possibilities to supplement the cur-
rently used low level measurement system with 
another system based on a different measuring 
principle. TVO’s plans to implement the modifica-
tion have been delayed. The current plan is to in-
stall the new devices for test use in annual outages 
of 2017 and 2018.
Renewal of the diesel generators
TVO has initiated a project for replacing all cur-
rent emergency diesel generators and their auxil-
iary systems at the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2. There 
are four emergency diesel generators in use at 
both operating reactor units in Olkiluoto. The re-
placement project is implemented taking also into 
account any increases in the need for power due 
to possible future plant modifications as well as 
the lessons learnt from the TEPCO Fukushima 
Dai-ichi accident in relation to securing the power 
supply. The nuclear safety requirements dictate 
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that a power margin of at least 10% is available in 
all load conditions. Furthermore, both main com-
ponents of the EDGs (the diesel engine and the 
generator) are old models, whose development and 
manufacture has been discontinued, and the avail-
ability of spare parts and the supplier’s technical 
support are declining. STUK approved the concep-
tual design plan on the replacement of the diesel 
generators in early 2013.
The purpose of the emergency diesel generators 
and their associated auxiliary systems is to sup-
ply electrical power to the 660 V emergency power 
system in case of loss of supply from the 6.6 kV 
main bar. Both plants have four subsystems, and 
each subsystem has its own standby diesel gen-
erator. Replacement of the diesel generators will 
also mean that the main switchgear in the 660 V 
emergency power network has to be replaced; this 
has already been done as part of the replacement 
of low-voltage switchgear as a modification project 
separate from the replacement of the EDGs.
 The intention is to implement the EDG re-
placement project during the normal operation of 
the plant units as far as possible. According to the 
plan, the new EDGs will be installed and commis-
sioned during power operation so that one new 
EDG is installed to both plant units during one 
power operation cycle. For this purpose, a ninth 
EDG unit has to be constructed to replace any one 
of the current EDGs of the Olkiluoto units 1 or 2. 
In the future, the ninth EDG can be connected to 
replace an EDG undergoing periodic maintenance 
at the Olkiluoto units 1 or 2, or it can replace a 
failed EDG. A new building will be constructed for 
the ninth EDG, while the replacement EDGs will 
be installed at the same premises where the cur-
rent units are located.
The renewal plan includes several safety im-
provements. First of all, the new EDGs would be 
equipped with two diverse component cooling sys-
tems. The primary EDG cooling would be provided 
by the sea water based cooling system, similar to 
present EDGs units. An alternative, automatically 
activated air based cooling system would be added 
to cope with situations involving the loss of avail-
ability of sea water. This would provide extra pro-
tection against external hazards, internal hazards 
such as fires, as well as component failures.
During last years TVO has continued the prepa-
ration of the replacement of the emergency diesel 
generators at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. At pre-
sent, TVO has started construction of the building 
for the ninth emergency diesel generator that will 
be shared by the units. According to the current es-
timated schedule, this emergency diesel generator, 
which will be used during the replacement project 
instead of the diesel generator that is currently be-
ing replaced at the units, will be installed and com-
missioned in the spring 2018. The plan is to have 
the entire diesel generator replacement project 
completed by the spring 2022.
Replacement of reactor coolant pumps 
and their frequency converters
In 2014, STUK approved TVO’s conceptual design 
plans on replacing the reactor coolant pumps and 
the frequency converters needed when controlling 
and supplying power to the pumps. The pumps 
are replaced because of their ageing. In connection 
with the replacement, a flywheel will be added to 
the reactor coolant pump shaft to ensure sufficient 
cooling of the nuclear fuel in case of a trip dur-
ing which the electrical power is unavailable. The 
pump is currently shut down by means of electric 
control. The first new reactor coolant pump has 
been commissioned at Olkiluoto 1 during the 2016 
annual outage. The plan is to replace all of the six 
pumps at Olkiluoto 2 during the 2017 annual out-
age and the remaining five pumps of Olkiluoto 1 
in 2018.
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Licensing steps
Decision-in-Principle procedure was carried out 
during the period November 2000 – May 2002 when 
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) applied a Decision-
in-Principle for the fifth NPP unit in Finland and 
the Government approved it and the Parliament 
confirmed the approval. Construction licence ap-
plication for the Olkiluoto unit 3 was submitted by 
TVO to the Ministry of Trade and Industry (pre-
decessor of the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy) in January 2004. The new unit, Olkiluoto 
3 is a 1600 MWe European Pressurised Water 
Reactor (EPR), the design of which is based on the 
French N4 and German Konvoi type PWR’s. A turn 
key delivery is provided by the Consortium Areva 
NP and Siemens. The technical requirements 
for Olkiluoto unit 3 were specified by using the 
European Utility Requirements (EUR) document 
as a reference. TVO’s specifications complemented 
the EUR mainly in those points where Finnish 
requirements are more stringent. STUK gave its 
statement and safety assessment in January 2005 
based on the review of the licensing documenta-
tion and the Government issued the Construction 
Licence in February 2005.
Construction of the Olkiluoto unit 3 still contin-
ues. In the turbine island, commissioning tests of 
the systems have been completed as far as possible 
without connection to reactor island. The turbine 
island is under preservation. In the nuclear island, 
the finishing of installation is going on and the com-
missioning tests have been started. Next major li-
censing step is the operating licence. TVO submit-
ted operating licence application to the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy in April 2016. 
Operating Licence is needed prior to loading nuclear 
fuel into the reactor core. IAEA has agreed to carry 
out a pre-OSART (Operational Safety Review Team) 
mission to Olkiluoto NPP before core loading.
Challenges
Olkiluoto 3 was supposed to start commercial oper-
ation in 2009. According to present schedule, com-
mercial operation will start in the end of 2018, nine 
years after the original target. At the moment, the 
licensee and the vendor have agreed on the time 
schedule, and detailed time schedules for the re-
maining work have been drafted.
There are certain factors that have affected 
greatly the project progress. Olkiluoto unit 3 is the 
 
Figure 23. Olkiluoto NPP unit 3 in construction phase in autumn 2015. Source: TVO.
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first European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) being 
constructed. Construction of the unit started after 
a long break in nuclear power plant construction in 
Europe, which had resulted in loss of experienced 
and qualified engineering and manufacturing re-
sources. Lack of knowledge on Finnish regulatory 
framework and safety requirements, insufficient 
completion of the design prior to construction, 
some difficulties with advanced manufacturing 
and construction technologies and lacks in safety 
culture in the earlier phase of construction works 
at site have been challenging aspects in the project 
and caused delays. On the other hand parties have 
succeeded to find deviations induced during the 
project and the end products have finally fulfilled 
quality, performance and safety requirements.
During the project, I&C design has lagged be-
hind process system design and for a long time it 
set the timeline of the project. Using of integrated, 
software based I&C platforms sets new require-
ments for designing, safety analyses as well as 
for implementation and testing of the systems. 
Configuration and requirement management and 
verification & validation actions have more es-
sential role during these phases than earlier when 
analog systems were used. The main issues where 
STUK has asked more clarification concern defin-
ing and management of interfaces of different I&C 
systems so that failure of one system can’t disturb 
other systems. STUK has also asked more clarifi-
cation how possible spurious actuations are taken 
into account in the design and corresponding safety 
analyses. STUK has received answers to the afore-
mentioned concerns as well as the related analyses 
and has been able to approve the I&C design. The 
individual I&C systems were tested in testbay in 
Erlangen. As the tests indicated no major deficien-
cies in the design, STUK allowed the shipment of 
the systems to Olkiluoto site. Installation and test-
ing of the I&C on site is currently ongoing.
Regulatory oversight
During the construction, STUK oversees the pro-
ject comprehensively. The licensee’s performance 
is evaluated via Construction Inspection Program. 
The purpose of the program is to verify that the 
performance and organisation of the licensee en-
sure high quality construction and implementa-
tion in accordance with the approved designs while 
complying with the regulations and STUK’s de-
cisions. Under Construction Inspection Program 
STUK has performed around 15 inspections eve-
ry year. Some of the inspections have been unan-
nounced inspections.
In addition to Construction Inspection 
Programme, STUK has strong on-site presence 
by the resident inspectors at the construction site. 
There are four resident inspectors dedicated for 
Olkiluoto unit 3 project. This provides STUK con-
stant flow of information and oversight capabilities 
and gives additional information on licensee’s ac-
tivities. STUK has therefore also very quick ability 
to response with short notice to any immediate 
safety concern or incident. Findings made by resi-
dent inspectors are also important inputs for the 
construction inspection programme inspections.
The construction of a nuclear facility shall not 
begin before the Government has granted the 
Construction Licence. After that, prior to start 
manufacturing, installation or commissioning of 
the system, structure or component, STUK’s ap-
provals for the detailed design or plans are needed. 
STUK also approves manufacturers of nuclear 
pressure equipment for their duties and inspection 
organisations and testing organisations for duties 
pertaining to the control of pressure equipment 
at nuclear facilities. During the Olkiluoto unit 3 
project, STUK has reviewed more than 16500 ap-
plications – about 10500 of them are submitted to 
STUK for approval.
STUK also inspects the compliance of the de-
sign and manufacturing of mechanical components 
and structures. Inspections are performed dur-
ing and after the manufacturing in manufactur-
ers’ premises and at the site after installation 
and during commissioning. In lower safety class-
es these inspections are conducted by Inspection 
Organisations.
Based on the findings made during the techni-
cal inspections, inspections under construction in-
spection programme, document reviews and other 
visits during construction, STUK prepares annu-
ally a comprehensive safety evaluation how safety 
aspects are fulfilled and taken into account during 
the construction. The experience has shown that 
STUK’s practice to oversee the project in all level 
of activities has been effective way to find possible 
weak points and deviations in early phase of the 
project. Translations of annual report can be found 
from the STUK’s website.
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Safety assessments based on 
the lessons learnt from TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident
Following the accident at the TEPCO Fukushima 
Dai-ichi nuclear power plant on the 11th of March 
in 2011, safety assessment of Olkiluoto unit 3 was 
initiated. The topics included the preparedness 
against loss of electric power supply, loss of ulti-
mate heat sink and extreme natural phenomena. 
As being a unit under construction, any immediate 
actions were not necessary, but STUK required the 
licensee to carry out additional assessment and 
present an action plan for safety improvements. 
Assessment was conducted and reported by the 
licensee to STUK on 15 December 2011. STUK 
reviewed the assessment and made decision on 19 
July 2012 on the suggested safety improvements 
and additional analyses.
External conditions in Finland are moderate. 
No destructive earthquakes or tsunami waves have 
been observed. Storms are not comparable to tropi-
cal cyclones and strong tornadoes are quite rare. 
Olkiluoto unit 3 fulfils the current regulatory re-
quirements concerning external events. The design 
basis of Olkiluoto unit 3 for external events has 
been selected conservatively in the design phase. 
The design basis covers earthquakes, internal and 
external flooding, extreme weather and other natu-
ral hazards (like snowstorms, frazil ice formation 
and impurities in the seawater) as well as human 
induced hazards. The design values correspond to 
return periods of up to 100.000 years and much 
longer for events with “cliff edge” type consequenc-
es. As the estimated conditions corresponding to 
such long return periods involve large uncertain-
ties, considerable physical margins to the largest 
values observed in the neighbourhood of the site 
have also been ensured.
The ultimate heat sink of the Olkiluoto unit 3 is 
the sea. In case of the total loss of the availability 
of sea water for cooling, the residual heat from the 
reactor core would be released to the atmosphere 
via the steam generators. The water inventory of 
the emergency feed water tanks is sufficient for 24 
hours. After 24 hours, make-up water will be added 
from the fire water distribution system with diesel 
powered pumps. In addition to the fire water dis-
tribution system, other water sources exist; mobile 
pump with hoses can be used for water transfer 
from the demineralized water tanks to the emer-
gency feedwater tanks. Also the nearby Korvensuo 
reservoir can be used as water source.
During refuelling outage the containment fil-
tered venting could be used to release the steam 
out from the containment in case of loss of sea 
water cooling. Filtered venting system is not an 
original safety feature of EPR concept but it was 
required by STUK in an early phase of the con-
ceptual design of Olkiluoto unit 3 to ensure the 
pressure management of the containment during 
severe accidents.
In the fuel building, the spent fuel pools can 
be cooled by evaporation. Make-up water is added 
from the fire water distribution system. In order 
to ensure water supply to the spent fuel pools in-
dependent of the fixed OL3 systems, mobile pump 
with hoses can also be used to add water to the 
pools. In the fuel building there are pipe fittings 
where the hoses can be connected or water can be 
injected directly to fuel pools with hoses. Water 
source is either demineralized water tanks or 
Korvensuo reservoir.
The current AC power supply systems of the 
Olkiluoto unit 3 include connections to 400 kV 
and 110 kV power grids, main generator (house 
load operation), four emergency diesel generators 
(EDGs), two station black out (SBO) diesel gen-
erators, a gas turbine and the possibility to sup-
ply electricity from the neighbouring NPP units 
via 400 kV switchyard. To ensure long autonomy 
of SBO diesels possibility to move fuel from EDG 
storage tanks to SBO diesels has been added. In 
addition, the licensee further evaluated the robust-
ness of EDG building doors against flooding and 
Figure 24. STUK’s resident inspector performing con-
struction inspection for primary circuit piping.
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the results indicate that there is no threat to loss 
of EDGs due to flooding (doors leak tight up to over 
10 m of water).
For uninterrupted power supplies, there are 
separate and diversified 2 h and 12 h battery 
backed power supply systems. The first set of 
batteries supplies all electrical equipment which 
require uninterruptible power in the nuclear is-
land and the second set of batteries supplies loads 
which are important in case of a severe accident. 
The licensee evaluates that there is no need for 
upgrading the battery capacity.
Severe accidents have been considered in the 
original design of the Olkiluoto unit 3. STUK has 
reviewed the overall SAM strategy and the ap-
proach has been accepted. No changes to this ap-
proach are expected based on current knowledge 
from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.
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construction licence application for 
Hanhikivi NPP unit 1 in planning phase
Environmental Impact Assessment of new 
nuclear power plants and candidate sites
In 2007, initiatives for building additional nucle-
ar power plant units in Finland were announced. 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was car-
ried out according to EIA legislation for the pos-
sible Olkiluoto 4 and Loviisa 3 units in 2007–2009. 
The Competent Authority for EIA procedure for 
NPP’s in Finland is the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy.
A new nuclear power company, Fennovoima Oy, 
was founded in 2007. The company started a pre-
liminary site survey process, mainly on the coast 
of the Gulf of Bothnia (the northern gulf of the 
Baltic Sea) and on the eastern Gulf of Finland (the 
eastern gulf of the Baltic Sea), the northernmost 
candidate site being 20–30 km from the borderline 
of Sweden. Fennovoima prepared an EIA pro-
gramme and subsequently an EIA report for three 
(originally four) alternative new candidate sites in 
2007–2009.
The EIA process did not reveal any major nu-
clear or radiation safety issues as regards the pro-
posed new NPP sites or new units on the existing 
sites. EIA is a legal process to cope comprehensive-
ly with the environmental issues depending on the 
specific site (e.g. sea environment and eutrophica-
tion, special natural species and phenomena, biodi-
versity, Natura natural reserve assessment, fisher-
ies, salmon migration, combined heat and power 
production) and to increase the opportunity for 
citizens and other stakeholders to receive informa-
tion, become involved in the planning and express 
their statements and opinions on the project.
Comments were requested from altogether nine 
countries near the Baltic See by the Finnish 
Environmental Ministry on the basis of so called 
Espoo convention. Several comments from e.g. 
Estonia, Sweden and Germany were given and 
considered by the Finnish authorities. Additionally, 
the Austrian Government as a party of the Espoo 
convention sent their statement on each EIA and 
requested for consultation in Finland. Thus, sub-
sequent meetings were arranged in 2008–2009 at 
the Finnish Ministry of the Environment where 
a Finnish delegation of experts from the utility 
concerned, STUK and the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy gave detailed explanations to the 
questions provided.
Separate applications for the Decision-in-
Principle for new NPP units were submitted to 
the Government in 2008 and 2009 by TVO, Fortum 
and Fennovoima. The relevant site-related factors 
potentially affecting the safety of a the planned 
 
Figure 25. Hanhikivi site in Pyhäjoki selected for Fennovoima new NPP (Hanhikivi 1). Source: Fennovoima.
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new NPP units and the related nuclear facilities 
during their projected lifetime were evaluated for 
the existing Loviisa and Olkiluoto sites and for 
the alternative new sites at Pyhäjoki, Simo and 
Ruotsinpyhtää proposed by Fennovoima. In late 
2009, Fennovoima removed the Ruotsinpyhtää site 
from its application for the Decision-in-Principle. 
The evaluations were reviewed by STUK and other 
expert organisations in their respective fields. In 
addition to the Finnish regulations, IAEA Safety 
Requirements and Safety Guides and WENRA re-
quirements were considered in the review.
Specific issues regarding the new sites are the 
size of precautionary action zone (5–6 km radius 
in Finland), the limitation of maximum population 
within it which may be affected in a severe acci-
dent situation and the possibility to evacuate the 
population. According to the Finnish regulations, 
an early evacuation before an expected release 
shall be possible within a time of four hours from 
the evacuation decision. The population in 2010 in 
the vicinity of the Finnish candidate sites is inter-
nationally compared relatively small (maximum of 
3000 inhabitants up to 6 km from the site at Simo).
According to STUK’s preliminary safety as-
sessments, no site related factors were found at 
any of the sites which would prevent building the 
proposed new NPP units and the related other 
nuclear facilities according to the safety require-
ments. More detailed evaluation of the site related 
factors will be conducted and site characterisation 
is accepted in connection with the Construction 
Licence process.
Fennovoima completed site selection process 
in October 2011 by selecting Hanhikivi site in 
Pyhäjoki. The company stated that the main tech-
nical arguments for site selection were bedrock 
intactness, lower seismicity, shorter cooling water 
tunnels and population density.
Decisions-in-Principle and safety 
assessments of new nuclear power plant units
Three new nuclear power plant units have 
been under consideration in Finland (see more 
details of the licensing process under Articles 7 
and 17). TVO submitted application for a Decision-
in-Principle (DiP) to the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy in 2008, Fennovoima and Fortum 
in 2009. In addition, two DiP applications by 
Posiva Oy have been handled for the expansion of 
the planned capacity of spent fuel repository for 
Olkiluoto 4 and Loviisa 3 units. The applications 
for NPP units were accompanied by documents of a 
total of seven alternative plant designs.
In the Decision-in-Principle (DiP) the Govern-
ment judges whether the proposed use of nuclear 
energy is in line with the overall good of society. 
STUK gave the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy preliminary safety assessments of all 
Decision-in-Principle applications in 2009. STUK’s 
preliminary safety assessments consisted of an as-
sessment of the safety of the plant alternatives and 
the sites as well as of an assessment of the organi-
sations, expertise and the quality management of 
the applicant. The assessments also covered the 
physical protection and emergency preparedness 
arrangements, nuclear fuel and nuclear waste 
management, nuclear liability and non-prolifera-
tion. STUK stated in its preliminary safety assess-
ment whether any factors have arisen indicating 
a lack of sufficient prerequisites for constructing 
a nuclear facility as prescribed in the Nuclear 
Energy Act. Safety assessment was based on the 
Government Decrees issued under the Nuclear 
Energy Act. Furthermore, STUK took a stand on 
the possibility of fulfilling other requirements laid 
down in legislation and YVL Guides as regards 
the issues to be reviewed by STUK. The aim of 
the preliminary safety assessment was to find any 
“show stoppers” in sites, organisations or plant 
design alternatives. Seven different plant design 
alternatives were assessed during the prelimi-
nary safety assessment period: ABWR (Toshiba-
Westinghouse), AES-2006 (Atomstroyexport), 
APWR (Mitsubishi Heavy Industry), APR-1400 
(Korean Hydro and Nuclear Power), ESBWR (GE 
Hitachi), EPR (AREVA) and KERENA (AREVA).
Most of the plant alternatives reviewed in the 
STUK’s preliminary safety assessments did not 
meet Finnish safety requirements as such. The 
nature and the extent of the required modifica-
tions vary between the plant alternatives. Some 
plant alternatives would only require fairly minor 
modifications; some would require more extensive 
structural modifications. The required technical 
solutions were still open for some alternatives.
All DiP applications were handled simultane-
ously and in May 2010 the Government granted 
two Decisions-in-Principle, one to Teollisuuden 
Voima Oyj (TVO) and another to Fennovoima Oy. 
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TVO’s DiP was granted according to the applica-
tion to build Olkiluoto unit 4 (OL4), single reac-
tor with maximum output of 4600 MWth. In the 
Fennovoima’s case Government granted DiP only 
for a single reactor with maximum reactor power of 
4900 MWth, although Fennovoima applied to build 
one or two reactors with maximum reactor power 
of 4300–6800 MWth.
The Government also granted a Decision-in-
Principle for Olkiluoto unit 4 spent fuel disposal, 
applied by the spent fuel management company 
Posiva Oy. For Fennovoima’s spent fuel disposal, 
the Government gave two options. By mid 2016, 
Fennovoima shall present a co-operation agree-
ment of spent fuel disposal with TVO and Fortum 
(the owners of Posiva) or start its own EIA process 
for the spent fuel disposal. Regardless of the op-
tion chosen a separate DiP will later be required 
for disposing of the spent fuel from Fennovoima’s 
planned reactor unit. For this DiP process also the 
corresponding EIA report needs to be updated or 
prepared for a possible new site.
At the same time the Government rejected 
Fortum’s DiP application to construct a new reac-
tor to Loviisa site (Loviisa unit 3), as well as the 
DiP application for expanding the capacity of the 
spent fuel disposal facility to include also the spent 
fuel from the Loviisa unit 3 was rejected.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the grant-
ed DiP’s were sent without delay to the Parliament 
for confirmation. The Parliament may reverse the 
Decision-in-Principle as such or may decide that it 
remains in force as such. After the hearings in the 
all main permanent committees, the Parliament 
ratified both granted NPP applications on the 1st of 
July 2010. Both the Decisions-in-Principle for new 
reactors state that the construction licence shall 
be applied within five years from the Parliaments 
confirmation (by the end of June 2015).
Due the delay of Olkiluoto 3 project utility TVO 
applied a five years extension of time to the grant-
ed Olkiluoto 4 DiP. TVO filed in May 2014 an appli-
cation for complementary DiP to the Government. 
Also utility Fennovoima had to apply a complemen-
tary DiP from the Government, because they chose 
ROSATOM AES-2006 plant design, which was not 
presented for preliminary safety review scope of 
Fennovoima 2010 DiP. Fennovoima sent the appli-
cation for complementary DiP to the Government 
in March 2014. STUK prepared its statements 
promptly after summer 2014. The Government did 
decisions on both applications in September 2014. 
Governments Decision-in-Principle was positive 
for Fennovoima Hanhikivi 1 project and negative 
for extension of the validity time of the DiP applied 
by TVO for Olkiluoto 4. Hence, the Olkiluoto 4 pro-
ject ended in June 2015 since TVO did not submit 
an application for construction licence.
Fennovoima Hanhikivi unit 1 
construction licence phase
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the applicant 
may ask advice or send plans for STUK’s review 
before the applications are filed to the Government. 
With this mandate, the utilities and STUK have 
had meetings to be prepared for the construction li-
cence safety assessment process. STUK has organ-
ised seminars with licence applicants on construc-
tion licence application requirements in relation to 
the plant design processes and shared the lessons 
learned from the Olkiluoto unit 3 construction pro-
ject. Process system and plant engineering (layout) 
design maturity in PSAR phase is dominating fac-
tor for successful construction licence application 
review.
The main challenge for construction licence 
application review was to conclude the renewal 
process of the legislation and the regulatory guides 
– new YVL guides. STUK started internal devel-
opment project for its requirement management 
(RM) to support the review process.
According to the set dead line in DiP, 
Fennovoima filed a construction license applica-
tion (CLA) for Hanhikivi unit 1 NPP on 30 June 
2015 to the Government and submitted according 
to the Nuclear Energy Decree first batch of safety, 
security and safeguards documentation to STUK 
for regulatory review and assessment. It was noted 
that Fennovoima was not able to submit a complete 
licensing documentation to the regulatory review 
and assessment at the same time. Fennovoima 
will complement its documentation during the 
years 2015–2017 according to a licensing plan. The 
Government has asked STUK to give its statement 
and safety assessment during the year 2017, if 
possible. One of the main challenges in batch-wise 
CLA submittals and regulatory review is to have 
rigid configuration management in place and self-
standing document submittals in logical order.
STUK has started the CLA review and also 
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the inspection programme on Fennovoima, Plant 
Vendor ROSATOM, and its main sub-suppliers. 
STUK conducted five management system in-
spections to Fennovoima and one to the General 
Designer JSC Atomproekt, St Petersburg, Russia, 
during the year 2015 and shall conduct about 12 
inspections on Fennovoima and ROSATOM main 
design organisations during the year 2016 to sup-
port its document review and assessment. STUK 
is publishing its inspection findings in periodical 
reports available on STUK’s web pages.
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The transparency and international co-operation 
are one of the corner stones in the Finnish nu-
clear safety policy. Finland has signed the inter-
national conventions and treaties aiming on safe 
and peaceful use of nuclear energy. After the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, Finland 
signed among 130 other countries in the General 
Conference in September 2011 the IAEA Action 
Plan. The twelve main actions included in the 
IAEA Action Plan and the related Finnish meas-
ures are discussed in this Annex. All Fukushima-
related decisions by STUK, the national reports 
and action plans have been published on STUK’s 
website.
Safety assessments in the light of the 
accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPP
Undertake assessment of the safety vulnera-
bilities of nuclear power plants in the light of 
lessons learned to date from the accident
Following the accident at the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant on the 
11th of March in 2011, safety assessments in 
Finland were initiated after STUK received a 
letter from the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (MEE) on 15 March 2011. The Ministry 
asked STUK to carry out a study on how the 
Finnish NPPs have prepared against loss of elec-
tric power supply and extreme natural phenomena 
in order to ensure nuclear safety. STUK asked the 
licensees to carry out assessments and submitted 
the study report to MEE on 16 May 2011. Although 
immediate actions were not considered necessary, 
STUK required the licensees to carry out addi-
tional assessments and present action plans for 
safety improvements. Assessments were conducted 
and reported by the Finnish licensees to STUK on 
15 December 2011. STUK has reviewed the results 
of national assessments, and made licensee specific 
decisions on 19 July 2012 on the suggested safety 
improvements and additional analyses.
Finland also participated in the EU Stress Tests 
and submitted the national report to European 
Commission by the end of 2011. An EU level peer 
review on the report was completed by April 2012. 
The recommendations of the EU peer review have 
been taken into account in the regulatory deci-
sions and were considered in the development of 
national regulations. In addition, Finland partici-
pated in the second Extraordinary Meeting of the 
Convention of Nuclear Safety (CNS) in August 
2012 and prepared a report introducing national 
actions in Finland initiated as a result of the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. STUK has 
prepared a National Action Plan in the framework 
of EU stress tests addressing the measures initi-
ated on a national level and at the nuclear power 
plants as a result of the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-
ichi accident. The National Action Plan takes into 
account the national safety assessments and relat-
ed regulatory decisions as well as the recommenda-
tions from the EU stress tests and Extraordinary 
CNS. All STUK’s related decisions, the national 
report to European Commission, the report to the 
Extraordinary CNS, and the National Action Plan 
have been published on STUK’s website.
Based on the results of assessments conducted 
in Finland to date, it is concluded that no such 
hazards or deficiencies have been found that would 
require immediate actions at the Finnish NPPs. 
Areas where safety can be further enhanced have 
been identified and there are plans on how to 
address these areas. The experiences from the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident are incor-
porated into the legislation and revised Finnish 
Regulatory Guides (YVL Guides).
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IAEA peer reviews
Strengthen IAEA peer reviews in order to 
maximize the benefits to Member States
Finland regularly hosts international peer re-
views and also offers its experts for the review in 
other countries. Finland also supports activities 
to improve peer review services and has already 
participated in the development of IAEA’s peer 
review services (e.g. IRRS (Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service) and the OSART (Operational 
Safety Review Team) missions.
The latest peer reviews in Finland are the follow-
ing:
•	 IAEA OSART safety review at Loviisa NPP in 
March 2007, with a follow-up review in July 
2008
•	 WANO peer review at Loviisa NPP in March 
2010 with a follow-up in April 2012, and in 
March 2015. The WANO review 2015 included 
also the WANO corporate review in January 
2016. The WANO Follow up review will be in 
2017.
•	 WANO peer reviews at Olkiluoto NPP in 2006, 
with a follow-up in August 2009, in 2012 with a 
follow-up in May 2014. The next WANO review 
will be carried out in October 2016.
•	 IAEA’s International Physical Protection Ad-
visory Service (IPPAS) mission in Finland in 
2009, with a follow-up mission in April 2012
•	 A Peer Review of STUK’s waste management 
related activities in 2009 (all EU member states 
were invited and representatives from 11 coun-
tries participated in the peer review)
•	 In 2011 STUK hosted a peer review of the 
emergency preparedness with the OECD NEA 
countries
•	 Finland had IRRT (International Regulatory 
Review Team) mission in 2001 and the follow-
up mission in 2003. IRRS mission was carried 
out to the regulatory body in October 2012 and 
the follow-up mission in 2015.
•	 The Government of Finland has requested the 
IAEA to carry out four OSART missions in Fin-
land between 2017-2022:
•	 Olkiluoto 1&2 OSART mission will be con-
ducted from 27 February till 16 March 2017
•	 Loviisa NPP OSART mission would take 
place in March 2018
•	 Pre-Operational OSART mission for Olki-
luoto 3 before the first fuel loading (accord-
ing to current schedule in April 2018)
•	 Pre-Operational OSART mission for Fen-
novoima (Hanhikivi 1) would take place in 
2022.
Finland continues the hosting and participation in 
the international peer reviews and will report the 
findings of these peer reviews as well as progress 
of the action plans in the national Convention on 
Nuclear Safety (CNS) report.
Emergency preparedness and response
Strengthen emergency preparedness and re-
sponse
The Finnish concept of off-site nuclear emer-
gency response has been developed since 1976, 
when the first public authorities’ off-site emer-
gency plan was prepared. The development has 
been a continuous process since then. The require-
ments for off-site plans and activities in a radia-
tion emergency are provided for in the Decree of 
the Ministry of the Interior issued in 2011. Off-site 
emergency plans are prepared by regional rescue 
authorities. Legislation and plans define clearly 
the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders hav-
ing a role in an emergency. Emergency exercises 
are conducted annually between the licensee and 
STUK. Every third year all authorities are train-
ing together at each site.
As a result of the studies made after the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, no needs 
for major changes were identified in off-site emer-
gency preparedness. However, some improvements 
were identified and implemented those requiring 
improved accessibility to the site in case of extreme 
natural hazards, ensured that sufficient amount 
of radiation protection equipment and radiation 
monitoring capabilities for rescue services and im-
proved the communication arrangements between 
emergency centres of NPPs, STUK, and Rescue 
Service.
The rescue planning is enhanced by the co-op-
eration between the nuclear power plant, regional 
rescue services, regional police departments and 
STUK. Permanent coordination groups have been 
established for both Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs in 
order to ensure coordinated and consistent emer-
126
STUK-B 205 New NPPs aNd coNstructioN liceNce aPPlicatioN for HaNHikivi NPP iN PlaNNiNg PHase ANNEX 5
gency plans, to improve and develop emergency 
planning and arrangements and to share lessons 
from the exercises, regulations and other informa-
tion. Also extensive training is arranged by these 
groups.
A National Nuclear Power Plant Emergency 
Preparedness Forum was also proposed in after the 
Fukushima accident for co-operation and combina-
tion between permanent groups with participation 
from Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Health, the regional rescue 
service authorities, STUK and the NPP licensees. 
However, after the initial proposals, the group’s 
field of responsibility was found to be mostly over-
lapping with other existing co-operation and co-
ordination bodies. Therefore, it has been decided 
that creation of a new group is not the best way to 
address the issue. Instead, the membership and 
responsibilities of existing groups have been ad-
justed. For example, Ministry of the Interior is now 
also member in both of the regional groups.
In addition, a transportable, insulated and 
heated container for personnel protective equip-
ment and radiation measuring instrument has 
been purchased in 2015 to quickly provide a cer-
tain amount of equipment in such a case when the 
normal storages in the NPP are unavailable e.g. 
due to the external hazards or fallout. The con-
tainer can be transported by a truck and it can be 
connected to the electricity grid or to the movable 
power engine. The use of the container has been 
trained together with the NPP staff, police, rescue 
services and STUK.
Further improvement of arrangements for the 
coordination of information to the public and me-
dia during emergencies is needed to ensure that 
the messages issued by different authorities are 
consistent. Guidelines for co-operation among au-
thorities have been written in a guidebook pub-
lished in November 2012 and updated in 2015.
Nordic countries have published two joint docu-
ments that detail the cooperation arrangements. 
Nordic Manual (updated 2015) describes practi-
cal arrangements regarding communication and 
information exchange to fulfil the stated obliga-
tions in bilateral agreements between the Nordic 
countries. The arrangements in this document 
include all phases of events, including intermedi-
ate and recovery phases. The second document, 
Nordic Flag Book (published 2014), describes joint 
guidelines, including operational intervention lev-
els, for protective measures concerning population 
and functions of the society in case of nuclear or 
radiological emergencies. These guidelines agreed 
by radiation and nuclear safety authorities in 
Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway and Sweden 
form a unique document as it includes practical 
criteria for early protective measures as well as re-
covery actions after contamination. Nordic Manual 
and Nordic Flag Book ensure that the response to 
any nuclear or radiological emergency in Nordic 
countries is consistent between the countries.
Finland participates actively in the interna-
tional co-operation also in the field of emergency 
preparedness, such as IAEA, OECD/NEA and EU/
EC (WENRA and HERCA). These working groups 
discuss i.a. mutual assistance and communication, 
co-operation and co-ordination of actions during 
nuclear of radiological emergencies. STUK has also 
hosted in 2009 a peer review organised by OECD/
NEA on guides concerning protective measures in 
early and intermediate phases of a nuclear or ra-
diological emergency.
National regulatory bodies
Strengthen the effectiveness of national regu-
latory bodies
According to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, 
the overall authority in the field of nuclear energy 
is the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. 
It prepares for example licensing decisions for the 
Government. According to the Radiation Act, the 
overall authority in the field of the use of radia-
tion and other radiation practices is the Ministry 
of Social affairs and Health. According to Section 6 
of the Radiation Act and Section 55 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act, STUK is responsible for the regulatory 
control of the safety of the use of radiation and 
nuclear energy. The rights and responsibilities of 
STUK are provided in the Radiation and Nuclear 
Energy Acts.
The regulatory control of the safe use of radia-
tion and nuclear energy is independently carried 
out by STUK. No Ministry can take for its decision-
making a matter that has been defined by law to 
be on the responsibility of STUK. STUK has no 
responsibilities or duties which would be in conflict 
with regulatory control.
STUK carried out a self-assessment concern-
ing i.a. the effectiveness of the regulatory body for 
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the latest IRRS mission conducted in Finland in 
October 2012. STUK identified many topics to be 
further improved during the self-assessment and 
some additional recommendations and suggestions 
were also given during the mission. The IRRS mis-
sion team found that STUK is a competent and 
highly credible regulator and is open and transpar-
ent. It also concluded that STUK is very active in 
promoting experience sharing both nationally and 
internationally. Areas for further improvement to 
enhance overall performance of the regulatory sys-
tem, included for example the following:
•	 although STUK operates in practice as an in-
dependent regulatory body, the Government 
should strengthen the legislative framework by 
establishing the regulator as a body separate in 
law from other arms of government
•	 the Government should seek to modify the 
Nuclear Energy Act so that the law clearly 
and unambiguously stipulates STUK’s legal au-
thorities in the authorization process for safety. 
In particular, the changes should ensure that 
STUK has the legal authority to both specify 
any licence conditions necessary for safety and 
specify all regulations necessary for safety
•	 Finnish legislative framework should be further 
developed to cover authorization for the decom-
missioning of nuclear facilities and the final 
closure of nuclear waste repositories
•	 STUK can further enhance the effectiveness of 
its inspection activities by enhancing the focus 
of inspection on the most safety-significant ar-
eas and developing a formal qualification pro-
gramme for inspectors.
Based on the recommendations and suggestions an 
Action Plan has been prepared by STUK.
The IRRS follow-up mission was conducted in 
2015. The purpose of the IRRS follow-up was to 
review the measures undertaken following the 
recommendations and suggestions of the 2012 
IRRS mission. The scope of the follow-up mission 
was same as in 2012 i.e. nuclear facilities (except 
the research reactor FiR-1), radiation sources and 
transport. As the result of the follow-up mission 
the review team concluded that the recommenda-
tions and suggestions from the 2012 IRRS mis-
sions have been taken into account systemati-
cally by a comprehensive action plan. Significant 
progress has been made in most areas and many 
improvements have been implemented in accord-
ance with the action plan. The IRRS team deter-
mined that 7 out of 8 recommendations and 19 of 
21 suggestions made by the 2012 IRRS mission 
had been effectively addressed and therefore could 
be considered closed. Two new recommendations 
were raised to amend the legislation to clarify that 
decommissioning of an installation and closure of a 
disposal facility require a licence amendment; and 
to address the arrangements for research in radia-
tion safety. STUK has updated its action plan and 
taken actions to complete it.
Operating organizations
Strengthen the effectiveness of operating or-
ganizations with respect to nuclear safety
The responsibility for the safety rests with the 
licensee as prescribed in the Finnish Radiation and 
Nuclear Energy Acts. Accordingly, it is the licen-
see’s obligation to assure safe use of radiation and 
nuclear energy. Furthermore, it shall be the licen-
see’s obligation to assure such physical protection 
and emergency planning and other arrangements, 
necessary to ensure limitation of nuclear damage, 
which do not rest with the authorities.
It is the responsibility of the regulatory body 
to verify that the licensees fulfill the regulations. 
This verification is carried out through continuous 
oversight, safety review and assessment as well 
as inspection programmes established by STUK. 
In its activities, STUK emphasises the licensee’s 
commitment to the strong safety culture. The ob-
vious elements of licensee’s actions to meet these 
responsibilities are strict adherence of regulations, 
prompt, timely and open actions towards the regu-
lator in unusual situations, active role in develop-
ing the safety based on improvements of technol-
ogy and science as well as effective exploitation of 
experience feedback.
Several peer reviews have been carried out at 
the both Finnish NPPs during the last ten years 
(see above the section concerning IAEA peer re-
views). The licensees have annually sent several 
peers to foreign peer reviews.
According to the Finnish regulatory guides, the 
licensees shall carry out a periodic safety review 
(PSR) at least every ten years. The Finnish PSR 
process and scope are in line with the IAEA guid-
ance (SSG-25). PSR is seen as a very important 
tool for promoting the continuous safety improve-
128
STUK-B 205 ImplementatIon of the Iaea actIon plan on nuclear Safety ANNEX 6
ment approach. The last periodic safety reviews 
were finalised in Loviisa in 2016 and in Olkiluoto 
in 2009. STUK regularly updates the regulatory 
requirements based on the operational experience 
feedback, research and technical development. 
The procedure to apply new or revised regulatory 
guides to existing nuclear facilities is such that 
after having heard those concerned, STUK makes 
a separate decision on how a new or revised YVL 
Guide applies to operating nuclear power plants, or 
to those under construction.
IAEA safety standards
Review and strengthen IAEA Safety Standards 
and improve their implementation
The most important references considered in 
rulemaking at STUK are the IAEA safety stand-
ards, especially the Requirements-documents, and 
WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulators’ 
Association) Safety Reference Levels and Safety 
Objectives for new reactors. Finnish policy is to 
participate actively in the international work on 
developing safety standards and adopt or adapt 
the new safety requirements into national regula-
tions. The newly developed regulations are high-
ly in line with the most recent development of 
the IAEA safety requirements. Lessons learned 
from the Forsmark event in 2006 and the TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident in 2011 are incorpo-
rated into the STUK Regulations and the new set 
of YVL Guides published in 2013. STUK will up-
date its Regulations and YVL Guides in 2017 tak-
ing into account e.g. updated IAEA Requirements 
documents.
International legal framework
Improve the effectiveness of the international 
legal framework
Finland signed on 20 September 1994 the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety which was adopt-
ed on 17 June 1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference. The Convention was ratified on 5 
January 1996, and it came into force in Finland on 
24 October 1996. Finland has implemented the ob-
ligations of the Convention and also the objectives 
of the Convention are complied with. Finland has 
regularly reported and participated in the review 
meetings. Finland observes the principles of the 
Convention, when applicable, also in other uses 
of nuclear energy than nuclear power plants, e.g. 
in the use of a research reactor. Finland has par-
ticipated in the working group on effectiveness and 
transparency of the Convention on Nuclear Safety 
and is supporting the initiatives to improve the 
CNS process.
The financial provisions to cover the possible 
damages to third parties caused by a nuclear ac-
cident have been arranged in Finland according to 
the Paris and Brussels Conventions. Related to the 
revision of the Paris and Brussels Conventions in 
2004, Finland has decided to enact unlimited licen-
see’s liability by law (the Finnish Nuclear Liability 
Act). This means, that insurance coverage will be 
required for a minimum amount of EUR 700 mil-
lion and the liability of Finnish operators shall be 
unlimited in cases where nuclear damage has oc-
curred in Finland and the third tier of the Brussels 
Supplementary Convention (providing cover up 
to EUR 1500 million) has been exhausted. The 
revised law will also have some other modifica-
tions, such as extending the claiming period up to 
30 years for victims of nuclear accidents. The law 
amendment (2005) has not taken effect yet. It will 
enter into force at a later date as determined by 
government decree. The entering into force of the 
amending act will take place as the 2004 Protocols 
amending the Paris and Brussels Conventions will 
enter into force.
As the ratification of the 2004 Protocols has 
been delayed, Finland made a temporary amend-
ment in the Finnish Nuclear Liability Act in 2012, 
implementing the provision on unlimited liability 
and requirement of insurance coverage for a mini-
mum amount of EUR 700 million. The temporary 
law came into force in January 2012 and will be 
repealed when the 2005 law amendment takes ef-
fect. In Finland, the finishing off the international 
ratification process of the convention amendments 
without any undue delay is considered to be ex-
tremely important.
Finland is a Member State of the European 
Union. In 2011 some amendments were done in 
the Nuclear Energy Act due to the Nuclear Safety 
Directive (Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom). In 
2013, the Nuclear Energy Act and the Radiation 
Act were under an amendment process to imple-
ment the Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 
2011 establishing a Community framework for the 
responsible and safe management of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste.
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The updated international requirements are 
reviewed and assessed by STUK to clarify the 
need for further modifications of STUK’s regula-
tions (STUK Regulations and YVL Guides). In this 
connection also the new requirements of Council 
Directive (2014/87/Euratom) amending Nuclear 
Safety Directive (2009/71/Euratom) and BSS direc-
tive (Basic Safety Standards Directive, 2013/59/ 
Euratom) are reviewed and assessed their impact 
on the Finnish nuclear energy regulations; the 
laws and STUK’s regulations.
Member states planning to embark 
on a nuclear power programme
Facilitate the development of the infrastruc-
ture necessary for Member States embarking 
on a nuclear power programme
Providing support to embarking countries is 
considered important in Finland. Finland is a 
member of the IAEA Regulatory Co-operation 
Forum and has participated on the Integrated 
Nuclear Infrastructure Reviews (INIR) missions 
organized by the IAEA. In addition, Finland par-
ticipates in EU/EC INIS activities by providing 
experts and training to embarking countries as 
well as tutoring to experts from embarking coun-
tries. Finland has also organised and continues to 
organise training courses on the experience on reg-
ulatory oversight on new construction and project 
management, regulatory framework in Finland, 
and experts from embarking countries have par-
ticipated. Experts from Finland have also lectured 
in individual IAEA training courses focused on 
embarking countries.
Capacity building
Strengthen and maintain capacity building
The competence of the licensees as well as the 
vendor and main subcontractors is one of the key 
review areas in the licensing processes for the use 
of radiation and nuclear energy and during the 
lifetime of the facilities. The requirements on the 
resources needed to be available for the licensee 
during normal operation as well as during emer-
gencies are given in the regulatory guides.
The management of STUK highlights the need 
for competent workforce. STUK has adopted a com-
petence management system and nuclear safety 
and regulatory competencies are also emphasised 
in STUK’s strategy. Implementation of the strategy 
is reflected into the annual training programmes, 
on the job training and new re-cruitments.
The national nuclear safety and waste manage-
ment research programmes have an important role 
in the competence building of all essential organi-
sations involved in nuclear energy. These research 
programmes have two roles: for the first ensuring 
the availability of experts and for the second ensur-
ing the on-line transfer of the research results to the 
organisations participating to the steering of the pro-
grammes and fostering the expertise. STUK has an 
important role in the steering of these programmes.
There is a basic professional training course on 
nuclear safety organised together with the Finnish 
organisations in the field. The first course com-
menced in September 2003 and the 14th 6-week 
basic professional training course will commence 
in autumn 2016. At the moment, about 800 new-
comers and junior experts, of whom about 80 have 
been from STUK, have participated in these cours-
es. The content and structure of the course has 
been enhanced according to the feedback received 
from the participants.
Due to planned expansion of the use of nuclear 
energy in Finland, a comprehensive study has been 
conducted in Finland to explore the need of ex-
perts and education of experts in Finland to meet 
the needs from the organizations in the field. The 
study was completed in March 2012. The update of 
the competence review is planned to be carried on 
in 2017 to reflect the current changes in the oper-
ating environment.
Protection of people and the 
environment from ionizing radiation
Ensure the on-going protection of people and 
the environment from ionizing radiation fol-
lowing a nuclear emergency
During nuclear or radiological incidents and 
emergencies STUK is responsible for safety assess-
ment of radiation situation and recommendations 
and advice for protective measures as defined in 
the Rescue Act. STUK provides recommendations 
of protective measures to authorities on local, 
provincial and governmental level. Furthermore, 
STUK provides advice to private sector for trade 
and commerce.
STUK has prepared so called VAL Guides, 
which contain the intervention strategy in Finland. 
VAL Guides contain protective measures and in-
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tervention levels in early and intermediate phases 
of a nuclear or radiological emergency, for various 
types of emergencies (such as fallout from nuclear 
detonation, severe accident in a NPP, malicious 
acts, contamination due to radioactive substances 
etc.). VAL Guides contain reference levels of expo-
sure during the first year and factors, other than 
radiation, affecting choice of protective measures 
and protective measures to be considered during 
nuclear or radio-logical emergencies and transi-
tion to recovery. VAL Guides contain criteria when 
protective measures are needed and when those 
can be lifted or modified. Criteria are given for 
each countermeasure as a projected dose and as an 
operational intervention level. They also include 
triggers such as plant condition, or emergency ac-
tion levels such as duration of a protective meas-
ure. VAL Guides include principles for reducing 
exposure of various parts of society (e.g. actions 
concerning population, exercising own profession 
in a contaminated area, decontamination, handling 
of waste containing radioactive substances etc.). 
VAL Guides are to be put into force by the Ministry 
of the Interior.
In Finland, there is an automatic external 
dose rate monitoring network consisting of about 
250 stations throughout the country. Results are 
available in real time (every 10th minute). In ad-
dition, a network has 22 stations with spectrom-
eters situated around the Finnish NPPs and in 
Helsinki. Nuclear power plants have trained moni-
toring teams capable of making dose rate and air 
concentration measurements. STUK has trained 
monitoring teams for dose rate monitoring, mobile 
spectrometers and a laboratory vehicle which has 
state of the art monitoring equipment for gamma 
(HPGe), alpha and air sampler. Results can be ob-
tained in 30 second interval.
There is also a network of environment and 
foodstuffs laboratories which have the capability 
to measure gamma radioactivity levels in the food 
and environmental samples. STUK coordinates 
operation and provides technical support if needed. 
In addition, STUK has delivered regional hospitals 
monitoring equipment for monitoring iodine in 
thyroid. This measuring capability is meant for 
screening the public for contamination of iodine.
In addition to actual emergency rescue plan-
ning, roles and responsibilities of authorities for 
longer-term actions following a nuclear accident 
have been defined. Longer-term actions include 
e.g. decontamination of environment, management 
of waste containing radioactive substances, radia-
tion monitoring and surveys, health control of the 
population, measures concerning agricultural and 
other production and measures to ensure uncon-
taminated food and feeding stuffs.
Communication and information 
dissemination
Enhance transparency and effectiveness of 
communication and improve dissemination of 
information
The Decree on the Finnish Centre for Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety (618/1997) defines STUK’s 
tasks. One of the tasks is to inform about radia-
tion and nuclear safety matters and participate on 
training activities in the area. STUK utilises many 
means to communicate with the public and inter-
ested stakeholders, such as meetings, seminars, 
and training courses. All these are tailored and 
targeted to different stakeholders and stakeholder 
groups.
STUK pays special attention to using internet 
to inform public and interested stakeholders about 
nuclear and radiation safety in general, risks re-
lated to radiation and use of nuclear energy, safety 
requirements, roles and responsibilities of STUK, 
STUK’s organization, current activities and oper-
ating experience, significant regulatory decisions 
taken, events and publications and safety research. 
STUK web pages can be found (www.stuk.fi) in 
Finnish, Swedish and in English. STUK has also 
made itself available in social media (Facebook and 
twitter).
What comes to radiation emergencies and haz-
ards, according to the Rescue Act and the Decree of 
the Ministry of the Interior concerning informing 
public during nuclear or radiological emergencies, 
the authority in charge is responsible for informing 
public on protective measures and other activities 
to be carried out. Authorities at governmental, pro-
vincial, and municipal level provide information on 
their own activities and give instructions regard-
ing their own sphere of responsibility. In case of 
a nuclear power plant accident there are many 
organisations providing information. Thus special 
attention needs to be paid to coordination of timing 
and contents of information.
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Further improvement of arrangements for the 
coordination of information to the public and me-
dia during emergencies is needed to ensure that 
the messages issued by different authorities are 
consistent. Guidelines for co-operation among au-
thorities have been written in a guidebook pub-
lished by the Ministry of Interior in November 
2012, which contains the detailed information of 
the arrangements in the Finnish society in the 
case of a nuclear or radiological emergency. Even 
more general principles and guidance of coordina-
tion or public communication during emergencies 
are given in the guidance by prime ministers office.
In an accident situation the principal informa-
tion route of warnings to the public is FM radio, 
TV and internet. The first outdoor warning to the 
public close the NPP is given by general warning 
signal via sirens or loudspeakers. By arrange-
ment with broadcasting companies, urgent RDS-
notifications can be transmitted promptly over the 
FM-radio and TV. There is a specific law for warn-
ing messages via radio and TV.
Finland has bilateral agreements with Sweden, 
Norway, Russia, Ukraine, Denmark and Germany 
on early notification of nuclear or radiological 
emergencies and exchange of information on nu-
clear facilities. In addition, STUK has bilateral 
arrangements with several foreign regulatory bod-
ies, which cover generally the exchange of informa-
tion on safety regulations, operational experiences, 
waste management etc. Such an arrangement have 
been made with NRC (USA), ASN (France), FANR 
(United Arab Emirates), NSSC and KINS (Republic 
of Korea), TAEK (Turkey), ENSI (Switzerland), 
SUJB (Czech Republic), Rostechnadzor (Russian 
Federation), CNSC (Canada), AERB (India), ONR 
(Great Britain), HAEA (Hungary), NNR (South 
Africa), NRA (Japan) and SSM (Sweden).
Research and development
Effectively utilize research and development
The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2003 
to ensure funding for a long term nuclear safe-
ty and nuclear waste management research in 
Finland. Money is collected annually from the 
licence holders to a special fund. Regarding nu-
clear safety research the amount of money is 
proportional to the actual thermal power of the 
licensed power plants or the thermal power pre-
sented in the Decision-in-Principle. For the nuclear 
waste research, the annual funding payments are 
proportional to the current fund holdings for the 
future waste management activities. In 2016 the 
Nuclear Energy Act was amended and the tempo-
rary increase of the money collected to the nuclear 
safety research fund was introduced. The purpose 
of temporary increase of the research funding is to 
renew the ageing infrastructure for the nuclear en-
ergy related research. The increased funding is col-
lected in between the years 2016 and 2015. At the 
first stage the additional funding is allocated for 
the new hot cell at VTT Center of Nuclear Safety 
(CNS) and at the second stage for the thermohy-
draulic laboratory at Lappeenranta University of 
Technology. The estimated investment for the VTT 
CNS hot cell laboratory is about 18 million euros.
The research projects are selected so that they 
support and develop the competences in nuclear 
safety and to create preparedness for the regula-
tor to be able to respond on emerging and urgent 
safety issues. These national safety research pro-
grammes are called SAFIR and KYT. The structure 
for SAFIR2018 was renewed to enhance multi-
disciplinary co-operation within the research pro-
gramme. Research areas are 1) Plant Safety and 
Systems Engineering, 2) Reactor Safety and 3) 
Structural Safety and Material. The key topics 
of the recent nuclear safety research programme 
(SAFIR2018) are automation, organisation and 
human factors, severe accidents and risk analy-
sis, fuel and reactor physics, thermal hydraulics, 
structural integrity and development of research 
infrastructure. The amount of money collected 
from the licensees in year 2016 was about 9 million 
€ for nuclear safety research. 4 million € is used to 
research projects and the rest is for the enhance-
ment of the infrastructure. The decision by TVO 
to terminate the Olkiluoto unit 4 project in 2015 
decreased the funding by 24 % for the SAFIR2018 
research projects. The research projects have also 
additional funding from other sources. The total 
volume of the programme in 2016 was 6.4 mil-
lion €. The results of the research programme are 
public. More information on the planning, steering 
and the research reports of the SAFIR and KYT 
programmes are available on the public websites 
(http://safir2018.vtt.fi/ and http://kyt2014.vtt.fi/).
In 2011, research needs originating from the 
TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident were stud-
ied, and an appendix addressing the topics for 
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further research (e.g. spent fuel pool accidents) was 
added to the research programme. The SAFIR2014 
research programme already included research 
projects on extreme weather phenomena, extreme 
seawater level variations and seismic issues. As 
a result of the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi acci-
dent, a reassessment was made how the accident 
should be taken into account, and the research 
projects were somewhat redirected. The research 
programme was supplemented with research top-
ics related to natural hazards and multiple failure 
events, the adequacy and scope of nuclear power 
plant design basis, mitigating the impact of ac-
cidents (e.g. high concentration of boron in the 
reactor circuit, hydrogen formation and transport, 
range of fission products released in core melt), and 
the overall life cycle of nuclear fuel including spent 
fuel pools. Some additional resources have also 
been allocated to the research of external events. 
The topics related to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-
ichi accident continue in the ongoing SAFIR2018 
research programme. As an example of the newly 
started issues is the resilience of the accident 
management and systemic approach to the safety 
culture.
The objective of KYT2018 (Finnish Research 
Programme on Nuclear Waste Management) is 
to ensure the sufficient and comprehensive avail-
ability of the nuclear technological expertise and 
other capabilities required by the authorities when 
comparing different nuclear waste management 
ways and implementation methods. Likewise the 
previous programme also KYT2018 is divided into 
three main categories:
•	 new and alternative technologies in nuclear 
waste management
•	 safety research in nuclear waste management 
and
•	 social science studies related to nuclear waste 
management.
The main emphasis in the research programme 
will continue to be devoted to safety related re-
search. The funding of the research programme 
is provided mainly by the State Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund (VYR) into which those respon-
sible for nuclear waste management pay annually 
0.08 % of their respective assessed liability. The 
current level of annual funding is 1.8 million €.
In Finland, the Technical Research Centre of 
Finland Ltd (VTT) is the largest research organisa-
tion in the field of nuclear energy. At VTT, about 
200 experts are working in the field of nuclear 
energy, half of them full-time. The total volume 
of the nuclear energy research in the year 2012 
was about 75 million € (estimate of the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy). This figure 
includes research related to use of nuclear en-
ergy made in all the stakeholder organisations. 
Two thirds of the research is focused on the dis-
posal of spent fuel, mostly funded by the company 
Posiva Oy. The largest individual organizations 
are VTT, GTK (Geological Survey of Finland), 
LUT (Lappeenranta University of Technology) and 
Aalto University (former Helsinki University of 
Technology, HUT).
Finland also participates in international re-
search activities, such as OECD/NEA/CSNI work-
ing groups, consortium which builds the Jules 
Horowitz research reactor (JHR) in France, 
Scandinavian NKS research programme, EU pro-
grammes, and bilateral co-operation with several 
countries. The Finnish technical support organi-
sations are active parties of TSO organisations 
co-operation such as ETSON in Europe and IAEA 
TSO Forum.
